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Abstract 
Despite the unproven effectiveness of many practices under the umbrella term 
‘complementary alternative medicine’ (CAM) there is considerable public demand 
for, but only limited provision of, CAM within the English National Health Service 
(NHS). This thesis examines whether government support for patient treatment 
choice creates a bigger space for CAM within the NHS.  It argues that policy-makers 
use choice both as policy initiative and as rhetorical device where the reference to 
choice ranges from liberal choice to consumer choice.  At the same time treatment 
choice and personalised healthcare are politically justified by relying on the 
traditional NHS values of equity and universality and on the notion of patient 
responsibilisation.  The different meanings claimed for choice in the political 
domain are mirrored by the perceptions of patient choice in tort law and in public 
law (including its European Union dimension).  However, the legal analysis shows 
that English domestic law will not generally uphold the NHS patient’s claim to a 
specific treatment. 
The thesis suggests that private and public law litigation by patients to enforce their 
demands against a doctor or health authority not only functions as a dispute 
resolution mechanism but also exerts unsettling effects on healthcare institutions and 
practices.  Although these effects are unlikely to be intended by the litigants they in 
turn support policy-makers’ use of choice as a lever for change and reform.  The 
thesis concludes that the government patient choice policy ought to be viewed as a 
strategy to destabilise and to encourage change within the NHS and its entrenched 
institutions and may have the unintended consequence of the emergence of a greater 
role for CAM. This finding coincides with the theme in government healthcare 
policy of patient responsibilisation also promoted by CAM’s emphasis on self-care 
and self-management. 
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Introduction 
Demand for complementary alternative medicine in England 
Complementary alternative medicine (CAM) in the UK bridges private and publicly 
funded healthcare settings. The extent of the use of CAM is not routinely measured, 
and any figures available are based on data from surveys which are generally out of 
date.
1
 There are some indications of the extent of access to CAM services. 
According to a survey of the UK in 2001, 10% of adults saw a complementary 
therapist in any twelve-month period, with more than half using at least one of five 
specific therapies.
2
 An earlier survey, conducted in England in 1998, found that, if 
remedies purchased over the counter are included, the proportion of adults having 
used CAM in the past twelve months is estimated to be almost 12%, rising to almost 
50% for lifetime use.
3
 Extrapolated data from a BBC survey on consumer spending 
on CAM in the UK led to an estimate of £1.5 billion in 1999,
4
 probably including 
over-the-counter sales.  
Complementary alternative therapy provision in the NHS 
It has been estimated that just 10% of the overall contacts with CAM practitioners in 
England are publicly funded through the National Health Service (NHS).
5
 From a 
survey conducted in 2001 it was estimated that almost half the general practices in 
England were providing some access to CAM therapies, although the treatment was 
                                                 
1
 S Boyle, ‘United Kingdom (England): Health System Review’ (2011) Health System in Transition 1, 
341; House of Lords, Science and Technology Committee Sixth Report, Complementary and 
Alternative Medicine (HMSO 2000) 1.14–1.21. 
2
 KJ Thomas and P Coleman, ‘Use of Complementary or Alternative Medicine in a General Population 
in Great Britain. Results from the National Omnibus’ (2004) 26 Journal of Public Health 152, 153 
referring to acupuncture, homeopathy, chiropractic, osteopathy or herbal medicine. 
3
 KJ Thomas and others, ‘Use and Expenditure on Complementary Medicine in England: A Population 
Based Survey’ (2001) Complementary Therapies in Medicine 2, 2. 
4
 E Ernst and A White, 'The BBC Survey of Complementary Medicine Use in the UK' [2000] 
Complementary Therapies in Medicine 32, 33.  
5
 KJ Thomas and others, ‘Use and Expenditure on Complementary Medicine in England: A Population 
Based Survey’ (2001) Complementary Therapies in Medicine 2, 6. 
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not necessarily funded by the NHS.
6
 According to the Smallwood Report in 2004, 
over 40% of Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) offered some form of CAM, with London 
PCTs providing the most access to these.
7
 Access to CAM as part of primary care is 
also possible with specialist CAM centres contracted with the NHS.
8
 Access to 
CAM is also provided in NHS hospitals by NHS-employed healthcare professionals 
as part of an integrated approach to cancer care and also part of end of life care,
9
 and 
in the three homeopathic hospitals in England including the Royal London Hospital 
for Integrated Medicine.
10
 
Patient treatment choice in the NHS: a contradiction? 
Despite the patchy data available it is apparent that, despite the cost-disincentives, 
there is considerable public demand for CAM but only very limited provision within 
the NHS. Public demand for CAM may be due, amongst other things, to the 
discontent with biomedicine because of the side-effects of drugs and their lack of 
effectiveness in many chronic conditions, the belief that CAM is less invasive and 
more natural, the greater involvement by the patient in the treatment, and the 
different relationship between CAM practitioner and client.
11
 At the same time, the 
widespread use of CAM, and CAM itself, are being challenged by its opponents 
within and outside the biomedical profession who stress the unproven effectiveness 
                                                 
6
 KJ Thomas and others, ‘Trends in Access to Complementary or Alternative Medicines via Primary 
Care in England: 1995–2001 Results from a Follow-up National Survey’ (2003) 20 Family Practice 
575, 575. 
7
 C Smallwood, ‘The Role of Complementary and Alternative Medicine in the NHS: An Investigation 
into the Potential Contribution of Mainstream Complementary Therapies to Healthcare in the UK’, 
FreshMinds, London 2005) 126  
<www.getwelluk.com/uploadedFiles/Publications/SmallwoodReport.pdf> accessed 15 November 
2010. 
8
 S Boyle, ‘United Kingdom (England): Health System Review’ (2011) Health System in Transition 1, 
339 giving as an example the Centre for Integrated Medicine in Winchester, but treatment funded 
by the NHS is only available if the patient’s general practitioner is willing to submit a funding 
application to her PCT and the PCT is willing to agree to the request. 
9
 S Boyle, ‘United Kingdom (England): Health System Review’ (2011) Health System in Transition 1, 
340. 
10
 C Zollman and A Vickers, ‘ABC of Complementary Medicine: Complementary Medicine in 
Conventional Practice’ (1999) 319 BMJ 901, 901. 
11
 S Cant and U Sharma, A New Medical Pluralism (UCL Press 1999) 46–47. 
11 
 
and the potential dangers of these treatments.
12
 However, the restricted provision 
within the NHS, which is unlikely to have increased in the past few years since the 
surveys were carried out,
13
 seems to contradict the patient choice and patient 
treatment choice policies of the current coalition and the previous New Labour 
governments.  
The concept of patient choice 
The policy of patient choice of treatment by policy-makers seems to suggest that 
patients are given a right to a specific treatment of their choosing and that this right 
might extend to include CAM. This is also a conclusion that can be drawn from the 
response by the current coalition government to the recommendations regarding the 
use of homeopathy in the NHS by the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee.
14
 Patient choice appeared to trump the lack of evidence base of 
homeopathy, with decisions on treatment to be made at the micro- and meso-levels 
between doctor, PCT and patient. 
The dictionary definition of choice as ‘an act of choosing between two or more 
possibilities’15 is not of much assistance in attempting to define the policy of patient 
(treatment) choice at the macro-level or at the micro- and meso-levels of the 
healthcare system. Choice carries different meanings in different contexts. Thus, 
patient choice can be linked with the concept of the right or freedom to choose as a 
liberal value also circumscribed by the concept of autonomy. Choice can also be 
linked with the idea of the consumer in the market exchanging money for the desired 
                                                 
12
 I Evans and others, Testing Treatments (2nd edn, Pinter & Martin 2011); S Singh and E Ernst, Trick 
or Treatment: Alternative Medicine on Trial (Bantam Press 2008); R Shapiro, Suckers: How 
Alternative Medicine Makes Fools of Us All (Vintage 2009); see also D Colquhoun, ‘The Quack’ page 
at <www.ucl.ac.uk/pharmacology/dc-bits/quack-01-06-07.html> accessed 10 October 2010.  
13
 In part due to the recommendations of the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee that the use of homeopathy should be withdrawn from the NHS, see House of 
Commons, Report of the Science and Technology Committee, Evidence Check 2: Homeopathy (HMSO 
2010); and in part due to the low-priority treatments policies of primary care trusts classifying CAM 
as treatments of low priority. 
14
 Department of Health, Government Response to the Science and Technology Committee Report, 
‘Evidence Check 2: Homeopathy’ (HMSO 2010). 
15
 At http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/choice accessed 1 September 2012. 
12 
 
goods or services, relevant in the context of healthcare mimicking market principles, 
in private healthcare and in the context of treatment across borders in the European 
Union. Lastly, patient choice at the macro-level may be understood as referring to 
liberal choice or to consumer choice, but in this context it may also be used by 
policy-makers as a policy mechanism with specific political objectives.
16
 The 
argument about patient treatment choice of CAM overlaps these different 
interpretations of choice employed at the various levels of healthcare decision-
making covered in the chapters. 
The concept of destabilisation 
Destabilisation is a theme linking patient choice as a policy mechanism, discussed in 
chapter 1, with the possible effects of patient choice litigation in tort law, covered in 
chapters 2 and 3, and in public law, covered in chapters 4 and 5. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary definition, destabilisation denotes ‘[to] upset the stability 
of; cause unrest in’17 a system. The notion of destabilisation is borrowed from Sabel 
and Simon’s concept of ‘destabilisation rights’ in public law as ‘claims to unsettle 
and open up public institutions that have chronically failed to meet their obligations 
and that are substantially insulated from the normal processes of political 
accountability’.18 Rather than referring to destabilisation rights, destabilisation is 
described as the possible ramifications of threatened or actual litigation by patients 
who have been refused their (treatment) choice on the status quo of the healthcare 
system, effects which go beyond the immediate parties to the (intended) action in 
tort law and in public law. In the context of the healthcare system at the macro-level, 
destabilisation is expressed as the intended effect of patient choice policies 
                                                 
16
 J Clarke and others, ‘The Antagonisms of Choice: New Labour and the Reform of Public Services’ 
(2008) Social Policy and Society 245, 251. 
17
 <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/destabilize> accessed 1 September 2012. 
18
 C Sabel and W Simon, ‘Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds’ (2003) 117 Harv 
L Rev 1016, 1020. 
13 
 
encouraging reform of the institutional architecture of the NHS, of the incumbent 
institutions.
19
 
The definition of complementary alternative medicine 
Complementary alternative medicine, or CAM, is a term describing a vast number of 
treatment modalities. The diversity of these therapies makes them difficult to 
categorise as a group, yet they are often collectively referred to as ‘complementary’, 
‘alternative’, ‘integrative’, ‘unorthodox’, ‘unconventional’, ‘unproven’, ‘natural’, 
‘traditional’ and ‘holistic’ medicine, and are contrasted with ‘conventional’, 
‘mainstream’, ‘allopathic’, ‘orthodox’, ‘conventional’ and ‘scientific’ medicine.20  
The definition of CAM by the House of Lords Committee on Science and 
Technology as a ‘diverse group of health-related therapies and disciplines which are 
not considered to be a part of mainstream medical care’21 has been adopted in this 
thesis. While this definition at once delineates CAM from orthodox medicine, it does 
not exclude practice of CAM by the medical profession, nor does it exclude referral 
of patients by orthodox medical practitioners to CAM practitioners. I have also 
adopted the Committee’s classification of the different CAM therapies into the 
following three groups
22
: 
 Group 1 includes the principal disciplines, which also claim to have an 
individual diagnostic approach, namely osteopathy and chiropractic, 
acupuncture, herbal medicine and homeopathy.  
 Group 2 contains therapies which are mainly complementary to 
conventional medicine and do not purport to embrace diagnostic skills. 
                                                 
19
 J Clarke and others, ‘The Antagonisms of Choice: New Labour and the Reform of Public Services’ 
(2008) Social Policy and Society 245, 250; S Greer and S Rauscher, ‘Destabilization Rights and 
Restabilization Politics Policy and Political Reactions to European Union Healthcare Services Law’ 
(2011) Journal of European Public Policy 220, 221. 
20
 V Kotsirilos, ‘Complementary and Alternative Medicine. Part 1– What Does It All Mean?’ (2005) 
Aust Fam Physician 595, 595. 
21
 House of Lords, Science and Technology Committee Sixth Report, Complementary and Alternative 
Medicine (HMSO 2000) 1.8. 
22
 ibid 2.1. 
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They include aromatherapy, the Alexander Technique, body work therapies 
including massage, counselling and hypnotherapy.  
 Group 3 includes therapies claiming to offer diagnostic information as well 
as treatment. These therapies, in general, favour a philosophical approach 
and are indifferent to the scientific principles of conventional medicine. 
They include Ayurvedic medicine and Traditional Chinese medicine, and 
also as crystal therapy, iridology, and kinesiology.  
Since the group 1 treatments are the ones used most widely by the public,
23
 the 
discussion of CAM in the thesis will concentrate on these treatments unless 
otherwise stated. Similarly to all CAM modalities, the treatments in group 1 are 
diverse, with very different theories for their mode of action.
24
 However, the group 1 
treatments also have features in common. They have the greatest claim to 
professional organisation by their practitioners.
25
 Practitioners of osteopathy and 
chiropractic are regulated in their professional activity and education by Acts of 
Parliament.
26
 Professional organisations for medical practitioners who practise 
osteopathy, acupuncture or homeopathy are in existence.
27
 Group 1 is also the group 
of treatments which is most likely to have been made available by the NHS.
28
 
Although all CAM therapies are based on theories about their modes of action that 
are not congruent with current scientific knowledge, osteopathy, chiropractic, 
acupuncture and herbalism have scientifically established efficacy in the treatment 
                                                 
23
 K Thomas and P Coleman, ‘Use of Complementary or Alternative Medicine in a General Population 
in Great Britain. Results from the National Omnibus’ (2004) 26 Journal of Public Health 152, 153. 
24
 E Ernst and others, The Desktop Guide to Complementary and Alternative Medicine: An Evidence-
Based Approach (2nd edn, Mosby 2006) 292–344. 
25
 S Boyle, ‘United Kingdom (England): Health System Review’ (2011) Health System in Transition 1, 
338. 
26
 Osteopaths Act 1993 and Chiropractors Act 1994. 
27
 British Medical Association, Complementary Medicine: New Approaches to Good Practice (OUP 
1993) 41 referring to the Faculty of Homeopathy, the British Osteopathy Association and the British 
Medical Acupuncture Society.
27
 
28
 K Thomas and others, ‘Trends in Access to Complementary or Alternative Medicines via Primary 
Care in England: 1995–2001 Results from a Follow-up National Survey’ (2003) 20 Family Practice 
575, 575-576. 
15 
 
of a limited number of ailments.
29
 Some of the CAM modalities in group 1 have also 
been evaluated by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence when developing 
clinical guidance. 
30
 
Methodology and purpose and aim of research 
The methodology employed in this thesis is socio-legal in its widest sense.  The 
meaning of socio-legal is taken to extend beyond its definition as synonymous with 
sociology of law or critical legal studies, and is not restricted to relating to 
empirically based studies or applied research.
31
  Rather, socio-legal is defined as an 
approach evaluating the impact of law in society and the relationship between law 
and other disciplines. Thus, ‘the “socio” in socio-legal studies means … an interface 
with a context within which law exists, be that a sociological, historical, economic, 
geographical or other context’.32  It therefore encompasses historical and 
contemporary analyses of the social, economic and political factors involved in the 
development of law, as well as analyses of law and its relationship to society and the 
State.
33
 
Most academic writing on the issue of patient choice restricts the discussion on 
either a private law or a public law standpoint with the writing on the European 
Union (EU) dimension generally adding a further, separate perspective.  In private 
law, much of the literature on patient choice tends to be doctrinal focussing on the 
issue of patient autonomy or patient rights under battery, or the issue of information 
                                                 
29
 House of Lords, Science and Technology Committee Sixth Report, Complementary and Alternative 
Medicine (HMSO 2000) 2.6; see generally E Ernst and others, The Desktop Guide to Complementary 
and Alternative Medicine: An Evidence-Based Approach (2nd edn, Mosby 2006). 
30
 eg clinical guidelines on treatment of low back pain 
<http://guidance.nice.org.uk/CG88/Guidance/pdf/English> accessed 30 January 2010; E Ernst, 
‘Assessment of Complementary and Alternative Medicine: the Clinical Guidelines from NICE’ (2010)  
J Clin Pract 1350–56 discussing the evaluation of 65 guidelines on the NICE website in August 2009 . 
31
 M Partington, ‘Implementing the Socio-Legal: Developments in Socio-Legal Scholarship and the 
Curriculum’ in G Wilson (ed), Frontiers of Legal Scholarship (John Wiley & Sons 1995) 93. 
32
 S Wheeler and P Thomas, ‘Socio-Legal Studies’ in D Hayton (ed), Law’s Future(s) (Hart 2000) 271. 
33
 M Partington, ‘Implementing the Socio-Legal: Developments in Socio-Legal Scholarship and the 
Curriculum’ in G Wilson (ed), Frontiers of Legal Scholarship (John Wiley & Sons 1995) 93 referring to 
the definition by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in ESRC, Review of Socio-Legal 
Studies: Final Report (1994) (ESRC 1994). 
16 
 
disclosure under negligence. The discussion largely turns on the fallacy of the 
judicial interpretation of autonomy and on whether tort law is a suitable vehicle to 
enforce patients’ rights.  Choice is debated as an expression of patient preference to 
select amongst options deemed appropriate by the doctor rather than a question of 
rights. Some attention is paid to professional guidance as more receptive to the 
notion of patient rights than the law.  A few writers suggest that this understanding 
of professional guidance may have some impact on future litigation, an argument 
which is followed up and expanded on in this thesis. In public law, the issue of 
patient rights is generally discussed as a question of resource allocation with the 
tension between individualism and universality.  The doctrinal legal analysis, to a 
large extent, concentrates on judicial review applications and the perceived role of 
the court in the assessment of the lawfulness, rather than the merits of the decision of 
the health authorities.  In both private and domestic public law there is little 
discussion of the influences of litigation on healthcare policy and stakeholders. In 
contrast, much of academic writing on patient choice in EU law concerns itself with 
more than doctrinal legal analysis and considers the destabilising effects of the 
decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
34
 on the healthcare systems of EU 
Member States.  These in turn are discussed as producing responses from 
stakeholders in the member States influencing policies at EU level.   
Rather than following the current discussion of patient choice in either private or 
public or EU law, this thesis situates choice in law at the micro-, meso- and macro-
levels of the English NHS and the UK’s membership of the European Union, and 
interacts with the perspective of other disciplines including ethics, history, policy 
and political discourse, and to a minor extent, empirical health science. While such 
an interdisciplinary approach has the benefit of considering English healthcare law 
from different angles, it has the drawback that it is difficult to do the various 
disciplines justice regarding the methodologies and practices common in these 
                                                 
34
 Since the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty, the ECJ is referred to as the ‘Court of Justice’.  As 
the cases discussed in this thesis were already concluded, the term ECJ will be used throughout for 
ease of reading. 
17 
 
disciplines. It further has the drawback that detail in the themes addressed had to be 
compressed or excluded altogether.  
The thesis refrains from adopting a pure black letter law approach, as this would not 
have been effective in analysing the key issues of this research.
35
  The thesis goes 
beyond the analysis and critique of legal principles and broadens the scope of legal 
research, making it possible to explore its broader context to enable the examination 
of government policy arguments.  Rather than focussing on doctrinal legal research, 
it exposes the interconnectedness of law and government policy and their impact on 
each other in the healthcare setting, determined by ethical, social and political 
considerations.  The recourse to historical discourse is intended to aid the 
understanding of the development of policies regarding non-mainstream healthcare 
such as CAM in the NHS.  
A pure doctrinal analysis of patient treatment choice leads to the conclusion that 
patients do not generally have a right to demand a specific treatment.  A different 
approach was therefore necessary to understand what appeared to be a paradox, 
namely government support for treatment choice, and even more so, the support for 
patient choice of CAM.   This required answers to a number of questions regarding 
the interpretation of choice at the level of government such as what choice means at 
the policy level, whether choice is used as a rhetorical device or as a policy 
initiative.  It also was necessary to consider an explanation for treatment choice of 
CAM in the context of the NHS because of the unproven effectiveness of many 
CAM practices.  Government policy papers suggested a link between choice and 
other policy concepts such as personalisation and responsibilisation and their 
justification in terms of the settlement values of the NHS, a link also explored by 
Veitch
36
. The discussion of these concepts, however, leaves the lack of 
enforceability of treatment choice in English law unexplained.   
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ECJ mobility case law suggests that EU citizens have a right to obtain specific 
healthcare across borders without prior authorisation at the cost of their national 
healthcare systems.  The exercise of this right encourages instability in the national 
healthcare systems and healthcare institutions leading to responses from 
governments and other stakeholders not only domestically, but also with bottom-up 
effects on EU institutions and regulations.
37
  Using the analogy of ECJ patient 
mobility litigation, similar effects of domestic private and public law litigation on 
NHS institutions and practices were possible.  Writers on EU law and policy such as 
Greer and Rauscher embraced the logic of destabilisation rights
38
 described by Sabel 
and Simon in the specific context of public law litigation in the United States but 
then expanded to include private law litigation.
39
  Miola amongst others has drawn 
attention to the symbiotic relationship between medical, private law and medical 
ethics in England.
40
  This thesis has adopted and expanded on this argument 
regarding patient treatment choice, analysing the effect of private law litigation on 
professional guidance as leading to a change in medical practice.  In the public law 
area, little debate has been forthcoming in academic literature concerning the effects 
of judicial review of individual funding requests on healthcare institutions and 
practices.  However, Platt and others, for example, discuss the positive effects of 
judicial review on public administration in local government,
41
 which has a possible 
resonance for the decision-making by health authorities.  While not using the 
language of destabilisation, the authors refer to public law litigation acting ‘as a 
lever for change’.42   
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The impact of private and public law ‘choice’ litigation on the NHS and its 
institutions can be contrasted with the choice and its interpretation at the level of 
government.  Choice at the macro-level can be analysed as rhetoric or a policy 
initiative suggesting liberal or consumer choice, but also as a different facet of 
change and destabilisation.  Clarke and others, for example, see government employ 
choice as a policy mechanism destabilising the institutional architecture of the 
NHS.
43
  A similar argument is used by Schelkle and others in their discussion on 
welfare reform in Europe regarding consumer choice as a proactive, government-led 
reform strategy.
44
  The analysis then suggests that at the level of the individual, 
patient choice of CAM becomes part of this government strategy and the possible 
beneficiary of choice-led reform. 
The research methods utilised in this thesis were based on a theoretical, literature-
based approach. Due to the interdisciplinary approach used, the scope of research 
materials consulted is more extensive than would have been required by a focus on a 
pure black letter law framework.  The legal materials include English and EU as 
well as some Canadian and US case law, English statute law and international legal 
material and legal academic commentary.  In addition, materials included also 
embrace policy documents, White Papers, Select Committee documents, Department 
of Health documents, ethical guidance by professional bodies and guidance by 
National Health Service bodies, patient survey reports and academic commentary 
from a variety of disciplines.  There was also some use of internet sources. 
The aim of the thesis is to make a distinctive contribution to the literature by adding 
to the debate on the meaning and effects of patient treatment choice in the context of 
CAM within the English NHS and in English private and public law. Specifically, 
the research addresses the question whether macro-level patient treatment choice of 
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CAM is a paradox not simply because CAM is not part of the dominant biomedical 
paradigm but because at the micro- and meso-levels of the healthcare system 
experience shows that patients’ treatment demands are often unsuccessful being 
subject to implicit and explicit rationing decisions. 
The purpose of the research is to explore whether the possible destabilisation of the 
patient choice policy at the macro-level and of patient choice litigation at the meso- 
and micro-levels in the NHS has the potential of reconfiguring a space for CAM in 
the NHS. To this end, the relationship between a macro-level policy of patient 
choice and the traditional values of the NHS, and the different interpretations of 
patient choice in private and public law and in the patient mobility jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice are examined. The research pulls together three 
themes: firstly, the history and politics of patients’ choice of CAM in the English 
NHS; secondly, the legal and ethical aspects of patient choice in tort law; and 
thirdly, the legal and policy aspects of patient choice in public law as affected by the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
Exclusions  
Much of the literature on CAM deals with the problem of its unproven effectiveness 
and the potential safety concerns,
45
 or the question of the regulation of CAM 
practitioners.
46
 Whilst not ignoring this literature, the thesis considers 
complementary medicine from a different perspective, namely the vantage point of 
patient choice at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels within the English NHS. It is 
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concerned with CAM provision at the primary (rather than secondary or tertiary) 
care level for patients with long-term chronic illness, which is where most CAM is 
used. Although much of the expenditure on CAM is on remedies purchased over the 
counter,
47
 the thesis is not concerned with self-help remedies but rather with CAM 
administered by doctors or CAM practitioners. Lastly, the thesis only includes the 
English NHS rather than the NHS in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This is 
not only because of the different values and policies of the healthcare services in the 
different parts of the UK,
48
 but also because the legal analysis is restricted to English 
law. 
The research for this thesis only covers the period up to 1st March 2013.  Any 
developments or changes in the law or the NHS after that date are not included. 
 
Outline of chapters 
The thesis is set out in five chapters which are linked by the different interpretations 
of patient choice. 
Chapter 1 discusses patient choice within the National Health Service (NHS) in 
England from a historical and political perspective. It reflects on the space for CAM 
in a health service based on a biomedical healthcare paradigm, where there is public 
demand for such treatment. It explores the possible contradictions of a macro-level 
patient treatment choice in a publicly funded health service which is founded on the 
values of comprehensiveness, equity and universality.
49
 Although patient choice has 
been attacked as a proxy for competition and marketisation and because of its 
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inequitable effects
50
 the chapter demonstrates that policy-makers of different 
political persuasions have adopted policies such as personalised healthcare and 
personal health budgets while being able to rely on the competing interpretations of 
the settlement values of the NHS for justification.
51
 It is argued that, rather than 
viewing patient choice exclusively as a strategy for cost containment and 
marketisation these policies may be a mechanism concealing other political 
intentions. Policy-makers may be using patient (treatment) choice as a mechanism to 
destabilise the institutional architecture of the NHS and encourage reform.
52
 The 
chapter concludes that this destabilisation may have the effect of reconfiguring the 
space for CAM in the NHS, helping to lower costs while at the same time 
encouraging self-care and self-management, thus reducing dependency on the NHS. 
Despite these macro-level policy arguments, in practice healthcare decisions are 
made at the micro- and meso-levels where patients’ access to CAM may be 
compromised. 
Chapter 2 links the concept of patient choice with the discussion of choice in its 
liberal or libertarian sense as a right to choose. Policy documents subject the right to 
treatment choice to the condition that treatment should be clinically ‘appropriate’. 
The clinical appropriateness of a treatment is a decision reached at the micro-level, 
between the general practitioner and the patient. With chronic conditions, where 
patients are often experts about their symptoms and their responses to treatment, the 
decision may well be that complementary alternative therapy, amongst the various 
therapeutic options, is one of the appropriate treatments.  
Where there is no conflict between doctor and patient, the patient will receive her 
preferred treatment. However, where there is conflict and medical law becomes 
involved, the question is whether the patient’s right prevails. It becomes a question 
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of how the courts interpret patient autonomy.
53
 Patient autonomy is the concept 
employed by the courts in cases where the patient chooses to refuse or demand a 
specific treatment. In refusal of treatment cases, conceptually based on the tort of 
battery and the lack of consent by the patient to bodily interference, the judicial 
conception of autonomy has tended towards an interpretation in terms of rights, the 
patient’s right to self-determination. This rights discourse might then be taken to 
imply a right to a specific treatment based on the common law
54
 and under Article 8 
ECHR, the infringement of the right to respect for one’s private and family life. 
The judicial conception of autonomy is, however, not consistent, not even in cases of 
lack of consent to treatment. It is demonstrated that the liberal notion of autonomy 
cannot be relied on as a right to a specific treatment. It cannot compel a doctor to act 
against her clinical judgment to provide a treatment that she regards as contrary to 
the patient’s best interests,55 whether such treatment is orthodox or CAM treatment. 
A doctor can legitimately decide that a treatment is not clinically indicated and need 
not be made available. It is argued, however, that litigation by patients, while not 
achieving the desired objective of acknowledging a right to choose, may have effects 
beyond the immediate parties to the action.
56
 It is suggested that tort litigation may 
have a destabilising effect on healthcare practices and regulations. It leads and has 
led to a debate on patients’ rights and a change in the attitude of the medical 
profession as represented by the guidance by the General Medical Council (GMC).
57
 
To that extent at least, it may explain why general practitioners are generally more 
open to the demand for CAM by patients with long-term chronic illnesses. 
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Chapter 3 continues the theme of choice in the context of a patient’s right to 
information about the different treatments available from the doctor. The question 
discussed in this chapter is the right of the patient to be informed about a proposed 
treatment and its alternatives, which may or may not include complementary 
alternative treatments, in order to arrive at an informed choice, an issue that is also 
sometimes referred to as ‘informed consent’.  
It is argued that English law in the area of information disclosure appears to have 
little concern for a patient’s interest in information to arrive at an autonomous 
treatment choice.
58
 On the one hand, the English judiciary has taken a minimalist 
interpretation of the information requirements necessary for real consent, ruling out 
medical trespass as long as the patient has been informed in broad terms about the 
treatment.
59
 On the other hand, using the law of negligence involves a concern with 
the duty by the doctor to inform the patient, rather than the right of the patient to the 
information.
60
 At the same time, the assessment by the courts of the adequacy of the 
information according to some version of the professional standard, together with 
the difficulty of proving causation, means that patients will rarely be successful in a 
claim for non-disclosure in negligence.
61
 Whether in this legal setting a doctor is 
under a duty to divulge information about alternative treatment options such as 
CAM as outside the medical paradigm adds a further layer to the debate. 
Patients have rarely been successful in informed consent claims because of the 
definitional limitations of both torts. It is argued, following Sabel and Simon, that 
the common law operates, however, not only as a system of dispute resolution but 
that informed consent litigation has wider ramifications on healthcare practices 
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generally.
62
 Litigation, even if unsuccessful, may have the effect of destabilising the 
status quo, leading to a change in medical practices – evidenced by the frequent 
revisions to professional guidance on informed consent by the GMC.
63
 The 
requirements in the GMC guidance are much higher than the minimal disclosure 
standards of the law
64
 and may suggest the need to discuss CAM options with 
patients affected by long-term chronic conditions.   
Chapter 4 connects with the discussion of the original settlement values in chapter 
1. It places patient treatment choice in the context of the financial constraints of 
health authorities, at present PCTs and in future Clinical Commissioning Groups 
(CCGs), charged with making resource allocation decisions from their fixed yearly 
budgets.
65
 Restricted finances have meant that some treatments, such as 
complementary alternative therapy, are not routinely available because they have 
been placed on a list of so-called ‘low-priority’ treatments.66 Patients can make an 
individual funding request to their PCTs for such a treatment on the basis of 
exceptional circumstances, if supported by their GP. Where the request is refused, 
the patient may look to the courts for judicial review of the decision. The role of the 
court is to oversee the legitimacy, procedural propriety and reasonableness of the 
decision, rather than assessing the merits of the patient’s claim.67 In reaching its 
decision the court will review and rule on the appropriateness of the exceptionality 
criteria applied by the PCT.  
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In this chapter, I suggest that the exceptionality criteria emerging from case law are 
often ambiguous, leading to uncertainty for patients and health authorities.
68
 To 
avoid the risk of litigation health authorities need to consider and weigh all relevant 
factors in the determination of the patient’s exceptional circumstances, including an 
assessment of the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of the requested low-priority 
treatment. The assessment of the effectiveness of CAM modalities with their lack of 
scientific validation will be an added difficulty.  
I will argue that the ambiguity of the exceptionality criteria emerging from case law 
not only has the potential of increasing the threat of litigation by patients but is also 
likely to have a destabilising impact on health authorities.
69
 Despite the difficulty for 
patients to succeed in judicial review litigation, the threat of litigation may 
encourage PCTs to concede funding requests to avoid costly and time-consuming 
court proceedings and reduce the risk of further claims by patients.
70
 Public law 
litigation has, however, still wider ramifications beyond the parties before the court. 
It may have consequences for the entire health care system. It changes the status 
quo, leading to public engagement, deliberation and negotiation, with effects on 
other institutions and practices.
71
 In view of the personalised healthcare agenda and 
personal healthcare budgets it may lead to a changed space for CAM within the 
NHS. This softening approach towards CAM needs to be seen in the light of 
government policies, such as the ‘responsibilisation’ of the patient and the need for 
containment of healthcare costs, and of the impact of the patient mobility case law of 
the European Court of Justice. 
Chapter 5 discusses the right of patients to receive healthcare in another EU 
Member State, and to be reimbursed by their healthcare system, a right which has 
been established in a series of judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
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despite the fact that the EU has no formal competence to regulate national 
healthcare.
72
 Cross-border healthcare has been interpreted by the ECJ as being an 
economic service,
73
 which also applies to the NHS
74
 with the patient either paying 
for the services in the ‘host’ Member State upfront or with the services being paid 
for by the ‘home’ Member State direct. Prior authorisation in case of hospital 
treatment has to be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria, whereas for non-
hospital care such as CAM, prior authorisation was found to constitute a barrier to 
the freedom to provide services.
75
  
The chapter suggests that, despite the paucity of cases which have been referred to 
the ECJ, litigation by patients claiming treatment rights across borders has had the 
effect of destabilising national healthcare systems, with repercussions far beyond the 
number of patients who exercised these rights.
76
 The legal uncertainty, due to the 
risk of patients obtaining treatment abroad to which they were not entitled in their 
home state, set in motion a restabilisation process which prompted political activity 
by the UK government and the NHS, leading to the drafting and adoption of the EU 
Directive on cross-border healthcare.
77
 The Directive is expected to end legal 
uncertainty about the care patients can receive abroad, while allowing the NHS to 
maintain control over patients’ entitlements.78 The thesis argues, however, that legal 
instability may persist as the Directive appears to perpetuate some of the issues 
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which caused the destabilising effects of ECJ case law on the NHS. One of these 
issues concerns the undefined health benefit basket of the NHS which does not 
exclude altogether treatments such as CAM. There is therefore scope for patients’ 
claims for reimbursement from PCTs for the costs of cross-border CAM to expand, 
indirectly, the availability of CAM from the NHS.   
29 
 
Chapter 1 
The history, politics and policy of patient choice at 
the macro-level: Interpreting patient access to CAM 
in the English NHS 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter considers the development of patient choice and patient treatment 
choice in the National Health Service (NHS) in England
79
 from historical and 
political perspectives and reflects on the space for complementary alternative 
medicine (CAM) within the NHS as part of the government policy of choice. As 
such it discusses the original settlement of the NHS in 1948 which made no 
reference to patient choice. At the same time it describes the NHS as based on a 
predominantly biomedical healthcare system dominated by a powerful medical 
profession, which has largely excluded CAM. From 1989 a new political discourse 
led to institutional changes in the NHS, representing a break with the past. A quasi-
market model of the NHS emerged where managers rather than doctors are in 
control of finances, the power of the medical profession is considerably curtailed, 
and choice, efficiency and competition are championed. There is an obvious tension 
between what has been termed the ‘church’ of the NHS,80 with its socialist values 
and aspirations, and the new, business-like ‘NHS plc’.81  
The chapter demonstrates that although patient choice has been attacked as being a 
proxy for competition, efficiency, marketisation and possible privatisation policies, 
and also for its inequity-inducing effects, there is continuity between the old and the 
new NHS. This is because policy-makers of different political persuasions can 
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justify patient choice by relying on the competing interpretations of the original 
values of the NHS. It is argued that rather than regarding patient choice exclusively 
as a strategy to encourage containment of cost, as well as marketisation and 
privatisation of the NHS, it may be open to different interpretations.
82
 It is suggested 
that governmental choice and treatment choice policies may hide other political 
intentions, namely that policy-makers may be using the patient choice agenda as a 
mechanism to destabilise the institutional architecture of the NHS and encourage 
reform
83
 while at the same time demonstrating a commitment to the values of the 
NHS and to fiscal prudence.
84
 CAM may become the unintended beneficiary of this 
strategy with the treatment choice policy leading to the opening of a greater space 
for CAM in the NHS.   
The chapter first discusses the core values and aspirations of the NHS when it was 
first founded in 1948, the ‘NHS church’, i.e. the values of comprehensiveness, 
universality, equity and free healthcare. It then proceeds to examine choice and 
efficiency, two of the new policies in the transformed NHS –‘NHS plc’. Interwoven 
in this discussion is a short outline of the history and development of CAM within 
the NHS.   
1.2. The NHS as a secular church: The traditional values of 
the English NHS 
The National Health Service Act 1946 is silent on the core values underlying the 
NHS, stating that the aim of the NHS is ‘to promote the establishment in England 
and Wales of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement in the 
physical and mental health of the people of England and Wales and the prevention, 
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diagnosis and treatment of illness’.85 The solidaristic principles underlying the NHS 
can be gleaned from the wartime Beveridge Report. Referring to the funding of the 
healthcare system at the time in terms of a compulsory health insurance, it is an 
exhortation of ‘men stand[ing] together with their fellows’ and speaks of a ‘pooling 
of risks’.86 For Aneurin Bevan, the architect of the NHS and also its first Health 
Minister, making the patient’s access to care independent of income within a state-
funded health service would prevent the anxieties caused by illness and economic 
necessity. A ‘free health service was pure socialism…opposed to the hedonism of 
capitalist society’87 leading to a society becoming ‘more wholesome, more serene 
and spiritually healthier’.88 It would provide a moral bonus to the population because 
it would satisfy the general inclination to solidarity and altruism.
89
  
While solidarity as underlying the health service may be agreed on,
90
 the values 
represented by the NHS are less clearly circumscribed, no doubt influenced by the 
changing policies of governments since the inception of the NHS.
91
 Different themes 
have emerged over the years. Some of these themes have been described as values 
underpinning the NHS whereas others are rather policies or means for achieving 
these ‘desirable ends’.92 In contrast to policies, values, defined as aspirations or 
conceptions of the morally desirable,
93
 tend to command universal support, are 
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essentially abstract and allow competing interpretations.
94
 The principles on which 
the NHS was founded can be viewed in this light.
95
 Seedhouse, for example, 
describes the beginnings of the NHS as ‘political fudge’ concealing a number of 
tensions. He argues that, despite the clash of political schools and professional 
interests at the creation of the NHS, the ambiguity of the conceptual foundations of 
the NHS may have enabled all stakeholders to feel some satisfaction at the time.
96
 It 
is in the process of implementing these values where contentions occur, but their 
fuzziness also has advantages. As discussed later in this chapter, the haziness of the 
settlement values does not only allow a large degree of policy divergence but has 
also enabled policy-makers of different political persuasions to use them to explain 
and justify their policies.
97
  
What, then, are the founding values of the NHS? The essence of the values of the 
Health Service was outlined by Bevan at the introduction of the National Health 
Service Bill in the House of Commons as ‘to divorce the ability to get the best health 
advice and treatment from the ability to pay and to provide the people of Great 
Britain, no matter where they may be, with the same level of service’.98 The leaflet, 
The New National Health Service, distributed to every household, confirmed 
Bevan’s vision:  
It [the Health Service] will provide you with all medical, dental, and nursing 
care. Everyone – rich or poor, man, woman or child – can use it or any part 
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of it. There are no charges except for a few special items … But it is not a 
charity. You are all paying for it, mainly as taxpayers.
99
  
Although the objectives of the NHS have been further pronounced on by Royal 
Commissions
100
 and expanded by later government documents
101
 and the NHS 
Constitution,
102
 it is possible to condense the early documents to four settlement 
values; comprehensiveness, universality, equity of access, and free at the point of 
delivery. The opacity and ambiguity of these concepts were apparent from the 
outset.
103
 They need to be analysed in turn in order to understand how they have 
come to be connected with the new policies of ‘efficiency’ and ‘freedom of 
(treatment) choice’ in more recent times. 
1.2.1 The value of comprehensiveness 
Although the goal of the comprehensiveness of the service was accepted by the 
various stakeholders,
104
 comprehensiveness could not be guaranteed, even from the 
inception of the NHS.
105
 However, more importantly, without a definition of health 
how could the NHS ever be described as a comprehensive service? The opportunity 
to define health had been missed.
106
 Although the Beveridge Report
107
 and parts of 
the 1944 White Paper suggest the adoption of a broad definition of health, the lack 
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of clarity of the term makes the ‘comprehensiveness’ of a health service a rather 
suspect value.  
Most theories of health claim that health is more than ‘absence of disease or 
disability’.108 As such, a health service would transcend clinical activity and 
consider people in their environmental context, or focus on wellness and 
empowerment rather than on morbidity and mortality. The lack of a definition of 
health played into the hands of the medical profession, leading to the conclusion that 
the NHS ended up ‘little more than a medical service dressed up in fine language’.109 
As Klein comments, the NHS was ‘designed to accommodate certain specific 
interests within the medical profession … [who] … obtained a monopoly of 
legitimacy among the health service providers: a unique position, reflected in the 
running of the NHS’.110 Health service providers who were not medically qualified 
were largely excluded from public provision of healthcare. 
Orthodox medical practitioners had, however, not always been a privileged group. In 
eighteenth-century Britain it may not have been easy to distinguish between the 
‘quacks’ or unorthodox healers and the ‘regulars’. Regular medicine did not enjoy 
the therapeutic success that would make it the automatic choice of patients.
111
 It is 
only from the mid nineteenth century that medical doctors achieved the dominant 
position in healthcare provision to the detriment of other healthcare practitioners.
112
 
They were successful in their professionalisation, removing the fragmentary nature 
of the medical profession by engaging in self-regulation, controlling the education of 
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medical students and requiring registration on a single national register.
113
 This was 
achieved with the introduction of the Medical Act 1858 which set up the General 
Medical Council as the controlling body of all qualified medical doctors,
 114
 uniting 
them against unqualified rivals such as bonesetters, herbalists and itinerants.
115
 The 
medical profession had ‘a secure foothold in the bureaucratic apparatus of the 
state’.116 It is therefore not surprising that the view of health that became dominant 
within the NHS was the medical concept of health, a concept where doctors and 
hospitals play the central role.
117
 Although this meaning of health is disputed, it has 
exercised influence on the definition of the values of the NHS, the allocation of 
resources,
118
 and on the position of CAM in the Health Service.  
Definitions of health: Biomedicine versus complementary alternative medicine 
Of the many different concepts of health, the medical model is probably the most 
restrictive, focusing on disease and disability, their causes and cure. It attempts to 
trace the pathways of disease, uncovering the pathological processes of disease and 
its effects and to understand the mechanisms of remedy.
119
 ‘It sees the body as a 
machine to be repaired by technical means’, with illness resulting from pathological 
processes in the biochemical functions of the body.
120
 The medical model attempts 
‘to uncover the underlying pathological processes and their effects’, but the 
aetiology of many diseases is unknown so treatment is often reduced to an attempt to 
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lessen the impact of symptoms and contain the illness rather than to cure.
121
 From 
this it becomes clear that the medical model tends to excel at treating infectious 
diseases and acute or traumatic injuries; it excels at emergency care,
122
 and is built 
around the treatment of acute or episodic health problems.
123
 
The medical model is, however, less successful with the diagnosis and treatment of 
chronic, multifaceted and terminal illnesses which are rarely cured by biomedicine, 
exhaust current scientific knowledge and often require treatment accompanied by 
considerable side-effects.
124
 It fails to recognise the limits of technologically 
oriented healing, creates feelings of dependence and leaves patients feeling 
alienated.
125
 With advances in healthcare keeping people alive and controlling but 
not curing their chronic illnesses, and an increasing number of older people in the 
population with chronic health problems due to their exposure to risk factors over 
their lifetime,
126
 a medical model of health may require rethinking. 
A holistic healing paradigm, in contrast, views ‘diseases as having multiple causes 
amenable to multiple therapeutic interventions through a variety of systems of 
care’.127 In holism the goal is ‘balance rather than simply a control of symptoms; 
subjective relief and not merely a favourable and scientifically measurable clinical 
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outcome’.128 The commonly understood meaning of holistic medicine is the notion 
that problems of ill-health involve the mind, body, and spirit of an individual, and 
holistic medicine is therefore an approach treating the whole person.
129
  
CAM, which comprises a multitude of treatment modalities, takes a generally more 
holistic approach to health than the biomedical model. CAM therapies range from 
complete systems of healing such as acupuncture, traditional Chinese medicine and 
herbal medicine, to therapeutic modalities such as aromatherapy and spiritual 
healing, to diagnostic methods such as iridology and kinesiology and to self-help 
measures such as yoga and biofeedback.
130
 According to Stone and Matthews, while 
this may mean that a CAM practitioner seeks to treat all levels of a patient’s 
problem, the more common understanding is that a therapeutic intervention at one 
level will have a positive effect at other levels.
131
 Coupled with the emphasis on the 
whole person, complementary alternative therapies importantly tend to place greater 
emphasis on active patient participation in a less disempowering therapeutic 
relationship between patient and practitioner, on self-responsibility and on 
individualised, patient-centred healthcare than the medical model.
132
 Because of its 
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emphasis on lifestyle, nutrition, self-care and emotional well-being, CAM has a 
preventive outlook, and with its emphasis on self-responsibility it is particularly 
suitable in chronic illness rather than in emergency care.
133
  
‘Comprehensiveness’ within a medical paradigm 
Although the medical model of health may have prevailed because of the missed 
opportunity of defining health, the National Health Service Act 1946 did not prohibit 
the provision of CAM under the NHS. Some groups of CAM practitioners had 
argued for inclusion in the National Health Service,
134
 but entry was made subject to 
the reorganisation of CAM practitioners with recognised training schemes and also 
to them working as medical auxiliaries under the direction of the medical profession, 
a proposal which was rejected.
135
 CAM could, however, still be provided by 
qualified medical practitioners as part of the NHS. Although the Medical 
Registration Bill 1858 had been intended to prevent the practice of non-orthodox 
medicine by medical practitioners, an amendment to the Bill instigated by Dr Quin, 
an influential doctor and homeopath, enabled the Privy Council to withdraw the 
right to award degrees from any university trying to dictate the type of medicine 
practised by its medical graduates.
136
 Thus, under the Medical Act 1858, 
conventionally trained doctors can legally practise other types of medicine.
137
 
Conventionally trained medical practitioners, for example, provided complementary 
therapies in homeopathic hospitals, even prior to the beginning of the NHS.
138
 
However, with the exception of homeopathy provided by medical practitioners,
139
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NHS cover of CAM treatment was rare
140
 because the medical establishment, 
through its trade union body the British Medical Association (BMA), and its medical 
licensing body the General Medical Council (GMC), kept control over any deviation 
from the biomedical model by orthodox practitioners, thus restricting the adoption of 
CAM treatments.
141
 
1.2.2  The value of universality 
Access to the National Health Service under the NHS Bill was to be available to 
everyone in England and Wales with no limitations according to financial means, 
sex, employment, vocation, area of residence, or insurance qualification.
142
 
Universality, originally opposed by the BMA as undermining opportunities for 
private practice, had been accepted as one of the values underlying the NHS. Bevan 
had referred to it as one of the purposes of the NHS: ‘to provide the people of Great 
Britain, no matter where they may be, with the same level of service’.143  
Universality appears a relatively unambiguous term. It is, however, linked with 
equity of access and may be confused with it as, without the availability of facilities 
and medical practitioners in all geographical areas, not all patients may be able to 
utilise the service.
144
 Universalism has been interpreted as the value coming closest 
to the understanding of solidarity. It provides people with tranquillity and 
reassurance if they, in Bevan’s words, ‘have at the back of their consciousness the 
knowledge that not only themselves, but all their fellows have access when ill to best 
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that medical skill can provide’.145 Universality therefore implies that people not 
receiving medical care now, but who may require such care in the future, still derive 
a benefit from the NHS.
146
 According to New, the concept combines two subsidiary 
values within it, namely that of cohesion and togetherness, and of security and 
reassurance, which is achieved by ensuring that everyone is covered by the 
healthcare system.
147
 Opting out, in the sense that tax can be withheld or reclaimed, 
is not possible. Universality is not affected by the paucity of provision of CAM 
within the NHS, whereas the paucity of provision has an adverse effect on equity of 
access.  
1.2.3 The value of equity 
The belief that equity underlies the National Health Service, that ‘the health service 
should be for all the British people equally’ has been a deeply cherished NHS 
principle.
148
 As Dixon and others pointed out, it would be difficult to find any 
academic study regarding the principles underlying the NHS which would not 
include a reference to the importance of equity or fairness and social justice.
149
 
However, it is not often clear what equality or equal access to healthcare implies. 
While closely related to universality, which provides assurance of the availability of 
healthcare in times of need, equity, unlike universality, is concerned with the 
distribution of benefits in society and deals with the fairness of distribution.
150
 
Universality, therefore, will allow people to avail themselves of the health service 
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whether or not they are able to pay for it, whereas equity of access is concerned with 
the fairness of distribution.
151
  
There are a variety of ways in which equity can be interpreted. Only two of these 
will be discussed; geographical equity of access and equity of access according to 
needs. 
Geographical equity of access 
Geographical equity of access involves ensuring that there are facilities available in 
all areas, that medical practitioners are accessible in all areas and that there are no 
barriers preventing patients from accessing the facilities or practitioners.
152
 It could 
be taken to include equity of resource distribution as well as equity of service 
distribution ‘to ensure that people in all areas have the same opportunity of access to 
the same range of services’ in order to reduce geographical inequalities of health.153 
There is, therefore, a contradiction when Webster can state that the NHS perpetuated 
the inequalities in healthcare provision it had inherited, mirroring the patterns in the 
distribution of wealth in the country. Thus the areas with the greatest problems of ill-
health also received the worst health services: the better hospitals and greater 
concentration of General Practitioners were concentrated in areas around London 
whereas the least well provided areas were mainly the areas where heavy industry 
was located.
154
  
While the geographical distribution of resources reflecting the relative health status 
of areas has now largely been achieved with the use of resource allocation 
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formulae,
155
 equity in terms of access to the same package of healthcare has not been 
achieved.
156
 Postcode rationing and local deviations from norms of provision are still 
common. Regarding the provision of CAM within the NHS a similar pattern is 
noticeable; equity of geographical access was contradicted by provision 
concentrated around the locations of the original homeopathic hospitals (London, 
Tunbridge Wells
157
, Bristol and Liverpool) and greater provision in the affluent 
south of England
158
 with postcode rationing making for local variation. 
Equity of access according to need 
Equity of access to healthcare linked with the notion of need also gives rise to 
ambiguity. Equity of access according to need implies distributive justice, that if 
people are not equal they shall not have equal shares of healthcare.
159
 However, the 
ambiguity of this value stems from the definition of need. The lack of consensus 
regarding the interpretation of need makes it difficult to realise a fair healthcare 
system. Thus an equitable provision of healthcare can be made dependent on factors 
or proxies for need, such as the severity of ill-health, the capacity to benefit, social 
factors, age or time waiting for treatment.
160
  
When interpreted in terms of the severity of ill-health, the worse a person’s health 
status, the greater her need for treatment. That a person who is in greater need 
receives faster or more intensive treatment is recognised, for example, with the use 
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of a ‘triage’ system in Accident and Emergency departments.161 Need is therefore 
linked to the ill-health of a person.
162
 A person who is not ill would not have any 
healthcare need, a view which defines the narrow medical model of health. This 
definition therefore limits the scope of the health services to medical treatments and 
excludes preventative
163
 and also holistic care. A person’s health status is, however, 
co-dependent on other factors
164
 which ought to be taken into account when 
assessing need, in order to reduce inequities in health between different people. 
Differing needs due to underlying inequalities therefore demand unequal treatment.  
Need may also be defined as the ‘capacity to benefit’. Examples would be patients 
presenting at an earlier stage and thus with a greater chance of a better treatment 
outcome than patients presenting with more advanced disease. Thus, if need is 
defined in terms of a person’s health status or degree of ill-health, then the later 
presenter has greater need, whereas if it is defined in terms of capacity to benefit, 
then the early presenter has the greater need.
165
 Capacity to benefit, apart from 
taking into account the likely response of a patient to treatment, can also take into 
account other factors such as age or social factors. However, capacity to benefit 
from healthcare is also dependent on what health services are available to the 
patient. As Seedhouse argues, the existence or availability of a specific treatment in 
the NHS is a pre-requisite for a person’s capacity to benefit.166 Any potential 
alternatives to existing NHS treatment would therefore also have to be assessed in 
terms of a person’s capacity to benefit. 
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The inconsistency of a generally accepted definition of need also renders equity 
open to different interpretations. Moreover, need defined in terms of ill-health or 
capacity to benefit protects the status quo, since meeting need is dependent on what 
is available to treat the sick. This definition of equity therefore excludes a wider 
definition of health and is restricted to the medical model.  
1.2.4 The value of ‘free’ healthcare 
Bevan intended the NHS to be a tax-financed service, free at the point of delivery,
167
 
recognised as an outstanding example of socialised medicine. He argued against 
charges since, if these were more than nominal, the less well-off would have to be 
exempted, thereby increasing administrative complexities.
168
 However, the National 
Health Service Bill in 1946 already anticipated some user charges, such as for the 
renewal or repair of spectacles and dentures, for certain goods and articles (such as 
supplementary foods and blankets) provided in connection with maternity and child 
welfare, and for private rooms in hospitals.
169
 However, charges have never 
contributed more than marginally to the income of the NHS, even after the advent of 
prescription charges.
170
  
Although the Health Service Bill specifically mentioned the kinds of health services 
which were to be included, from hospital and specialist services to health centres and 
general practitioner services, supplementary services such as midwifery, maternity 
and child welfare and the provision of drugs and medicines,
171
 it did not exclude 
CAM. The health service was to cover all ‘necessary forms of healthcare’,172 but a 
clarification of what constitutes necessary healthcare was not provided.
173
 
Complementary alternative medicine may or may not be part of this necessary 
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healthcare
174
 with the decision as to its availability not unrelated to this definitional 
haziness.  
Patient choice played no role in the original NHS settlement. The role of patient 
choice is, however, understood as entwined with the market reforms of the NHS that 
commenced under the Thatcher government, to which the chapter now turns, which 
also had an impact on the publicly funded provision of CAM.   
1.3. ‘NHS plc’: The new policies of the transformed NHS: 
efficiency and choice 
Whilst rationing and priority-setting were not contemplated when the NHS was 
created, as it was expected that the demand for health services would gradually 
decrease once the unmet need had been satisfied, the opposite happened: the demand 
for medical services exceeded all expectations.
175
 It was recognised early on that the 
NHS was not self-limiting in that its contribution to national health did not limit the 
demands upon it to a volume that could be fully met.
176
 It is this demand for 
healthcare which led to the adoption of a new principle or policy goal, that of the 
cost containment of healthcare spending.
177
 While values such as universality, equity 
and comprehensiveness of healthcare are values which tend to command universal 
support,
178
 it is debatable whether cost containment can be described as such.
179
 Cost 
                                                 
174
 KJ Thomas and others, ‘Access to Complementary Medicine via General Practice’ (2001) British 
Journal of General Practice 25, 28–29 stating that treatment provision of CAM within the GP 
practice in 1995 was privately and publicly funded. 
175
 C Webster, The National Health Service: A Political History (2nd edn, OUP 2002) 29–30; D 
Seedhouse, Fortress NHS: A Philosophical Review of the Health Service (John Wiley & Sons 1995) 14; 
C Ham, Health Policy in Britain (6th edn Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 77. 
176
 R Klein, The New Politics of the NHS: From Creation to Reinvention (6th edn, Radcliffe Publishing 
2010) 29 where the author refers to comments by the Guillebaud Committee set up in 1952 to 
inquire into the cost of the NHS. 
177
 D Seedhouse, Fortress NHS: A Philosophical Review of the Health Service (John Wiley & Sons 
1995) 15. 
178
 R Klein, ‘Values Talk in the (English) NHS’ in SL Greer and D Rowland (eds), Devolving Policy, 
Diverging Values: The Values of the United Kingdom’s National Health Services (Nuffield Trust 2007) 
22. 
179
 D Seedhouse, Fortress NHS: A Philosophical Review of the Health Service (John Wiley & Sons 
1995) 15. 
46 
 
containment is a policy goal, a means to realising desirable ends.
180
 In a national 
health service this goal can be achieved by different means such as not increasing 
funding to meet rising demand,
181
 user charges,
182
 reducing the quality of healthcare 
provided, reducing the varieties of healthcare included in the healthcare basket,
183
 
delaying elective healthcare services and, importantly, by means of improving 
efficiency.  
In 1980, the Conservative Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, not content with 
patching the leaky roof of the old NHS – the ‘NHS church’ – began a radical 
reshaping of the NHS leading to the establishment of the internal market, the new 
business-like NHS – ‘NHS plc’– in 1990.184 Efficiency became the driving force in 
this new NHS. Despite the fierce campaign against the proposals launched by the 
doctors’ trade union body, the BMA, the power of hospital consultants, seen as an 
obstacle to efficiency,
185
 was reduced and replaced by managers with private-sector 
entrepreneurial experience, with the aim of making doctors more accountable for 
their performance.
186
 New contracts for GPs were introduced. The long-standing 
close relationship between the medical profession, the BMA and the government had 
changed. As Klein points out: ‘If the medical profession had shown itself strong in 
the distributional conflicts that followed the creation of the NHS in 1948, it had 
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proved powerless to prevent the introduction of the new settlement … the medical 
profession lost its central place on the stage.’187 
1.3.1 The policy goal of efficiency 
The concept of efficiency contains a number of subsidiary elements
188
 which lead to 
different interpretations. Efficiency matters since the size of the NHS budget is 
dependent on the state of the economy and the decisions on the priority of different 
spending programmes:
189
 any increase in spending on health by the government 
means a reduction in expenditure on other areas such as education or defence.
190
 The 
heading of efficiency has been related to its relevance in a competitive market, to 
ensure that providers operate at minimum costs
191
 and also to the pursuit of cost-
effectiveness.
192
  
Efficiency and the healthcare market 
The internal healthcare market was first proposed in 1989 in the White Paper 
Working for Patients
193
 with providers competing for contracts with purchasers, a 
proposal which was subsequently translated into the NHS and Community Care Act 
1990.
194
 The reforms were designed to respond to the pressures on the service 
caused by rising demands and limited supply of resources.
195
 The competitive nature 
of the market was intended to provide the incentive for providers to improve 
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efficiency and become more responsive.
196
 It was hoped that competition would lead 
to a reduction in costs and a lowering of public expenditure on the NHS. In order to 
stimulate competition, choice was given to the District Health Authorities (DHAs) 
and to the newly created GP fundholding practices
197
 to purchase care from hospitals 
– the newly created NHS trusts – thus splitting the responsibility for purchasing and 
provision, both functions previously held in the hands of the DHAs.
198
 Fundholding 
practices were given an incentive to be more efficient by being allowed to keep any 
savings from their budget to use for patient care.
199
 The only choice patients were 
given was the choice of changing their GP.
200
 
The problem at the core of the idea of the internal market in the NHS, where market 
decisions and impersonal market forces were to drive efficiency, was that it was not 
a market in the real sense but rather a quasi-market using market-like 
mechanisms.
201
 The concept of the internal market turned into a managed market 
where policy-makers were ‘active actors rather than passive spectators’ of events.202 
In many areas in the country, competition between providers was non-existent.
203
 If 
the logic of the market had been allowed to work then hospitals in areas of 
oversupply
204
 or providing an unacceptable standard of care should have gone 
bankrupt, whereas instead policy-makers intervened to determine the future of health 
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care, thus risking the weakening of the competition that was designed to drive down 
costs.
205
 
A part of the market reforms to drive efficiency had been the introduction of 
fundholding GP practices.
206
 Although fundholding may not have had a major 
economic impact on the local hospital trusts due to GPs’ loyalty to them and the fact 
that the fundholders’ budgets only represented a small proportion of the income of 
any trust, it enabled GPs to enlarge the scope of primary care.
207
 Fundholders were 
able to use their resources to buy additional services for their patients, including 
CAM, which could be purchased from CAM practitioners working outside the 
practice.
208
 They could refer their patients to osteopaths and chiropractors, as these 
practitioners had become state-regulated,
209
 and could also employ CAM therapists 
in their practice using the resources of their funds for the employment of additional 
professional staff.
210
 The logic of market competition therefore appears to have 
found more resonance in the purchasing of additional ‘primary care’ services by GP 
fundholders with no interference from the government.  
No consensus has emerged on the impact of the internal market on the NHS 
regarding efficiency gains. Studies by economists, however, agree on the difficulty 
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of demonstrating efficiency gains as a consequence of the internal market.
211
 There 
are limitations in evaluating any measurable change in an entire healthcare system 
because of the confounding effects of other factors on the system such as the level of 
resources invested by the government at the time to smooth the implementation of 
the internal market.
212
 Le Grand and others conclude in their analysis that overall 
very little changed with the introduction of the internal market although they found 
some minor improvements in efficiency.
213
  
Efficiency as cost-effectiveness 
Leaving aside macro-economic calculations of the efficiency of health interventions 
generally and concentrating specifically on medical (and also CAM) treatment, cost-
effectiveness entails the importance of cost as well as the degree of effectiveness of 
specific treatments. Although the main objective of the NHS is to produce health,
214
 
another of its objectives should be to maximise the total quantity of health gain of 
the population.
215
 As resources are limited it is necessary to use these resources in 
the most efficient manner to maximise health outcomes.
216
  
The New Labour government developed its own policies for the reform of the NHS, 
distinct from the internal market of the previous government. The White Paper, The 
New NHS
217
 included different mechanisms to increase efficiency.
218
 In particular, 
the creation in 1999 of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE)
219
 had 
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as one of its objectives the development of guidance based on clinically effective 
treatments and procedures which reach a threshold level of cost-effectiveness. 
Quality-Adjusted Life Years or QALYs are the method used by NICE in its cost-
effectiveness assessments; they enable the quantification of the costs and health 
gains of the population which can be expected from different treatments.
220
 
Applying the QALY cost-effectiveness analysis to CAM is problematic for a variety 
of reasons, not least because of the prevalent medical healthcare model in the NHS 
and the assessment of effectiveness in accordance with this model.
221
 It is also 
problematic because of the difficulty of the overall cost calculation of CAM, the 
importance of treatment outcomes rather than the healthcare process,
222
 and the 
importance of increased life expectancy in the QALY calculation.
223
 
Linked with the goal of efficiency the other major new policy goal emerging in the 
new NHS was patient choice. It is the development of the patient choice policies 
from 1989 onwards that will be discussed next.  
1.3.2 The policy goal of patient choice  
The Conservative government’s White Paper Working for Patients,224 which set in 
motion the market reforms in the NHS, linked these reforms with the objective of 
increasing choice for the patient, specifically ‘greater choice of services 
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available’.225 However, apart from having a ‘real choice between GPs’, the only 
option patients had was buying their healthcare outside the NHS, thus taking some 
of the pressure off the service.
226
 Within the NHS the individual patient was not 
given additional power to make decisions;
227
 rather it was a choice by the GP on 
behalf of the patient and was intended to facilitate competition amongst hospitals for 
non-urgent treatment.
228
 General practice was to play an increasing role in assisting 
patient choice and directing resources to match patient needs throughout the NHS.
229
 
The patient had the choice of changing her GP if she did not approve of the use of 
resources on her behalf.
230
  
The emphasis on choice as an instrumental aim by policy-makers to achieve the 
values of the NHS has been a legacy of the White Paper. This is despite the fact that 
when New Labour won the general election in 1997 initially there was no mention of 
choice at all.
231
 New Labour’s terminology rather than featuring the market, 
competition or choice
232
 stressed the values of equity and also quality.
233
 However, 
in 2000 with the introduction of the NHS Plan,
234
 patient choice became an 
important theme. Patients’ choices were to include the right to choose a GP based on 
information to be made available about GP practices,
235
 patients were to have more 
options about accessing the NHS with a choice of emailing or phoning their GP 
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practices for advice and booking appointments online
236
 and a choice of hospital and 
date and time of hospital appointments.
237
 Staff responsiveness in the NHS to 
individual patient needs
238
 and patient choice became the new policies. Although 
rejecting the emphasis on competition within the internal market and abolishing GP 
fundholding, New Labour accepted some quasi-market principles by keeping the 
purchaser/provider split with the creation of Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) as main 
purchasers of healthcare services.
239
 Rather than linking choice with market 
competition, New Labour claimed that patient choice enhanced equity and would 
lead to greater equality in the health service and a fairer distribution of access to 
health services.
240
 Successive Department of Health Papers
241
 confirm New 
Labour’s vision of patient choice and equity with free choice of any hospital for 
treatment, including private hospitals,
242
 and more choice of treatment options for 
patients with long-term conditions.
243
 Patient choice was confirmed also in the NHS 
Constitution of 2009.
244
 As Klein points out, the elements of the market were, 
however, also present in New Labour’s policies not only with the choice for 
consumers but also money following the patient, competition between a plurality of 
diverse providers and practice-based commissioning.
245
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Choice was again confirmed as a principle in Equity and Excellence: Liberating the 
NHS,
246
 the White Paper published by the new coalition government in 2010, 
enabling choice ‘through an information revolution’.247 Specifically, patients were to 
have the choice of any qualified provider, choice of a consultant-led team, choice of 
GP practice, choice in care for long-term conditions and choice of treatment and, to 
make these choices about their care, patients are to have access to the information 
they want.
248
 Patient choice is also enshrined in the new edition of the NHS 
Constitution for England
249
 and the Health and Social Care Act 2012.
250
 The 
language of the coalition government is more market-focused with an increasing role 
for private sector providers in community as well as hospital care,
251
 shadowing the 
policies of the time when choice first reared its head: the emphasis is couched in 
terms of competition in the healthcare market.
252
 
Patient treatment choice of CAM within the NHS 
Interest in CAM experienced a considerable increase in the mid-1960s, possibly as 
part of an emerging medical counter-culture with a desire for alternative lifestyles 
associated with a rejection of scientific progress and professional experts within 
orthodox medicine.
253
 Growing demand for CAM by patients may have also been 
linked to the desire to try out alternative therapies because of the perceived lack of 
efficacy and safety issues of orthodox treatments and to a challenge of professional 
experts.
254
 However, provision of CAM within the NHS was largely restricted to the 
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homeopathic hospitals because of the general opposition of the medical profession 
and the BMA to alternative medicine.
255
 The GMC was also opposed to the practice 
of unorthodox therapies
256
 but relaxed its stance after 1983.
257
  
With the introduction of the internal market in 1991 and the emphasis on choice, 
although it was more GP-led than patient-led choice, CAM started to become more 
widely available in the NHS.
258
 Increasing consumer demand in the private sector 
had exerted an impact on orthodox medical practitioners, in particular GPs, with a 
greater number of GPs practising one or more alternative therapies themselves.
259
 
With the introduction of the new contracts, health authorities were able to reimburse 
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GPs employing complementary therapists.
260
 GP fundholding practices, on the other 
hand, could use their funds to purchase complementary therapies, for example from 
CAM practitioners working outside the practice.
261
 GPs could also refer patients for 
CAM to osteopaths and chiropractors as these practitioners had become state-
regulated.
262
 Patient ‘choice’ was therefore at the discretion of the GP and publicly 
funded CAM could generally only be accessed via a GP.
263
 Not surprisingly, the vast 
majority of CAM provision remained in the private sector.
264
 
With New Labour the growth of CAM within the NHS was subjected to a more 
systematic and collective decision-making process.
265
 The choice policy was now 
focusing on equity and reductions in health variation rather than the market with its 
competition. Although overall more CAM services were accessed through the NHS, 
these were paid for directly by the patients.
266
 A survey carried out in 2001 
established that now 50% of GP practices offered their patients some access to CAM 
treatments. However, the percentage of patients financially supporting these 
services, which they had accessed through the NHS, doubled.
267
 NICE,
268
 
established by New Labour, promotes evidence-based medicine, and CAM therapies 
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which were to be available on the NHS had to be scientifically validated.
269
 In its 
response to the Report by the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee 
on CAM,
270
 the New Labour government at the time emphasised that it supported 
the evaluation of CAM therapies by NICE
271
 but added that only once a therapy had 
gained a critical mass of evidence to support its efficacy should the NHS and the 
medical profession ensure that the public had access to it.
272
  
Patient choice of CAM treatment is being supported by the coalition government, at 
the time of writing, as a policy goal rather than depending on principles of evidence-
based medicine.
273
 Funding decisions on CAM are to be left to local decision-
makers, whether PCTs or Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), and the role of 
NICE which had been created
274
 to establish uniform standards of treatment across 
the NHS is to be reduced. It is therefore likely that, with the demand for CAM by 
patients at present not being satisfied by public funding, NHS expenditure on CAM will 
increase. Personal health budgets, which were introduced in November 2012, will 
provide patients affected by chronic conditions with greater choice of treatment,275 and 
enable them to purchase health-related services either directly or through a third 
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party.276 In pilots carried out, patient choices have included aromatherapy and other 
CAM treatments.277  
Current political discourse therefore demonstrates enthusiasm for treatment choice 
in the NHS.  At the same time patient choice has been attacked for what it 
represents. It is challenged because it is seen to be in conflict with the traditional 
values of the NHS as inducing inequality and because it is seen as a proxy for 
policies of marketisation and privatisation such as efficiency and competition.278 
Pollock, for example, claims that the new ‘NHS plc’ has abandoned the founding 
principles of the NHS of comprehensiveness, universality and equity.
279
 According 
to Fotaki, it is the expansion of the market and the marketisation policies of choice, 
competition and efficiency which are perceived as having a detrimental effect on the 
traditional values of the NHS.
280
 Yet, other writers argue that despite these new 
policies the English NHS is performing well when measured against its core values. 
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The continuity between the old and the new NHS is preserved
281
 as policy-makers of 
different political persuasion have endorsed the founding values of the NHS.
282
  
These challenges to patient choice are examined, concentrating on choice in the 
primary care sector as being most relevant in the context of CAM. The following 
discussion explores the possibility of whether policy-makers, rather than using 
patient choice as a proxy for privatising or quasi-privatising the NHS, may be using 
it as a policy mechanism hiding other political goals and intentions while at the same 
time attempting to affirm the underlying values of the NHS.  
1.4. Challenges to patient choice  
Opponents of choice regard it as inextricably linked with market economies, where 
choice is a proxy for competition and efficiency, marketisation and ultimately 
privatisation. As Pollock claims: ‘The NHS is being dismantled and privatised … 
The disaster that is unfolding is overwhelming in its complexity and magnitude … 
[The NHS] has been made into a laboratory for market-based policy 
prescriptions.’283 It is, however, questionable to what extent a policy of patient 
choice in a publicly funded healthcare system should be viewed exclusively as a 
proxy for marketisation policies and whether it may not be a rhetorical device by 
policy-makers concealing different political intentions.
284
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1.4.1 Choice as a proxy for marketisation policies  
Concentrating on the primary care level where most CAM is delivered, for choice to 
be possible it is a prerequisite that there must be a reasonable number of primary 
care providers from which the patient can choose.
285
 It is difficult to imagine 
meaningful choice unless there is competition amongst providers for patients.
286
 The 
NHS healthcare market has of course never been a real but rather a quasi-market. In 
this quasi-market, regarding NHS primary care
287
, the GP who provides the better 
service
288
 and is more responsive to patient demand may attract more patients and 
will continue in business as long as the services provided are also efficient. Patients 
who are dissatisfied with the services of their GP have the opportunity to switch GP 
practices.
289
 Thus, at least in theory, patient choice may lead to competition between 
providers which in turn may promote efficiency.
290
  
Evidence, however, suggests that to provide choice there would need to be an 
increase in the number of primary care providers in the NHS.
291
 Choice has so far 
been limited in many areas because of closed or ‘open but closed’ GP lists,292 with 
practices refusing patients if there are no spaces for new patients or the patients are 
from outside their catchment area. The market argument that healthcare providers 
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who offer a choice of treatment, including CAM, will attract more patients and 
prosper, has therefore been hardly relevant.
293
  
Evidence also suggests that although choice of GP was a policy objective since the 
healthcare reforms in 1990,
294
 it was rarely enacted by patients switching 
practices.
295
 Patients prefer to be treated locally and, when choosing their GP, tend 
to choose the GP closest to their home rather than on the basis of other criteria.
296
 In 
any case, in order to have a real choice on such other criteria, for example, whether a 
practice provides CAM services and whether these services are NHS funded, 
information is crucial. As long as this information is not freely available competition 
will be stifled. There will be increased cost to provide this information and to 
provide support to make the information accessible to patients.
297
  
1.4.2 Choice as proxy for efficiency 
Rather than just the opportunity to choose a GP there is considerably more evidence 
that patients wish to be involved in individual treatment decisions
298
 and have 
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information about available treatment options.
299
 Most patients place greater value 
on involvement in choosing their treatment or treatment package.
300
 As will be 
shown below, a choice of treatment in the primary care sector may, however, not 
lead to a reduction in cost or greater efficiency. 
To be able to make a treatment choice, patients require information about the variety 
of possible treatments and their different risks and outcomes. While choice of 
treatment is likely to be less important for patients in acute and life-threatening 
medical situations, where the patient is particularly vulnerable and dependent on the 
expertise of the physician,
301
 much more of the time in general practice is spent on 
patients with chronic, not time-limited conditions,
302
 where recovery is impossible or 
at least unlikely in the near future and requires ongoing management over a period 
of years.
303
 In order to exercise treatment choice the information requirements of 
these patients, often affected by several co-existing chronic health problems, will be 
extensive. However, there is often insufficient evidence available about the 
competing advantages and drawbacks of treatments for multiple conditions.
304
 
Studies among patients in general practice have shown that patients are not 
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sufficiently informed to make choices,
305
 and this is one of the most common causes 
of dissatisfaction of patients.
306
  
While patients are likely to benefit from being given information enabling them to 
make choices, the provision of this information is likely to add considerable costs. 
Not only is it likely to necessitate extending the allocated consultation time in the 
GP practice, it may also require patient choice advisors 
307
 and decision aids to 
improve the patients’ understanding of, and help them with, their treatment 
options.
308
 It might require a complete re-designing of the consultation process, with 
patients having to be referred to patient choice advisors and GPs having to incur 
additional costs to employ more staff.
309
 Providing information and support to 
patients to enable them to arrive at sensible choices about their healthcare is 
therefore likely to lead to a significant increase in resources rather than enabling cost 
containment. 
Whether patient choice really leads to efficiency gains in the primary healthcare 
sector is therefore far from clear,
310
 unless efficiency gains could possibly be 
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achieved by moving some of the costs of treatment to the patient
311
 by, for example, 
enabling access to CAM services through the primary care sector on the 
understanding that the patient will have to bear the costs of these services.
312
  The 
concern with patient choice as proxy for marketisation policies is of course the 
concern that market reform will lead to privatisation or quasi-privatisation
313
 where 
efficiency will become the driving force, leading to conflict and tension with the 
traditional values of the NHS, particularly the value of equity.
314
 However, policy-
makers have tended to justify their policies as supportive of the original 
settlement.
315
 In this light, the antagonism towards patient choice in the English 
NHS as leading to inequity and therefore undermining one of its core values also 
needs to be scrutinised. 
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1.4.3 Choice and inequity 
The apparent tension between choice and equity mirrors the conflict between 
individualist and the collectivist values underlying the NHS. Patient choice or 
individualist demand is challenged as being in tension with healthcare, which aims 
to be egalitarian.
316
 Choice is attacked as the emphasis ought to be on the fair 
treatment of every patient given the available resources. Only if NHS resources were 
unlimited could every patient’s preferences be satisfied.317 In a healthcare system 
with limited resources the range of options available will have to be curtailed in 
order to achieve equality of provision of the core services.
318
 Because of the inherent 
ambiguities in the definition of equity, however, patient choice is able to co-exist 
with equity. The haziness of the settlement value helps policy-makers to explain and 
justify their choice agenda. Geographical equity of access, equity of access 
according to need and equity in terms of patients’ unequal capabilities and health 
literacy serve as examples.  
As has been argued, geographical equity of access in terms of the distribution of 
resources reflecting health status has largely been achieved equalising the capacity 
of PCTs to meet local needs.
319
 Defined in terms of equity of access to the same 
packages of healthcare, local variations in healthcare packages exist and patients are 
able to access specific treatments in one area but not in another.
320
 These 
geographical inequalities in access to choice only became apparent following the 
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introduction of patient choice policies.
321
 Freedom of choice for patients advocated 
by policy-makers at the macro-level contradicts the ‘postcode rationing’ of specific 
healthcare services at the meso-level.
322
 However, much depends on how 
geographical equity is defined. 
A still greater tension appears to exist between equity of access according to need 
and choice. Whether need is defined in terms of a person’s negative health status or 
in terms of a person’s capacity to benefit, providing choice may impact on the 
overall availability of services in a healthcare system with limited resources. Greater 
choice in a resource-constrained system will therefore be at the expense of some 
users judged less needy, whether they are considered to be less in need of acute 
assistance or less likely to benefit from treatment. However, any lack of consensus 
regarding the interpretation of need unwittingly assists the proponents of choice. 
Needs-assessment is controversial:
323
 a definition of need may not be a purely 
medical assessment but may include social and moral judgments.
324
 An assessment 
of capacity to benefit, for example, may lead to the exclusion of older or poorer 
patients and those with a variety of health problems but a definition of need is also 
dependent on what the healthcare professional or organisation believes ought to be 
provided.
325
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Choice and lack of ‘voice’ 
Inequitable access to NHS healthcare may also refer to patients having unequal 
capabilities and differential knowledge with which to make choices.
326
 Differences 
in health literacy and health-seeking behaviour between different socio-economic 
groups have been adduced as explanation.
327
 Patients in higher socio-economic 
groups have also been shown to be more able to absorb and act upon information, 
which is often presented in an unfamiliar language by healthcare professionals. They 
have greater self-confidence in the consultation room and are in possession of more 
information about their health and their entitlements, and where and when to access 
services.
328
 In Hirschman’s terminology, these patients are able to use their ‘voice’ 
to demand their choice of service but may also use the threat of ‘exit’ from the 
NHS.
329
 This apparent inequity can be countered by extending patient choice to the 
less well-off, as everyone would then have the option of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ which 
would reduce the inequities that exist in the NHS.
330
 Giving patients of lower socio-
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economic groups a ‘voice’ will involve providing them with information about 
choices and helping them to communicate with healthcare professionals who are 
able to elicit and understand their concerns.
331
 At the same time the original NHS 
settlement value is being defended.
332
  
The need by policy-makers to rely on the ambiguities and tensions of the traditional 
values of the NHS to justify their policies is no doubt due to the importance placed 
by the public on the principles underlying the NHS, so that any explicit movement 
away from them could cause significant political damage.
333
 More recently the 
political discourse has turned from patient choice to the specific patient treatment 
choice policies of personalised healthcare and personal health budgets with their 
greater openness to CAM. It is suggested that these policies have equally been 
defended by policy-makers of different political parties as adhering to the founding 
principles of the NHS.   
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1.5. Patient treatment choice in defence of the original 
settlement 
Choice of treatment for the patient has been linked by governments in recent years 
with the notion of personalised healthcare in which patients receive a more tailored 
service.
334
 It can be illustrated by the introduction of the concept of personal health 
budgets in the NHS under New Labour in 2009.
335
 The current coalition government 
has continued the support for personal health budgets.
336
  
1.5.1 The policy of personalised healthcare  
Lord Darzi’s report High Quality Care for All explains the concept of personalised 
healthcare under New Labour. The report states that people ‘expect not just services 
that are there when they need them, and treat them how they want them to, but that 
they can influence and shape for themselves’,337 and ‘want care that is personal to 
them’,338 concluding that ‘a health service without freedom of choice is not 
personalised’.339 Liberating the NHS: Greater Choice and Control, the White Paper 
of the current coalition government, states that personalised care planning is ‘about 
engaging people in making choices about how they want to manage their care’; 
‘about setting personal goals and receiving appropriate support to achieve those 
goals as equal partners with health care professionals’ and ‘about treating a person 
                                                 
334
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as a whole, recognising that there are other issues in addition to medical needs that 
can impact on a person’s total health and wellbeing’.340  
The personal health budgets in turn aimed to help ‘ people to get the services they 
need to achieve their health outcomes, by letting them take as much control over 
how money is spent on their care as is appropriate for them’.341 Foreshadowed in 
High Quality Care for All under New Labour, personal health budgets, which are 
voluntary, were intended for patients with fairly stable and predictable conditions, 
such as patients with long-term chronic conditions.
342
 According to Personal Health 
Budgets: First Steps, the personal health budgets were to allow patients to ‘buy’ a 
package of services in addition to the comprehensive primary medical services 
provided by GPs.
343
 Likewise, the current coalition government’s White Paper 
Liberating the NHS: Greater Choice and Control speaks of shared decision-making 
as being central to developing effective personalised care-plans for people with 
long-term conditions, with choice playing an ‘important role in promoting equality 
and reducing inequalities’, but also encouraging ‘healthcare providers to tailor their 
services to what people want and to improve their quality and efficiency’.344 
Personal health budgets play a big part in choice and personalised care planning, and 
are ‘an extension of personalised care planning’ giving people ‘more control over the 
money that is spent on their care’.
345
 
1.5.2 Personalised healthcare and equity 
The justification for these treatment choice policies by both the New Labour and the 
coalition governments was in terms of the original NHS settlement. Thus Lord 
Darzi’s report stated that ‘providing personalised care should also help us to reduce 
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health inequalities, as the households with the lowest incomes are most likely to 
contain a member with a long-term condition’.346 Likewise, New Labour’s personal 
health budget scheme expressly underlined that the key principles of the NHS are to 
be upheld, specifically ‘equality and tackling inequalities’.347  
While the coalition government also explained these policies as linked to the value 
of equity, choice and personalisation of healthcare could not be separated from the 
issue of cost management in the NHS.
348
 Efficiency, mentioned on twenty-five 
occasions in the White Paper Equity and Excellence, and costs, mentioned on thirty 
occasions, are a central theme. Efficiency in particular is a major driver: decision-
making by patients about their own health and care, and patient choice, are amongst 
the changes intended to bring about a ‘revolution in NHS efficiency’349 while stating 
at the same time that ‘[the] intention is to secure excellence as well as equity’.350 
Policy-makers thus utilise equity to make their policies palatable to the public, to 
construct a convincing narrative whether or not the value of equity can be 
satisfied.
351
 Clearly, however, the issue of cost management in the NHS is one of the 
central political concerns; at the forefront of the political debate is still the question 
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of how the rising costs of the NHS are to be managed.
352
 The NHS which offers 
choice and personalised healthcare to the patient is a health service where patients 
are expected to be more active and more involved in their own care.
353
 To this end, 
choice and personalised care have increasingly been linked with the theme of 
‘responsibilisation’, or individuals taking responsibility for their lifestyle choices in 
relation to health. Affording patients choice makes patients therefore an unwitting 
tool in political manoeuvres of cost containment.
354
 The shift to patients taking more 
control over the management of their health and their healthcare reduces their 
dependence on the NHS, and has the potential benefit of reducing the costs of 
publicly funded healthcare
355
 while at the same time deepening the commitment to 
the value of solidarity.
356
 
1.5.3 Personalised healthcare and solidarity 
High Quality Care for All speaks of patients being enabled to self-care,
357
 patients 
who are empowered by choice being more likely to take responsibility,
358
 and people 
being encouraged to take responsibility for their own health throughout their lives.
359
 
Similarly in Personal Health Budgets: First Steps references are made to ‘the 
                                                 
352
 K Veitch, ‘The Government of Health Care and the Politics of Patient Empowerment: New Labour 
and the NHS Reform Agenda in England’ (2010) 32 Law & Policy 313, 320; cf P Spicker, 
‘Personalisation Falls Short’ (2012) British Journal of Social Work 1, 7 arguing, in the context of social 
care, that there are growing doubts that savings are to be made with personal health budgets so 
that other things being equal, personalisation will be no cheaper than the alternatives, and may be 
more expensive. 
353
 C Needham, ‘Interpreting Personalization in England’s National Health Service: A Textual Analysis’ 
(2009) 3 Critical Policy Studies 204, 207. 
354
 I Whiteman, ‘The Fallacy of Choice in the Common Law and NHS Policy’ (2011) Health Care 
Analysis, forthcoming <www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22109706> accessed February 2012 
referring to K Veitch, ‘The Government of Health Care and the Politics of Patient Empowerment: 
New Labour and the NHS Reform Agenda in England’ (2010) 32 Law & Policy 313. 
355
 K Veitch, ‘The Government of Health Care and the Politics of Patient Empowerment: New Labour 
and the NHS Reform Agenda in England’ (2010) 32 Law & Policy 313, 320. 
356
 C Needham, ‘Interpreting Personalization in England’s National Health Service: A Textual Analysis’ 
(2009) 3 Critical Policy Studies 204, 213 referring to New Labour’s avowed aim to use 
personalisation in order to deepen solidarity and equity within the NHS. 
357
 Department of Health, High Quality Care for All: NHS Next Stage Review: Final Report (HMSO 
2008) 40. 
358
 ibid 33. 
359
 ibid 319.  
73 
 
individual’s own responsibility and accountability’,360 people having independence 
and choice but also responsibility,
361
 people exercising their choice around support 
for self-care,
362
 a culture shift in care planning starting from the assumption of self-
care and control,
363
 and support for self-care and self-management.
364
 The current 
government’s White Paper Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS and the 
consultation paper Liberating the NHS: Greater Choice and Control continues this 
theme of responsibilisation. Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS suggests 
that patients, in return for greater choice and control, should accept responsibility for 
the choices they make
365
 and the need for increasing self-care.
366
 Liberating the 
NHS: Greater Choice and Control addresses responsibilisation as patients taking 
more responsibility for their health and treatment choices
367
 and building ownership 
of, and a shared responsibility for, managing their conditions, especially where 
lifestyle changes may be needed.
368
 It also suggests that people living with long-term 
conditions should exercise choice around the self-care support they receive, so that 
they can manage their condition better and take more control over their health and 
wellbeing.
369
 Patients are therefore positioned not only as conscious choosers of 
possible treatments but also as choosers of their lifestyle, and must therefore take 
greater responsibility for making healthy choices.
370
 This emphasis on the individual 
to assume responsibility for the management of her own health and healthcare and 
making responsible choices is also encapsulated in the NHS Constitution: ‘You 
                                                 
360
 Department of Health, Personal Health Budgets: First Steps (HMSO 2009) 29. 
361
 ibid 38. 
362
 ibid 30. 
363
 ibid 29. 
364
 ibid 11. 
365
 Department of Health, Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS (HMSO 2010) 16. 
366
 ibid 46. 
367
 Department of Health, Liberating the NHS: Greater Choice and Control, a Consultation on 
Proposals (HMSO 2010) 23. 
368
 ibid 4. 
369
 ibid 26. 
370
 I Greener, ‘Towards a History of Choice in UK Health Policy’ (2009) 31 Sociology of Health and 
Illness 309, 315, 322.  
74 
 
should recognise that you can make a significant contribution to your own, and your 
family’s good health and well-being and take some personal responsibility for it.’371  
Making patients become more active and take responsibility for their health, 
reducing acute episodes and hospital admissions of patients with long-term chronic 
conditions, rather than being resource intensive might lead to resource savings. 
Linking responsibilisation to the traditional values of the NHS, it is possible for 
policy-makers to interpret responsibilisation as a commitment to the value of 
solidarity by lessening the cost of publicly funded healthcare.  
CAM and responsibilisation 
Responsibilisation by making patients take more control over their health is a 
concept also underlying the holistic healthcare model of CAM. Unlike the 
biomedical model, the adoption of CAM with its emphasis on self-management and 
self-care might support a government strategy of responsibilisation, particularly of 
patients with chronic illnesses where CAM treatments have their place. Viewed in 
this light, personal health budgets affording patients this choice might therefore 
achieve their intended purpose: patients’ reliance on CAM might lead to growing 
self-reliance in health matters and even help curtail the rising costs of healthcare in 
the field of chronic care. According to the report on the early experiences of budget 
holders, patients planned on using their healthcare budgets amongst other things on 
CAM, namely chiropractic, osteopathy and acupuncture but also therapies without 
any scientific basis
372
 such as Reiki, massage, reflexology, aromatherapy and 
hydrotherapy.
373
  
For policy-makers the ability to defend their patient treatment choice policies as 
consistent with the original settlement values helps to deflect the criticism of choice 
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opponents who view these policies as a strategy for cost reduction by encouraging 
marketisation and possible privatisation.
374
 Cost containment is clearly a major 
concern for the NHS
375
 but to suggest that the underlying motivation is 
marketisation and possible privatisation of the NHS may be too narrow an 
explanation. The management of costs through policies of personalisation and 
concurrent responsibilisation need not necessarily be a policy concentrated 
exclusively on the extension of a market model. As has been argued, market 
mechanisms have not been the most efficient means to achieve cost savings in a 
publicly funded healthcare system.376  
1.6. Patient treatment choice as a mechanism of 
destabilisation 
Rather than being viewed as a coherent theme or narrative in developing a market 
model in healthcare, the policies of treatment choice, personalisation and 
responsibilisation ought to be viewed as also allowing different interpretations.377 It 
is argued that policy-makers may be using these policies as a strategy of 
destabilisation, stirring up the entrenched institutional architecture of the NHS and 
encouraging reform.
378
 This destabilisation strategy is clearly motivated to a large 
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extent by the need for fiscal austerity.
379
 However, the motivation is certainly more 
complex and may include other intentions such as quality improvement, greater 
efficiency and responsiveness, and administrative modernisation
380
 of the NHS. It 
may of course also have a populist motivation, based on increasing consumer 
satisfaction for reasons of electoral politics.
381
 It is suggested that patients 
demanding increased access to CAM in the NHS may become the unwitting 
beneficiaries of this strategy of destabilisation.   
Choice as ‘a proxy for instability as a dynamic of system reform’382 is the 
explanation for the patient treatment choice and personalisation in New Labour’s 
policy documents.
383
 From a textual analysis of these documents Needham, for 
example, concludes that personalisation is a narrative of disruption in response to 
organisational failure and is depicted in many texts as ‘a “radical agenda” which will 
shake up the health service.’384 As Needham states, a destabilisation agenda can be 
detected in the development of the personal health budgets.
385
 In addition, she 
identifies that New Labour had a further ‘clear agenda to encourage destabilisation’ 
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with the encouragement of a diverse range of providers likely to lead to volatility 
with ‘exit’ by commissioners and also patients.386  
The current government’s patient treatment choice policies can likewise be regarded 
as a strategy of destabilisation albeit with a pronounced link to marketisation and 
privatisation mechanisms. The personal health budgets as part of the agenda for 
personalisation of healthcare are clearly a major system-level reform affecting the 
use of a wide range of services and support in the NHS.
387
 The Health and Social 
Care Act 2012 enshrines the most extensive reorganisation of the structure of the 
English NHS to date, extending primary care provision to include ‘any qualified 
provider’388 intending to encourage ‘fair and effective competition … [as] a means 
to give greater choice and control to patients to access high quality care’.389 
Necessarily a commissioning of services currently outside the scope of NHS 
provision is likely to encourage a reorganisation of the primary care sector and to 
lead to changed practices within the NHS.  
CAM could become one of the beneficiaries of this governmental reform as the 
volatility in the primary care sector may in turn open up a greater space for CAM 
within the NHS.
390
 Particularly in general practice, there has been a depreciation of 
the claims to expertise by orthodox medical practitioners,
391
 with the changing 
relation between complementary and orthodox medicine becoming noticeable. More 
extensive incorporation of CAM in health service provision has also been aided by 
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the change in the special relationship between the state and the medical profession 
since 1990 and the regulation of the professions of osteopaths and chiropractors 
under Acts of Parliament. At the same time, the current restructuring of expertise in 
general practice may be a populist move, particularly regarding patients suffering 
from intractable chronic conditions not amenable to cure by conventional 
medicine.
392
 However, the greater incorporation of CAM in public health service 
provision may additionally have economic benefits because of the potentially lower 
cost of CAM and the possible reduced need for medical personnel.
393
 Lastly, it may 
also allow a reformulation of the meaning of the ‘comprehensiveness’ of the NHS. 
1.7. Conclusion 
As has been discussed, the current policies of patient choice and patient treatment 
choice have been challenged on a number of levels. Choice as a proxy for 
competition and efficiency is criticised as a mechanism for the marketisation and 
privatisation of the NHS and, as such, anathema to the value of equity, but whether 
choice leads to efficiency gains is far from clear. Patient choice has further been 
challenged for its inequity-inducing effects as having a negative impact on 
geographical equity of access, on equity of access according to need and also in 
terms of patients with different levels of abilities and different levels of health 
literacy. However, policy-makers are able to justify their policies by relying on the 
traditional values of the NHS due to their ambiguity and haziness.  
It has also been shown that more recently policy-makers have turned to the specific 
treatment choice policies of personalisation of healthcare and personal health 
budgets. These have been linked with the notion of responsibilisation, which also 
underlies CAM with its emphasis on self-management and self-care. Reduced 
dependency on the NHS through the responsibilisation of patients could simply be 
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regarded as supporting the founding value of solidarity by reducing patient 
dependence on the NHS and containing costs. A patient choice of CAM could be 
advocated in this light. However, it has been argued that the patient choice policy 
may be motivated by different political objectives. Policy-makers may be using it as 
a mechanism to destabilise the institutional structure of the NHS encouraging 
change and reform. This volatility might reconfigure the space for CAM within the 
NHS and support the ongoing restructuring of the relations between orthodox and 
complementary medicine. Although it might be seen as a populist move by 
government it may also entail cost savings for the NHS. 
These macro-level policy arguments, however, fail to take into account that in 
practice healthcare decisions are made at the micro-level, between patients and 
doctors, and at the meso-level between patients and PCTs, or in future CCGs. Thus, 
notwithstanding the macro-level policy of patient treatment choice
394
 patients’ 
choice of CAM may be compromised at the micro- and meso-levels, with patients’ 
demand for CAM frustrated by GPs opposing the use of CAM by their patients
395
 
and PCTs only funding CAM in exceptional cases.
396
 The interpretation of patient 
choice of treatment at the micro-level is discussed in the next chapter.  
  
                                                 
394
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Chapter 2 
Destabilising effects at the micro-level: Patient 
treatment choice in the courts and in the consulting 
room  
2.1. Introduction 
Policy-makers embrace the principle of patient treatment choice, linking it with the 
concept of patient responsibilisation, patient self-care and self-management. At the 
same time they subject the right to choice of treatment to the condition that treatment 
should be clinically ‘appropriate’. Which treatment a patient will actually receive, 
however, is a micro-level decision reached at the level of the medical practitioner 
and the patient. In most cases there is no conflict between doctor and patient and the 
patient will receive her preferred treatment. With chronic conditions where patients 
are often experts about their symptoms and their responses to treatment, the decision 
may even be that complementary alternative therapy, amongst the various 
therapeutic options, is a suitable option.  
This chapter discusses the less common situation of a conflict between doctor and 
patient, where the doctor deems the patient’s desired choice of treatment 
inappropriate or offers a range of treatments which do not include the patient’s 
preferred option. When conflict arises and the patient, relying on the political 
discourse of NHS choice and her right to choose, rejects the treatment or treatments 
offered by the doctor and demands her preferred choice, medical law becomes 
involved, and associated with it a concept as open to interpretation as the policy-
makers’ rhetoric: the concept of patient autonomy.  
The chapter demonstrates that the rhetoric of autonomy employed by the courts in 
cases where the patient chooses to refuse or demand a specific treatment is in many 
cases of little benefit to the patient. In treatment refusal cases, conceptually based on 
the tort of battery and the lack of consent by the patient to bodily interference, the 
judicial conception of autonomy has tended towards a liberal interpretation as an 
absolute right to reject treatment.  However, even in refusal cases, this rights 
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discourse is not unlimited but constrained by the judicial determination of a patient’s 
deemed lack of capacity and inability to refuse consent.   
The language of autonomy and rights has been transferred to claims for a specific 
treatment based on the common law
397
 and as an infringement of the right to respect 
for one’s private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).
398
  The decisions in cases such as Burke
399
 and Glass
400
 
lead, however, to the conclusion that the judicial interpretation of patient choice is in 
conflict with the choice rhetoric of policy-makers at the macro-level and that 
patients cannot rely on the concept of autonomy in its liberal sense to justify a claim 
for a specific treatment, whether such treatment is orthodox or complementary 
alternative medicine (CAM) treatment. 
It is argued, however, that litigation between patients and doctors involving claims 
of rights, while not achieving the desired objective of acknowledging patients’ 
demand for specific treatment, also does not only affect the immediate parties to an 
action; the precedential dimensions of the common law extend beyond the individual 
case and such litigation is having a destabilising effect on healthcare practices and 
regulations. Doctors faced with patient demands will generally rely on the guidance 
of their regulatory body, the General Medical Council (GMC), which, while 
reflecting the decisions in the case law, goes much further than the common law to 
accommodate patients’ preferences. To that extent at least, the more open attitude of 
many general practitioners (GPs) to consumer demand for CAM may well be an 
indirect outcome of the destabilising effect of patient litigation.  
The chapter first gives a brief outline of different ethical conceptions of autonomy 
which are then compared with the inconsistent judicial interpretation of autonomy in 
treatment refusal cases and then proceeds to an analysis of the sparse case law on 
patient choice as a right to demand a specific treatment.  
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2.2. The many faces of autonomy 
Since the publication in 1977 of Beauchamp and Childress’s book, Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics,
401
 the bioethical, and to some extent also the legal, discourse has 
been dominated by the principle of autonomy.
402
 We live in the time of the triumph 
of autonomy in bioethics.
403
 Not only medical ethics but also law today is dominated 
by the paradigm of the autonomy of the patient.
404
 The mastery of patient autonomy 
is, however, not without its opponents amongst bioethicists as well as lawyers.
405
 As 
has been suggested, one of the underlying problems with the concept of autonomy is 
that ‘there are almost as many different conceptions as there are commentators 
writing on the subject’.406 Gerald Dworkin, for example, equates the multi-faceted 
concept of autonomy with liberty, self-rule or sovereignty, freedom of will, dignity, 
individuality, independence, responsibility, self-knowledge, self-assertion, critical 
reflection, freedom from obligation, absence of external causation and knowledge of 
one’s own interests.407 These different conceptions of autonomy, developed in 
philosophy and bioethics, are based on the interpretations by libertarian, liberal, 
principled and relational autonomists. An outline of these interpretations of 
autonomy is sketched to highlight the approach taken by English judges when 
                                                 
401
 T Beauchamp and J Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (6th edn, OUP 2008). 
402
 See eg M Brazier, ‘Do No Harm – Do Patients Have Responsibilities Too?’ (2006) CLJ 397; J 
Coggon, ‘Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: Justifiable Inconsistency 
or Blinkered Moralism’ (2007) 15 Health Care Analysis 235; G Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of 
Autonomy (CUP 1997); C Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in 
Medical Ethics and Law (Hart 2009); A Maclean, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law: A 
Relational Challenge (CUP 2009); S McLean, Autonomy, Consent and the Law (Routledge-Cavendish 
2010); J Montgomery, ‘Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26 LS 185; O O’Neill, 
Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (CUP 2002); K Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law (Ashgate 
2007).  
403
 C Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy. Patients, Doctors, and Medical Decisions (OUP 1998) xi. 
404
 ibid 3; R Gillon, ‘Ethics Needs Principles – Four Can Encompass the Rest – and Respect for 
Autonomy Should Be “First among Equals”’ [2003] J Med Ethics 301, 310. 
405
 M Brazier, ‘Do No Harm – Do Patients Have Responsibilities Too?’ (2006) CLJ 397; C Foster, 
Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law (Hart 2009); A 
Maclean, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law: A Relational Challenge (CUP 2009); S 
McLean, Autonomy, Consent and the Law (Routledge-Cavendish 2010); K Veitch, The Jurisdiction of 
Medical Law (Ashgate 2007). 
406
 A Maclean, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law: A Relational Challenge (CUP 2009) 10. 
407
 G Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (CUP 1997) 6. 
83 
 
adjudicating on patients’ healthcare choices whether in the area of refusal of 
treatment or demand for a specific treatment.  
2.2.1 Libertarian and liberal autonomy 
At a general level, libertarian autonomy is the right to self-determination supporting 
the idea of choice without presupposing any rational or moral decision-making by 
the person.
408
 It is a view of autonomy that equates it with ‘mere, sheer choice’.409 
The more meaningful liberal interpretation of autonomy limits individuals’ demands 
on society.
410
 Liberal autonomy is based on rational choosing offering more than 
sheer choice. The principal source for most conceptions of liberal or rational 
autonomy is John Stuart Mill.
411
 Choices are made by exercise of the ‘human 
faculties of perception, judgment, discriminate feeling, mental activity, and even 
moral preference’.412 But reasoned choice is not unrestricted; the freedom of the 
individual to choose is not absolute. While the individual is not accountable to 
society as long as his actions only concern his own interests; if his actions are 
prejudicial to the interests of others or cause harm to others, he may be subjected to 
social or legal punishment.
413
 Autonomy in either of these senses is concerned with 
the rights of individuals rather than with their obligations.  
2.2.2 Relational autonomy 
Relational autonomy rejects the notion of autonomy as the mere ability to make 
decisions. It acknowledges the inter-relationship of the person with society. Choices 
are considered as socially constructed and having consequences for the 
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community.
414
 Sheila McLean argues that, while relational autonomy does not seek 
to deny the importance of decisional freedom, it tries to constrain the excessive 
selfishness of individualistic autonomy.
415
 It also accepts that autonomous choices 
need to be made in response to obligations and responsibilities. Thus people are not 
merely decision-making machines, isolated from each other without obligations and 
responsibilities.
416
 ‘Relational autonomy recognises that no man is an island, but that 
we all exist in a network of relationships.’417 Of course, such a model of autonomy 
does not reject the concept of autonomy as rational self-determination and rational 
choice, and has been criticised as a misunderstanding of liberal autonomy. Liberal 
autonomy does not negate that most individuals value their relationships and take 
them into account when arriving at their autonomous decisions.
418
 Relational 
autonomists, however, see a moral component to the choices that the individual 
makes,
419
 whether this moral component is part of the obligation to engage in a 
process of joint decision-making between patient and healthcare professional and 
reach a decision which is autonomous,
420
 or private decisions are tested against their 
relational values. The choices of the individual are constrained because individuals 
do not tend to function in complete isolation from others.
421
 
2.2.3 Principled autonomy 
‘Principled autonomy’, to adopt O’Neill’s term, is the conception of autonomy set 
out in Kant’s writings. It grounds rights in obligations, based on Kant’s concept of 
autonomy manifested in ‘a life in which duties are met, in which there is respect for 
others and their rights, rather than in a life liberated from all bonds’.422 It is moral 
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autonomy
423
 as opposed to personal or liberal autonomy, originating with the idea 
that morality consists of self-enacted principles. In this conception, autonomy is not 
about acting arbitrarily but is about creating an ethical world constructed on the 
basis of obligations rather than rights.
424
 When speaking of rights, particularly in 
substantival ways, it is easy to imagine, according to O’Neill, that it is the individual 
making the rights claim against unspecified others or even at the world at large, 
whereas obligations of action or refraining from action have to be specified with 
specific claimants in mind.
425
 Thus focussing on obligations takes the relationship 
between obligation bearer and rights holder as central.
426
 In the context of a publicly 
funded, solidarity based healthcare system it may well be difficult not to consider 
obligations to others before considering an individual’s choice. 
The equivocal nature of the concept of autonomy in bioethics may lead to equally 
varied ways in which autonomy is used in law. Whichever of the various bioethical 
interpretations of autonomy is used by English judges, judicial interpretation ought 
to be consistent so that patients can predict whether their choices will be respected 
and will be enforceable. To determine whether patients have a legally enforceable 
choice, either when refusing treatment or demanding treatment such as CAM, it is 
necessary to analyse how judges translate autonomy into reality. 
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2.3. Autonomy in the courts 
Autonomy has, as Brazier points out, belatedly acquired its own mastery in English 
law.
427
 It has found a place in much of medical law but it is the law of consent that 
has been coined the ‘heartlands of autonomy’.428 It is the area where the results of 
judicial determinations include most references to autonomy as a reason for the 
decision.
429
 The ruling orthodoxy links autonomy with the right to self-
determination, the right to determine access to one’s body.430 To this extent at least, 
the definition of autonomy used by judges appears to come closest to the liberal or 
libertarian concept of autonomy. As Foster surmises, ‘the highly edited samples of 
philosophical thinking to which judges are exposed will paint Millian autonomy as 
the all-trumping principle’.431 The question is not only whether this judicial 
definition is unequivocal
432
 but whether autonomy is interpreted as a right to 
autonomy and thus synonymous with the idea of patients’ rights.433 As Brazier 
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suggests, autonomy has gradually become a claim to a right to health care, the health 
care of one’s choice rather than simply the right to protect one’s bodily integrity.434   
Before turning to consider a possible right to a specific treatment it is necessary to 
examine the protection that the tort of battery, on which the right to refuse treatment 
is grounded, provides to the patient. It is the tort of battery or trespass which is the 
bodyguard of autonomy and protects bodily integrity.
435
  
2.4. Autonomy and refusal of treatment 
As has been suggested, the courts, rather than subordinating healthcare practice to 
legal control, have avoided developing hard rules which would curb the power of the 
medical profession, except in the area concerning the right of competent adults to 
refuse treatment.
436
 Thus the touching of a person without his or her consent is 
prima facie unlawful and consent, in the context of treatment, has the legal function 
of making the touching of the patient by the doctor lawful.
437
 Its ethical function is 
the respect of the patient’s autonomy,438 ensuring that unwanted treatment cannot be 
provided even if the doctor believes it to be in the interest of the patient.
439
  
Where the patient has not given her consent to treatment, a doctor who intentionally 
commits an act causing direct contact with the patient’s body is liable for the tort 
(and possibly the crime) of battery or trespass to the person.
440
 Thus, in Judge 
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Cardozo’s well known statement in the US case of Schloendorff v Society of New 
York Hospital: ‘Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault for which he is liable in 
damages.’441 As Lord Donaldson MR formulated the principle in English law:  
The law requires that an adult patient who is mentally and physically capable 
of exercising a choice must consent if medical treatment of him is to be 
lawful … Treating him without his consent or despite a refusal of consent 
will constitute the civil wrong of trespass to the person and may constitute a 
crime.
442
 
The tort of battery entails active physical interference in the absence of consent. It 
does not extend to non-invasive treatment such as the prescription of therapeutic 
drugs, but includes the examination of the patient, taking blood, giving injections 
and surgery.
443
 Further and major limitations for an action for battery are the 
definition of what counts as consent,
444
 i.e. the need for the consent to be 
voluntary,
445
 real
446
 and given by a patient who has capacity.
447
 Although the judicial 
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definition of each of these requirements poses a risk to the protection of a patient’s 
autonomy, it is the definition of capacity which poses the greatest risk, which makes 
the qualified judicial support for patient autonomy apparent.
448
  
As Teff argues, the focus of the law is on whether or not the battery has technically 
been committed and not on whether there has been a failure to respect the claimant’s 
right to self-determination; the focus of the law is not on patient autonomy or choice 
                                                                                                                                         
which others might regard as sensible. It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the 
choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.’  
448
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treatment against Ms B’s expressed wishes constituted battery. 
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as such.
449
 The emphasis on the technical aspects of battery is particularly apparent 
when the rules on capacity are being stretched to deprive some patients of their 
residual autonomy.
450
 Generally, as long as the individual understands the nature of 
the decision and its risks, or is able to weigh up the information about the decision, 
she is deemed to have capacity and therefore has an absolute right of refusal, even if 
the choice leads to irreparable damage to health, or even to death.
451
  
It may of course not always be easy to decide whether a patient has simply unwise or 
irrational views or is unable to understand the nature of the decision. Although 
judges claim not to be interested in the nature and rationality of a refusal decision, as 
Veitch states, they are very much concerned with these when assessing capacity.
452
 
The irrationality of a decision sometimes constitutes evidence of incompetence, 
particularly where refusal of treatment has serious consequences or a mental health 
issue is involved.
453
 In a number of refusal cases it appears therefore that judges 
simply pay lip service to the autonomy of the patient, in the sense of liberal 
autonomy, while attempting to arrive at the ‘right’ outcome.454 Some authors have 
suggested that autonomy in these cases was interpreted by the courts as principled 
autonomy,
455
 or relational autonomy,
456
 thus enabling the refusal of the patient to be 
disregarded without offending the concept of autonomy.   
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Whether or not judges give different meanings to autonomy, since they are loathe to 
find doctors liable for the tort (and more so the crime) of battery, consent and its 
ethical correlate – autonomy – are better regarded as subsidiary to, or part of, the tort 
of battery rather than as free-standing elements. However, both consent and 
autonomy have taken on a life of their own in other areas of the law
457
 and autonomy 
has been relied on in cases of demand for treatment, to which this chapter now turns.  
2.5. Autonomy and demand for specific treatment 
While non-consensual touching amounts to battery, and not respecting a competent 
patient’s refusal of treatment would necessitate non-consensual touching, a demand 
for treatment is not an interference with one’s bodily integrity. The right not to have 
one’s bodily integrity infringed means that the doctor has a duty not to operate on or 
treat a patient without her consent
458
 but it does not follow that the patient has a right 
to choose or demand a specific treatment. As Lord Donaldson MR stated obiter in 
Re J: 
No one can dictate the treatment to be given to the child, neither court, 
parents nor doctors. There are checks and balances. The doctors can 
recommend treatment A in preference to treatment B. They can also refuse to 
adopt treatment C on the grounds that it is medically contra-indicated or for 
some other reason is a treatment which they could not conscientiously 
                                                                                                                                         
pregnant woman who not only considers the consequences for herself of refusing a Caesarean 
section but prioritises the welfare of her baby.  
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administer. The court or parents for their part can refuse to consent to 
treatment A or B or both, but cannot insist on treatment C.
459
  
That an English court will not order a doctor to administer a specific treatment was 
also emphasised by Leggatt LJ in Re J, a later case, in a unanimous decision by the 
Court of Appeal: 
I can myself envisage no circumstances in which it would be right directly or 
indirectly to require a doctor to treat a patient in a way that was contrary to 
the doctor’s professional judgment and duty to the patient. A court can give 
or withhold a consent or authority such as might be given or withheld by a 
patient or a child's parent. But no reported case has been cited to the court in 
which any judge in any jurisdiction has ever purported to order a doctor to 
treat a patient in a particular way contrary to the doctor's will until Waite J 
made his order in the present case.
460
 
The courts in these cases defer to the judgment of doctors as knowing which 
treatment is medically indicated or is ‘clinically appropriate’. The emphasis is not on 
the autonomy of the patient but rather on the doctor’s clinical discretion or medical 
autonomy although medical autonomy cannot be unfettered.
461
 Medical autonomy is 
underlined in English law by reference to the doctor having a duty to act in the 
patient’s best interests.462 Thus Lord Donaldson MR: 
The fundamental issue … is whether the court … should ever require a 
medical practitioner … to adopt a course of treatment which in the bona fide 
clinical judgment of the practitioner concerned is contra-indicated as not 
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being in the best interests of the patient … I cannot at present conceive of 
any circumstances in which this would be other than an abuse of power as 
directly or indirectly requiring the practitioner to act contrary to the 
fundamental duty which he owes to his patient. This … is to treat the patient 
in accordance with his own best clinical judgment.
463
 
This raises the question, however, whether under the guise of best interest courts are 
not authorising doctors to make choices that may reflect other than the patient’s 
interests and which may be choices that go against the patient’s expressed views.464 
It also raises the question whether the duty of the doctor to the patient and the 
exercise of her clinical judgment are not conflated in English law.
465
 
Where does this leave the right to self-determination and the principle of autonomy 
giving patients the right of choice and not simply the right to refuse treatment? Is the 
right to choose not what patients are led to expect from the NHS choice policy? As 
Brazier argues, ‘an emphasis on choice within the NHS increasingly results in 
clamour that patients must be given what they demand. Autonomy is extended to an 
argument that it creates an obligation on doctors to satisfy that choice.’466 Autonomy 
is expressed in terms of rights, and denying patients their CAM treatment of choice 
in the NHS might arguably be considered unjust because other patients can afford to 
pay for it privately. After all, treating liberal autonomy with full theoretical rigour 
ought to include a right to choose one’s treatment of choice.467 Patients are led to 
expect that autonomy is the main value, and that autonomy puts them in control of 
their healthcare choices. Or is the patient’s autonomy limited to giving consent to 
one or the other treatment on offer and to the question whether the consent was 
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sufficiently informed?
468
 The patient’s right to demand a specific treatment came 
before the courts in the case of Burke
469
 to which the chapter now turns. 
2.5.1 The case of Burke and the common law 
Mr Burke suffered from spino-cerebral ataxia, a degenerative brain condition which 
takes a very similar course to multiple sclerosis and had confined him to a 
wheelchair. At some time in the future he would be likely to require artificial 
nutrition and hydration (ANH) while still mentally competent. He would later 
become totally immobilised, dependent on others and unable to communicate but 
still retaining full cognitive faculties even at the end stage of his illness. He would 
therefore still be aware of the pain and distress due to malnutrition and dehydration 
should ANH be withdrawn. Mr Burke was concerned about the GMC guidance for 
doctors on withholding and withdrawing treatments that may prolong life, issued in 
2002.
470
 He believed that a doctor might interpret these guidelines as authorising 
withdrawal of ANH despite the express wishes of a patient to continue receiving 
such treatment as long as possible. Mr Burke wanted to receive ANH until he died 
from natural causes.  
Munby J, in a lengthy judgment in the High Court, granted the declaration of the 
unlawfulness of some of the paragraphs of the guidelines sought by Mr Burke. The 
judgment is remarkable because of Munby J’s emphasis on the right to autonomy as 
the right to self-determination. He appeared to deduce this free-standing right of 
autonomy from cases involving the torts of battery and negligence.
471
 As Foster 
concludes: ‘The ratio of Munby J’s judgment can be said to be: Autonomy trumps 
all.’472 Rather than speaking of the duty by the doctor to provide treatment, Munby J 
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emphasised the patient’s rights under the common law,473 noting that the duty the 
doctor owes is a duty to act in the best interests of what the patient considers to be 
his best interests: 
The duty to care is, in principle a duty to provide that treatment which is in 
the best interest of the patient … Doctors can properly claim expertise on 
medical matters; but they can claim no special expertise on the many non-
medical matters which go to form the basis of any decision as to what is in 
the patient’s best interests. Medical opinion, however eminent, can never be 
determinative of what is in a patient’s best interest. In the final analysis it is 
for the patient, if competent, to determine what is in his own best interests.
474
 
(My italics) 
Best interests: the patient’s or the doctor’s view? 
As Biggs points out, Munby J’s discussion of the relationship between the concepts 
of autonomy, best interests and patients’ demands was held to be unhelpful by the 
Court of Appeal.
475
 Not surprisingly, Munby J’s advocacy in the High Court was 
overturned. Lord Phillips MR criticised the use of ‘best interests’ in the context of 
the competent patient.
476
 Using best interests in this way would suggest that ‘treating 
a patient in the manner that doctors consider to be in his best interests may be at 
odds with the patient’s wishes’.477 Rather, the ‘best interests’ test was of most use 
when considering the duty owed to an incompetent patient, and easiest to apply 
                                                                                                                                         
particular treatment since to require a doctor to act moves the question from being purely self-
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where the relevant interests were medical.
478
 All the same, the doctor owes a duty to 
her patient to administer such treatment as is in the patient’s best interests,479 a duty 
generally determined by the Bolam test,
480
 meaning that the doctor should provide 
treatment regarded as proper by a ‘responsible body of medical opinion’.481 Munby 
J’s distinction of Bolam and best interests, with the former only concerning clinical 
perspectives, was rejected by Lord Phillips.
482
 His Lordship, therefore, in Miola’s 
words, effectively ‘re-Bolamised’ the concept of best interests.483  
Clinically indicated treatment  
To dispel the GMC’s concern that doctors might be forced to accede to a patient’s 
demand for a specific treatment, Lord Phillips offered the following guidance:  
The doctor, exercising his professional judgment, decides what treatment 
options are clinically indicated, (i.e. will provide overall clinical benefit) for 
his patient … Where the patient wants a treatment which the doctor has not 
offered to him the doctor will, no doubt, discuss that form of treatment with 
him (assuming that it is a form of treatment known to him) but if the doctor 
concludes that this treatment is not clinically indicated he is not required (i.e. 
he is under no legal obligation) to provide it to the patient.
484
  
Although Burke dealt with the specific facts of a patient demanding ANH at the end 
of life, the Court of Appeal’s dicta are as all-encompassing as those of Munby J. It 
appears that whether or not a treatment is clinically indicated is decided by the 
doctor who is entitled to exercise her therapeutic discretion in making her 
assessment of the best interests of a competent patient.
485
 Thus, a doctor can 
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legitimately decide that certain treatments are not in the best interests of a patient 
and need not be made available. For example, she may not consider CAM to be in 
the best interests of a patient and therefore need not offer such a treatment.  
Both the expression ‘clinically indicated’ and the Bolamisation of the best interests 
of the patient are arguably open to criticism.
486
 Not only does ‘the doctor’s judgment 
about a treatment being “clinically indicated” import an old-fashioned doctor-
knows-best paternalism into the process of medical decision-making’,487 but a 
Bolamised best interests test also ensures that, despite policy-makers’ rhetoric, 
common law leaves patients’ treatment choice firmly within the medical 
profession’s discretion. It also amounts to a disregard of patient autonomy in its 
liberal interpretation.  
While Munby J did not consider the specific case before him as involving a question 
of resource allocation, it may be possible to imply a principled interpretation of 
autonomy in the Court of Appeal’s decision, especially if one considers the effect of 
a patient’s right to demand treatment on other patients. In the context of refusal 
cases Veitch, for example, argues that as blind faith in medical paternalism is no 
longer considered acceptable by the judiciary, the use of principled autonomy 
captures the idea of responsible choice. Thus ‘principled autonomy … offers the 
possibility of stressing the importance of patients being able to decide for 
themselves, while … allowing for an investigation into the extent to which they have 
met various indeterminate standards of obligation and responsibility.’488 In this view, 
the request for a specific treatment might not be responsible and the expression of 
independent reason, and the rejection of a right to choose can thus be defended by 
turning to patients’ and doctors’ obligations and duties. Clinical discretion as to what 
treatment is appropriate is determined by the doctor’s obligation of doing the ‘right’ 
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thing for her patient. Patients’ moral and legal obligations are then seen as deciding 
in favour of one of the offered treatment options, including no treatment.
489
  
While the common law and reliance on principled autonomy does little to 
accommodate patients’ rights, Mr Burke also claimed his right to autonomy under 
human rights principles, which will be discussed next. 
2.5.2 Human rights law and patient autonomy 
The central role of human rights in healthcare is of relatively recent origin in the 
English courts as, traditionally, healthcare disputes between doctor and patient 
regarding the provision and quality of healthcare were considered primarily as an 
aspect of tort law.
490
 This is not to say that there have not been criticisms of the 
regulation of the practice of medicine by resort to the law of battery and also the law 
of negligence.
491
 For Kennedy, for example, medical law should be approached in 
terms of human rights, the rights of patients.
492
 To analyse the law wholly in terms 
of duties rather than rights ignores the imbalance or disequilibrium of power which 
exists in the doctor-patient relationship.
493
 The role of patients’ rights is to set 
permissible limits to the exercise of the doctor’s powers.494 As Montgomery points 
out, the view of medical law as human rights law can be contrasted with the non-
interventionist approach by judges presenting little threat to the autonomy of the 
professions and the hegemony of medicine, although things have begun to change.
495
 
Extra-judicially, judges themselves have acknowledged that the courts had treated 
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the medical profession with excessive deference
496
 but there is some evidence for a 
change occurring due an increasing awareness of patients’ rights. As Lord Woolf has 
stated: 
Like it or not, we have moved from a society which was primarily concerned 
with the duty individuals owed to society to one which is concerned 
primarily with the rights of the individual … The move to a rights-based 
society has fundamentally changed the behaviour of the courts.
497
 
Likewise, extrajudicially, Lord Irvine has stressed that the courts had become more 
interventionist and more reluctant to allow the medical profession dictate to them.
498
 
The ECHR, to which the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) gives effect, may 
encourage the courts to focus more on the patient’s rights and ‘this may prove not 
entirely compatible with what doctors have traditionally seen as their duties’.499  
Human rights law advocates a prioritisation of individual autonomy and rights in 
English medical law.
500
 Although Mason and Laurie express concern that embracing 
the language and values of the human rights discourse may lead to ‘overly-
individualistic notions of autonomy’ in the area of medical law, they accept that 
autonomy, although not specifically mentioned in the ECHR, forms part of the rights 
enjoying protection particularly as part of the respect due to private and family life 
under Article 8(1).
501
 The Article provides: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his 
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private and family life, his home and his correspondence’.502 It has been interpreted 
as including ‘a right to determine for ourselves how we live our lives, free from state 
interference, including in respect of what medical treatment we receive’.503 The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has confirmed this interpretation in the 
case of Pretty:
504
  
Although no previous case has established as such any right to self-
determination as being contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court 
considers that the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle 
underlying the interpretation of the guarantees.
505
 
The right protected is not just a right against arbitrary interference by the state and 
public authorities such as NHS Trusts and their staff, but extends to positive 
obligations by the state to protect those rights against positive or negative 
infringement by others.
506
 Rather than the negative aspect of autonomy as freedom 
from interference when making a choice between available options, this could be 
interpreted as the positive aspect of a patient’s autonomy which requires that 
unavailable choices are actively provided.
507
 Does Article 8 of the ECHR allow such 
a positive right to demand medical treatment which would make established English 
legal precedent inconsistent with the Convention? Prior to the coming into force of 
the Human Rights Act 1998, Buxton LJ had denied that Article 8 did provide such a 
right in R v North West Lancashire Health Authority, ex p A, D and G,
508
 a case that 
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involved the provision of gender reassignment surgery and the question of resource 
allocation.
509
  
Before turning to the case of Burke and the right to demand treatment under the 
Convention, we note that the right to demand treatment had already come before the 
court in Strasbourg in the case of Glass v UK.
510
 
Glass and the right to treatment under Article 8 ECHR  
David Glass, a twelve-year-old boy who was severely mentally and physically 
disabled, had been readmitted to hospital on several occasions with respiratory 
failure. The doctors considered his condition terminal and further intensive care 
inappropriate, prescribing diamorphine to relieve the child’s pain and suffering and 
putting a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order in the child’s notes, the latter without the 
mother’s knowledge. On discovering the order, the child’s mother and family 
objected, disagreeing with the doctor’s diagnosis and the administration of 
diamorphine as a palliative measure which they believed to amount to euthanasia. 
They demanded that life-preserving treatment should be provided
511
 but 
diamorphine was administered all the same. A fracas broke out between the family 
and doctors during which the mother resuscitated her son and the doctors were 
injured. Despite the doctors’ pessimistic prognosis the child’s condition improved 
and he was again discharged from hospital. The mother’s application for judicial 
review was rejected at first instance, a decision which was confirmed on appeal. 
‘Judicial review was too blunt a tool’ for the sensitive issues in such a case but that, 
in the case of a serious dispute between parents and doctors, the matter could be 
                                                 
509
 A Maclean, ‘A Crossing of the Rubicon on the Human Rights Ferry’ (2001) 64 MLR 775, 776 
arguing that the case is indicative of a restrictive approach to the interpretation of the HRA 1998; 
regarding resource allocation, see C Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of 
Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law (Hart 2009) 130, arguing that right to treatment will be 
affected by the scarcity of resources, and A Maclean, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
Individual’s Right to Treatment’ [2000] Medical L Intl 245, 249 arguing that the right to demand 
treatment is qualified by the government’s obligation to ensure the economic well being of the 
country or the protection of health of others under Article (2); for a discussion of the issue of 
resource allocation see chapter 4. 
510
 Glass v UK [2004] ECHR 102. 
511
 R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, ex p Glass (1999) 50 BMLR 269, 276. 
102 
 
brought before the court to decide on the best interests of the child.
512
 As Maclean 
points out, this case is a good example of the judiciary subordinating patients’ rights 
to doctors’ clinical judgment.513  
The child’s mother then applied to the ECtHR which held that the child’s Article 8 
rights had been infringed and the hospital trust ought to have sought a court 
judgment to resolve the disagreement. Pecuniary damages were awarded but the case 
did not conclude that doctors needed to provide treatment against their clinical 
judgment. Contrary to expectations in 2000,
514
 and although the Convention and 
therefore the HRA 1998 entail a different approach from the common law to 
determining the obligations of doctors and the rights of patients, the case does not 
suggest that patients can enforce a right to demand treatment. 
Burke and Article 8 ECHR 
As the case of Burke turned on the right to life-saving treatment, it also implicated 
several Convention Articles, including Article 2 (the right to life) and Article 3 (the 
right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment).
515
 It is, however, 
Article 8, the right to respect for private life, which is the issue. For Munby J, Article 
8 enshrined the principle of autonomy, expressed in Burke through an advance 
directive. As Munby J stated:  
The personal autonomy protected by Article 8 means that in principle it is for 
the competent patient, and not his doctor, to decide what treatment should or 
should not be given in order to achieve what the patient believes conduces to 
his dignity and in order to avoid what the patient would find distressing.
516
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Leaving aside considerations of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, what this statement 
amounts to is that a competent patient has a right to demand treatment, that the 
patient’s wishes are determinative. The interpretation of autonomy in its negative 
sense, bound up with consent and the tort of battery making the touching of the 
patient by the doctor unlawful, is changed to one which entitles the patient to 
determine her own treatment.  
As Mason and Laurie point out, Munby J speaks ‘of the “absolute nature” of the 
right to respect for autonomy and self-determination’.517 For some commentators 
this interpretation has far-reaching consequences and conflates autonomy with 
egotistical hedonism:
518
 it means that what the patient wants is what the patient 
gets.
519
 Other commentators are concerned that it might lead to doctors having to 
provide contra-indicated or inappropriate treatments according to the patient’s 
demands.
520
 Munby J’s judgment can therefore be regarded ‘as an assault on medical 
discretion’,521 ‘a thinly veiled attempt to empower patients’,522 widening the 
treatment choices available to Mr Burke, including the opportunity to have his own 
opinion about his best interests respected. In this light, the HRA 1998 has changed 
the relationship between doctor and patient to a less paternalistic and more rights-
based one in accordance with the principle of individual autonomy.
523
 This could 
cause the problem that doctors may feel pressurised to treat contrary to their clinical 
judgment. As Gurnham points out,
524
 Munby J avoids this by suggesting that a 
doctor need not treat a patient against her professional judgment but this did not 
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exonerate the doctor from her duty to find another doctor who will provide the 
treatment.
525
  
The Court of Appeal, in a single judgment by Lord Phillips MR, was scathing in its 
criticism of Munby J’s judgment.526 It rejected the rights based arguments preferring 
to express the case as one of doctors’ duties rather than patients’ rights.527 In the 
words of his Lordship: 
Autonomy and right of self-determination do not entitle the patient to insist 
on receiving a particular medical treatment regardless of the nature of the 
treatment. Insofar as a doctor has a legal obligation to provide treatment this 
cannot be founded simply upon the fact that the patient demands it. The 
source of the duty lies elsewhere.
528
 
The case of course turned on ANH rather than on treatment generally, and must be 
read in light of this. Thus ‘for a doctor deliberately to interrupt life-prolonging 
treatment in the face of the competent patient’s expressed wish to be kept alive, with 
the intention of thereby terminating the patient’s life, would leave the doctor with no 
answer to a charge of murder.’529 In the realm of medical treatment, whether or not 
at the end of life, the right the patient possesses is the right to refuse the treatment 
options which the doctor considers appropriate. As stated, albeit obiter, by his 
Lordship, ‘in truth the right to choose is no more than a reflection of the fact that it is 
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the doctor’s duty to provide a treatment that he considers to be in the interests of the 
patient and that the patient is prepared to accept’.530 Thus the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that the doctor’s view of the patient’s best interests is paramount 
when determining which treatments should be made available, and patients cannot 
demand a treatment not recommended by the doctor.
531
 As Gurnham concludes, the 
fundamental difference in approach between the two judgments is Munby J’s 
invocation of Convention rights and the enforceability of patients’ rights and the 
Court of Appeal’s reliance on the medical profession’s self-regulation.532  
Although human rights law could be ‘a powerful tool in controlling medical power’, 
it would not be difficult to conclude that the ECHR, as interpreted by the English 
courts, may be quite friendly to paternalistic medicine.
533
 English courts have been 
reluctant to make major changes, stressing the need for a restrained judicial role.
534
 
Although Article 8 includes a right to autonomy in its liberal sense, Maclean argues 
that judicial concern regarding clinical integrity (and also resource allocation) 
underlies the caution of the courts in interpreting human rights provisions.
535
 The 
rights under the HRA 1998 are interpreted ‘to ensure that they are compatible with 
the common law rather than by adapting the common law to concord with those 
rights.’536 Thus, Veitch concludes that deploying human rights to defend common 
law rules and principles necessarily diminishes the ability of the patient to use the 
human rights discourse as a means to criticise the content of the law.
537
 The rejection 
of a more proactive approach by the judiciary in favour of patients,
538
 and the 
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reassertion of a limited judicial function witnessed in the Court of Appeal in Burke, 
will leave treatment decisions litigated in the courts in the hands of the doctor.   
Litigation between patients and doctors involving claims of rights to specific 
treatment may not be successful in the courts but, as Sabel and Simon argue, tort 
litigation does not simply operate as a mechanism of dispute resolution.
539
 The 
precedential dimensions of common law adjudication extend beyond the parties to 
the action and shape the backdrop of general rules which regulate social 
interaction.
540
 Thus, in areas such as tort law, the common law has a tendency ‘to 
destabilise congealed social practices’.541 In the healthcare arena, private law 
litigation regarding patients’ rights to demand a specific treatment similarly has 
potentially destabilising effects on healthcare regulation and practices. These effects 
extend to the guidance provided by the regulatory body of the medical profession, 
the General Medical Council (GMC). This guidance has undergone frequent 
revisions and, despite the outcome of the decision in Burke,
542
 has generally been a 
step ahead of the common law requirements.
543
 It is to the GMC guidance the 
chapter turns next. 
2.6. GMC guidance 
Not only can professional guidance be more specific, but also doctors are more 
likely to be influenced by the professional guidance than by case law emerging from 
the courts.
544
 Doctors, rather than looking to the law, will look to the GMC for 
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guidance on managing patients’ expectations regarding choice of treatment. In turn 
the GMC’s role as regulator of the medical profession includes the power to advise 
its members on standards of professional performance and medical ethics.
545
 
Although not legally binding, GMC guidance functions as a benchmark for 
considering doctors’ fitness to practise and a basis of appraisal for NHS doctors.546 
In this light, the remainder of this chapter considers to what extent, in response to 
the destabilising effects of common law litigation, the GMC has encouraged a model 
of patient-centred care prioritising patients’ wishes concerning their treatment over 
and above what the common law demands. 
2.6.1 Guidance on consent and on end of life care 
Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together,
547
 the guidance on consent 
published after the decision in Burke, appears to restrict the patient’s role in 
treatment decision-making where there is conflict with the doctor to the role 
endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Burke,
548
 namely that of having veto power only. 
Thus, if patients ask for a treatment that the doctor considers would not be of overall 
benefit to them, the doctor should discuss the issues and explore the reason for their 
request but the doctor does not have to provide the treatment. He should explain any 
other options available, including the option to seek a second opinion.
549
 The 
guidance, a revision of Seeking Patients’ Consent,550 seems clear about its 
interpretation of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Burke: 
For the purposes of this guidance, the key point is the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion that doctors are under no legal or ethical obligation to agree to the 
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patient’s request for treatment if they consider the treatment is not in the 
patient’s best interests.551 
Likewise, the GMC’s Treatment and Care Towards the End of Life,552 replacing the 
2002 guidance Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Treatment,
553
 the 
subject matter of Burke, repeats that the doctor does not have to provide the 
treatment requested by the patient if he considers the treatment clinically 
appropriate.
554
 The endorsement of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Burke leaves 
the GMC open to a charge of endorsing medical paternalism as it does not appear to 
change the legal position regarding treatment requests. 
Although a reaffirmation of the limits to patients’ rights, the GMC guidance, 
however, places the emphasis on the decision-making process.
555
 Thus the emphasis 
in Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together is on joint decision-
making.
556
 Although much of the guidance involves the provision of information, 
the principles stated at the beginning of the guidance require doctors to listen to 
patients and respect their views and to discuss with patients what their diagnosis, 
prognosis, treatment and care involve.
557
 The key principle in Part 1 of the guidance 
is partnership, which is emphasised in Part 2 by the reference to the need for the 
exchange of information between doctor and patient as central to good decision-
making.
558
 As Miola stresses, the guidance and the requirement to engage with the 
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patient goes generally beyond what English law demands of doctors.
559
 It also goes 
further than Seeking Patients’ Consent which placed greater reliance on the patient’s 
trust to achieve a successful doctor-patient relationship.
560
 Even if the patient’s 
rights do not extend to demanding a specific treatment, the current guidance places 
more demands on the doctor regarding the decision-making process, focusing on 
whether the doctor has engaged the patient in a partnership approach to decision-
making. Thus: ‘whatever the context in which medical decisions are made, you must 
work in partnership with your patients to ensure good care. In doing so, you must … 
respect patients’ decisions.’561 
Similarly, Treatment and Care Towards the End of Life places considerable weight 
on the involvement of the patient and their family and carers in the treatment 
decisions that may arise at the end of life, the very issues that concerned Mr 
Burke.
562
 While the guidance reiterates its interpretation of the legal position that a 
doctor need not provide ‘clinically inappropriate’ treatment to the patient563 the 
guidance is overall more nuanced, giving prominence to the decision-making 
process and joint discussions between doctor and patient and the patient’s family and 
carers. Regarding advance care planning, for example, the guidance states: ‘If a 
patient in your care has a condition that will impair their capacity as it progresses … 
you should encourage them to think about what they might want for themselves 
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should this happen … Your discussions should cover … the patient’s wishes, 
preferences or fears in relation to their future treatment and care …’564 
2.6.2 Good medical practice  
In 2006, comprehensive changes had already been made to the GMC’s core 
professional guidance with the publication of Good Medical Practice.
565
 Both 
Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together (2008) and Treatment 
and Care Towards the End of Life (2010) reaffirm in their preliminaries the duties of 
doctors as laid down in the new core guidance. The most significant change is the 
move towards promoting a doctor-patient partnership, a recurring theme in the 
document.
566
 Good Medical Practice stresses the duties of a doctor as being; to work 
in partnership with the patient, to respect patients’ right to reach decisions with the 
doctor about their treatment and care
567
 and to support patients in caring for 
themselves to improve and maintain their health.
568
 Most importantly, regarding 
patients with chronic, long-term conditions, the doctor’s role is to promote patient 
self-care and self-management, to encourage patients to take an interest in their 
health and to take action to improve and maintain it.
569
 In Good Medical Practice 
the GMC states: ‘To fulfil your role in the doctor-patient partnership you must … 
support patients in caring for themselves to improve and maintain their health … 
[and] encourage patients who have knowledge about their condition to use this when 
they are making decisions about their care.’570  
Although reference to self-care and self-management and the encouragement of 
decision-making is omitted from the 2008 guidance Consent: Patients and Doctors 
Making Decisions Together, the guidance set out in Good Medical Practice as the 
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current core professional guidance is not obsolete.
571
 The later GMC document is 
particularly relevant in the context of acute or life-threatening situations where 
patients are reliant on the expertise of the doctor providing the therapy options and it 
makes sense for patients only to have veto power of healthcare decisions. However, 
in situations where patients can claim superior knowledge and expertise, such as 
patients with long-term chronic illness, it makes much less sense. As Holm suggests, 
the ‘expert patient’ movement has shown that patients with chronic diseases can 
become experts in the management of their own particular illness and key decision-
makers in the treatment process.
572
 These patients often know more about the corner 
of healthcare that is relevant to them than the healthcare professionals, and can 
acquire the knowledge and skills to make decisions independently.
573
 The doctor 
will still know more about medicine than the patient, but in the concrete situation 
this is often irrelevant. It is the patient who is the most expert regarding her 
condition in the specific context, and it is the patient who manages her illness on a 
daily basis and can make the general claim that the decision is about her life.
574
 It is 
the expert patient who may also be aware of the effects and side-effects of orthodox 
treatment regimens and may ask for complementary and alternative treatment 
options.
575
 In Teff’s words, non-medical dimensions of ill health can be vital to an 
assessment of what constitutes good medical treatment in a particular case, and only 
the patient can be fully aware of the impact that an illness is having on her life.
576
 
Thus the optimum choice of treatment is not necessarily that deemed to be the most 
appropriate one, or in the patient’s best interests, by the doctor. 
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The Good Medical Practice guidance takes cognisance of this and of the large 
patient group affected by a long-term chronic condition, estimated by the 
Department of Health in 2000 to number 17.5 million people in the United 
Kingdom.
577
 Clearly, in most cases patient and doctor will agree on the treatment. 
As Biggs points out, the vast majority of medical decisions are reached by mutual 
agreement between doctor and patient, even when there is initial disagreement.
578
 
The support of patients’ self-care and self-management advocated in Good Medical 
Practice is reminiscent of government policy of patient responsibilisation. It also, at 
least in part, explains why GPs, who are the most familiar with long-term chronic 
conditions,
579
 have yielded to some extent to consumer demand for CAM perceived 
as suitable for these conditions. 
2.7. Conclusion 
On the basis of the interpretation of autonomy in the common law and human rights 
law, there is no legal right to compel a doctor to act against her clinical judgment to 
provide a treatment that he regards as contrary to the patient’s best interests.580 
Unless included in the treatment options offered by the doctor, the choice of a 
different treatment such as CAM cannot be insisted on by the patient, however 
expert she may be in managing her condition and taking responsibility for her health. 
The situation of the patient at the micro-level is therefore in stark contrast to the 
rhetoric of choice heard from policy-makers at the macro-level. Munby J’s judgment 
in Burke was appealed by the medical profession, through the GMC, seeking to 
protect therapeutic discretion. They feared that the case amounted to a ‘Draconian 
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restriction of the exercise of the doctors’ professional skills’.581 The subsequent 
rejection of the judgment at first instance by the Court of Appeal handed the GMC a 
resounding victory.
582
  
However, as has been argued, litigation by patients in the area of refusal of or 
demand for treatment, although rarely successful, exerts destabilising effects on 
healthcare practices and regulation. It has led to a debate on patients’ rights and a 
change in the attitude of the medical profession as represented by the comprehensive 
changes to GMC guidance in the recent past. The partnership model in decision-
making advocated by the guidance helps explain why the expert patient affected by 
long-term chronic illness may in many cases be the key decision-maker regarding 
her treatment. It also helps explain to some extent at least why some GPs react more 
positively to patient demand for CAM.  
The next chapter considers the treatment options which need to be disclosed by the 
doctor to enable a patient to arrive at an informed choice of treatment; contrasting an 
action in the tort of negligence for lack of ‘informed consent’, which requires more 
detailed information, with the minimalist information requirements for ‘real consent’ 
to rule out an action for battery. 
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Chapter 3 
Destabilising effects at the micro-level: Patients’ 
rights to information about treatment alternatives in 
tort and under GMC guidance 
3.1. Introduction 
Policy-makers do not only support the concept of patient treatment choice but 
recognise that information is vital for the patient’s ability to choose.583 The NHS 
Constitution speaks of the patient’s right to information.584 Equity and Excellence: 
Liberating the NHS, the White Paper published by the then new coalition 
government in 2010, refers to an information revolution: ‘We will put patients at the 
heart of the NHS, through an information revolution and greater choice and control 
… Patients will have access to the information they want, to make choices about 
their care.’585 The White Paper consultation document Liberating the NHS: an 
Information Revolution speaks of good health care being dependent on good 
information as the basis for genuine shared decision-making between doctor and 
patient and that ‘without the right information, support and infrastructure being in 
place the vision of informed, empowered patients making choices over the things 
that matter to them is unlikely to be achieved’.586 As a good example of a genuine 
dialogue between doctor and patient about treatment options the document points to 
the long-term conditions model, which includes a personalised care planning 
discussion, focused on the needs and wants of the patient
587
 which is also the area 
where CAM may be located.  
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This chapter discusses the protection of the rights of the patient to information about 
proposed treatments and the alternatives, including CAM treatment options, in 
English tort law. It discusses whether tort law recognises the right of the patient to 
medical disclosure of treatment information, often referred to as the doctrine of 
informed consent, covered by the tort of trespass or battery and the tort of 
negligence.
588
 It contrasts the definitional limitations of the tort of trespass with the 
limitations of the tort of negligence regarding the patient’s interest in information 
about treatment options and their attendant benefits and risks. Specifically it 
analyses the extent to which either is concerned with the patient’s right to self-
determination, comparing the patient’s right to a minimum of information necessary 
for real consent under the law of trespass
589
 with the requirement for more extensive 
information disclosure under the law of negligence, covering the disclosure of 
available treatment options.
590
 However, the law of negligence, rather than being 
defined in terms of patients’ rights, is defined in terms of doctors’ duties591 and any 
remaining illusion of patients’ informational rights is further destroyed in that the 
adequacy of the information provided is assessed in accordance with the 
professional standard underpinned by the Bolam test
592
 test or some modified 
version of the Bolam test.
593
  
Because of these definitional limitations of both torts regarding patients’ rights to 
information and the additional relatively rigorous application of the causation 
principles in the tort of negligence patients have rarely been successful in informed 
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consent claims.
594
  However, it is argued that informed consent litigation has had 
considerable destabilising effects on healthcare practices,
595
 evidenced by the 
frequent revisions to the professional guidance with regard to this issue by the 
GMC.
596
 GMC guidance expects a much higher standard of information disclosure 
from doctors than does tort law, and rather than being guided by the minimal 
requirements of the law doctors are looking to the standards set by the GMC 
regarding the exchange of information with their patients.
597
 These higher standards 
may well include a discussion of CAM treatment options particularly with patients 
with long-term, chronic conditions.
598
  
The chapter begins by briefly analysing the problem of the definition of the doctrine 
of informed consent and then proceeds to contrast the doctrine under both torts as a 
means to protect the patient’s right to adequate information to enable her to choose 
her preferred treatment.  
3.2. The definition of ‘informed consent’ 
Although a doctor can only provide treatment to a patient who has first given her 
informed consent to the treatment,
599
 the phrase has been described as ‘apt to 
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mislead’600 and ‘vague and ambiguous’.601 This is because the word ‘informed’ does 
not describe the type or amount of information required. Consent necessarily 
requires a minimum of information so that one knows what one is consenting to.
602
 
Skegg suggests that it is unfortunate that the term ‘sufficiently informed consent’ did 
not become common, as it would have made users aware that the issue concerned 
how informed one had to be for the purpose in question.
603
 However, even the 
addition of ‘sufficiently’ or ‘adequately’ to the word ‘informed’ as a qualification of 
consent may simply emphasise the need for consent, rather than suggest a distinct 
concept. Nevertheless, as Brazier already argued over twenty years ago, the phrase 
‘informed consent’ is too well established to be dislodged: it acts as a useful 
shorthand for who ultimately takes the decision on the patient’s medical treatment, 
and how much information the patient should be given.
604
  
The doctrine of informed consent, as imported from the United States,
605
 appeared to 
conflate trespass and negligence.
606
 The concept in English law, however, 
distinguishes between an action in medical trespass and an action in negligence, 
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based on the difference between the quantity and type of information which is not 
communicated.
607
  
3.3. The right to information under the tort of trespass 
A doctor is liable under the tort of trespass or battery when the medical treatment 
has been given without any valid or ‘real’ consent by the patient.608 Only the 
patient’s consent to the treatment will absolve the doctor from liability for unlawful 
touching: the patient must know the nature of the treatment she is consenting to.
609
 If 
the patient consents to a procedure which is wholly different from the one 
performed, there is no real consent.
610
 However, all that is required for the consent to 
be real is that the patient has been informed in broad terms of the nature of the 
procedure.
611
 
A commitment to patient autonomy in its liberal sense would require that all 
material information necessary to reach a decision and give consent ought to be 
provided. As Teff argues, insisting that patients have ‘consented’ to procedures 
without knowing what they entail is over-literal and artificial.
612
 Consent after all 
seeks to transfer some power to the patient in the areas affecting her self-
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determination.
613
 However, for consent to be valid under the law of trespass it is 
unnecessary for all material information to be disclosed.
614
  
Needless to say it is difficult to see how consent which is uninformed and given in 
ignorance of relevant risks and alternatives can be deemed valid.
615
 The distinction 
between the nature of the procedure and serious risks associated with it appears 
unduly restrictive in a situation where trust plays a major role.
616
 Similarly, how can 
a patient be said to give valid consent when aware of the nature of one treatment but 
not of the alternative treatments and their possibly lower risks? The definition of 
medical trespass should not be restricted to non-disclosure of the nature or type of 
treatment ‘to the extent of excluding almost completely the protection under the tort 
of the patient’s right of self-determination’.617  
Instead Tan, for example, suggests a test for trespass based on the degree of 
information rather than the type of information not disclosed, which requires a 
greater failure of medical advice to be established than in medical negligence to 
render a treatment non-consensual.
618
 Information of alternative treatment options 
ought to be included in the information necessary for a valid consent. After all, in 
order to arrive at an informed choice, the patient needs to be able to weigh up the 
small benefits of one treatment option with the high risks but greater benefits of 
another treatment. Where the patient’s choice, for example, is between angiography 
                                                 
613
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and an MRI scan, with their different risk profiles, why should the lack of 
information not have vitiated consent for the purposes of trespass?
619
  
Likewise, if failure to disclose risks and alternatives were considered to vitiate 
consent then the fact that a reasonable doctor would not have disclosed them would 
not absolve him from liability.
620
 Since trespass is based on the patient’s integrity, 
Tan argues that it is for the reasonable patient to give consent to the medical 
procedure. The test for sufficiency of knowledge would therefore be the reasonable 
patient test.
621
 This more generous interpretation of the prerequisites for consent 
under the tort of trespass would contribute to redressing some of the imbalance 
favouring medical paternalism.
622
  
Leaving aside the problem of the minimalist definition of real consent, as Teff states, 
the tort of trespass  
is not fundamentally concerned to ask ‘what must be done in order to 
safeguard, to the fullest extent possible, the right of the patient as an 
autonomous person to choose between courses of action affecting him or 
her?’ Its focus is on whether the doctor’s conduct satisfies the constituent 
elements of the tort of battery.
623
 
The tort of trespass requires that the patient has been physically touched by the 
doctor when there has been no consent to such contact. There has to be direct contact 
with the patient, however trivial, to amount to sufficient force.
624
 The requirement of 
physical contact makes an action in trespass unsuitable for the prescription of drugs, 
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so trespass would not offer a remedy to a patient who complained of lack of 
disclosure of side-effects.
625
 Medical treatment usually involves physical contact: for 
example, an injection or the taking of blood or any manipulation of the patient 
would be sufficient for this purpose. However, as Tan argues, the law could 
overcome the problem of the lack of directness of the administration of a drug in the 
case of failure of advice of serious drug side-effects by ‘regarding the causal 
sequence as sufficiently direct for the purpose of developing medical trespass in 
order to protect the patient’s right of self-determination’.626  
Thus although an action in trespass would have the potential to enforce the patient’s 
right to information, the courts have been reluctant to find any scope for liability for 
trespass in the medical context.
627
 This is regrettable since the fact that there is no 
need to prove harm under the tort protects the patient’s right to self-determination. 
As Jackson points out, in a successful action for medical trespass it is the harm to the 
patient’s dignity which is being compensated: ‘It is the violation of the patient’s 
right to make an informed choice which is being compensated’ rather than the 
materialisation of some remote risk.
628
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The aggrieved patient who has received inadequate information is therefore more 
likely to look towards the tort of negligence for a remedy. The chapter now turns to 
consider what protection the law of negligence affords the patient’s right to 
information. 
3.4. Informational rights and duties under the tort of 
negligence  
The difficulty with informed consent in negligence arises from the fact that the 
doctor’s duty to provide the patient with treatment information, and the need to 
obtain the patient’s consent, are closely connected but often confused.629 The focus 
is on the doctor’s behaviour rather than on the patient’s autonomy, as the law of 
negligence emphasises the doctor’s duty rather than the consent of the patient, but 
the doctor’s behaviour is ultimately subject to judicial control and scrutiny.630 If it 
were different, would the law not insist on the understanding of the patient? 
Information is central for consent, and to have made an informed decision suggests a 
process of deliberation based on understanding.
631
 However, there is no insistence in 
negligence on the understanding of the patient.
632
 While the question ought to be 
whether the patient has adequate understanding of the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the proposed treatment and alternative treatment options to enable 
him to make an informed decision, English case law does not bear this out.
633
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To make disclosure of information part of the doctor’s general duty of care is to shift 
the emphasis away from a patient-centred right of autonomy.
634
 Thus the patient’s 
right to be informed of treatment risks is a derivative right dependent on the doctor’s 
duty of care rather than the individual’s right to self-determination.635 However, 
although a rights-based approach to informed consent in negligence is therefore 
problematic, the vocabulary of autonomy or the right to self-determination have on 
occasion been deployed, arguably misleadingly, by the courts in England under the 
aegis of negligence.
636
  
Rather, any residual ‘rights’ the patient may have to satisfy her informational 
requirements depend on the judicial approach to the duty of information 
disclosure.
637
 The difficulty in specifying how much information about benefits and 
risks of a treatment and its alternatives ought to be disclosed to patients is reflected 
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in the ongoing debate over the standard of the duty to disclose the law should and 
does in fact apply.
638
  
3.4.1 The standard of disclosure 
Commentators have argued that only a subjective patient standard of disclosure 
would be protective of patient autonomy as only such a standard would provide the 
information the particular patient requires.
639
 Although the subjective patient 
standard has been supported in some common law jurisdictions
640
 the argument 
against the application of this standard is that it may place too burdensome a legal 
duty on the doctor and that it would be unworkable in practice.
641
 In any case, 
English law does not recognise a subjective disclosure standard. Rather there is 
academic debate whether the significance or materiality of the treatment risks which 
need to be disclosed are to be judged by a standard more favourable to the doctor, a 
modification of the Bolam
642
 standard or according to the reasonable patient 
standard.
643
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This debate has been ongoing since the landmark House of Lords case of Sidaway
644
 
where the patient’s claim, that the failure to inform her of a small risk of injury of 
less than 2% to her spinal column during spinal surgery was a breach of the 
surgeon’s duty of care, was rejected unanimously by the Law Lords. However, their 
Lordships reached this decision by different routes with all, except Lord Scarman, 
favouring to a greater or lesser degree the Bolam standard as the applicable standard.   
While Lord Diplock was the staunchest advocate for the application of the strict 
Bolam test, in complete contrast, Lord Scarman in his dissenting speech rejected the 
Bolam test for the question of disclosure of risks, placing his argument around the 
patient’s rights. Approving the reasoning adopted in the US case of Canterbury v 
Spence
645
 and the Canadian Supreme Court case of Reibl v Hughes,
646
 his Lordship 
opted for the reasonable patient test as the test for risk disclosure: ‘The test for 
materiality is whether in the circumstances of the particular case the court is satisfied 
that a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk.’647 Lord Templeman applied a different reasoning from the 
other judges, as he phrased the doctor’s duties in contractual terms rather than in 
terms of duty of care. However, implied in his judgment is not a rejection but a 
modification of the prudent doctor standard of disclosure. Likewise, Lord Bridge, 
with whom Lord Keith agreed, recognised that the Bolam test should not be applied 
without qualification. Applying the Bolam test did not mean ‘to hand over to the 
medical profession the entire question of the scope of the duty of disclosure, 
including the question whether there has been a breach of that duty’ and it was open 
to the courts to condemn non-disclosure ‘where the disclosure of a particular risk 
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was so obviously necessary to an informed choice on the part of the patient that no 
reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make it.’648  
As the only case turning on the question of the standard of disclosure heard in the 
House of Lords
649
 it is of course regrettable that no clear conclusion can be drawn 
from the judgment.
650
 The issue of the applicable standard arose again in Pearce
651
 
in the Court of Appeal following in the aftermath of Bolitho,
652
 a House of Lords 
case which applied the modified Bolam test to medical diagnosis and treatment but 
excluded information disclosure.
653
 The case concerned a patient who was pregnant 
with her sixth child and had already gone two weeks past her delivery date. The 
consultant advised her to have a normal birth without medical intervention. He did 
not warn her of the risk of non-intervention of a small (0.1 to 0.2 %) increased risk 
of still birth, which eventuated. Her claim for failure to disclose this risk was 
rejected. In the words of Lord Woolf MR: 
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In a case where it is being alleged that a plaintiff has been deprived of the 
opportunity to make a proper decision as to what course he or she should 
take in relation to treatment, it seems to me to be the law … that if there is a 
significant risk which would affect the judgment of the reasonable patient, 
then in the normal course it is the responsibility of the doctor to inform the 
patient of that significant risk, if the information is needed so that the patient 
can determine for him or herself as to what course he or she should adopt.
654
 
The judgment would appear to suggest that if a reasonable patient would consider a 
risk significant then the doctor ought to inform him or her of this risk. However, 
citing Bolitho and Lord Bridge’s twist on Bolam in Sidaway, Lord Woolf relied on 
the medical experts called by the defendant to determine that the small risk in this 
case was not significant. Both these judgments recognised that medical experts are 
subject to judicial scrutiny, albeit only in rare cases; the disclosure of risks is 
therefore decided primarily by the medical experts.  
This leaves the correct position in English law after Pearce still open to debate. 
Brazier and Miola, for example, argue that Pearce introduced the reasonable patient 
test into English law because of their emphasis on the reasonable patient in Lord 
Woolf’s judgment.655  In contrast Maclean places the emphasis instead on the word 
significant.
656
 Doing so preserves the professional standard, which is what Lord 
Woolf did ‘by relying on the experts for the determination of the significance of the 
risk’.657 As Maclean has stated elsewhere: ‘the standard [then] becomes: the doctor 
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must disclose those risks that the reasonable doctor believes the reasonable patient 
ought to find significant to a decision’.658 
The correct position in English law is most likely that proposed by Jackson
659
 and 
Jones,
660
 namely that Pearce has conflated the reasonable doctor and the reasonable 
patient test so that ‘English law applies a test somewhere between the “reasonable 
doctor” and the “prudent patient” test’: no reasonable doctor would fail to disclose a 
risk regarded as significant by a reasonable patient.
661
 This view can also be 
considered confirmed by the dicta in the House of Lords case of Chester v Afshar,
662
 
appealed on the issue of causation. The content of the doctor’s duty was described 
by Lord Bingham in terms of the surgeon having a duty to warn of a ‘small but 
unavoidable risk’;663 Lord Hope referred to the surgeon as owing a duty to the 
patient to inform her of risks inherent in the surgery, including the risk of 
paralysis;
664
 Lord Walker stated that ‘the surgeon’s duty to advise and warn his 
patient is closely connected with the need for the patient’s consent’.665 Only Lord 
Hoffman and Lord Steyn appeared to move towards a patient-centred standard of 
disclosure. Lord Hoffman recognised that failing to warn the patient of risks was ‘an 
affront to her personality’666 and Lord Steyn’s judgment emphasised patient 
rights,
667
 respect for patient autonomy
668
 and the end to medical paternalism.
669
 
However, Lord Steyn expressly approved Lord Woolf’s judgment in Pearce670 and 
its expression of the reasonable patient test in terms of the doctor’s duty, although 
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his Lordship did not clarify who was the arbiter to decide on the significance of the 
risk or the seriousness of the risk. The majority support in Chester is therefore 
unlikely for the reasonable patient standard.
671
 In any case there is a fundamental 
problem with the reasonable patient standard: The problem lies in ascertaining the 
nature and reactions of the mythical reasonable patient.
672
 After all, there is no 
standard patient but only a particular patient.
673
 
Of course, the information to be disclosed concerns not only the benefits and risks of 
a treatment but also alternative treatment options and their attendant benefits and 
risks. This question has, however, only occasionally been considered by English 
courts and only little academic commentary has surfaced pertaining to this 
question.
674
 However, ‘knowledge of the alternatives may be as significant as 
knowledge of risks, since a patient may need information about alternative 
treatments, including the option of non-treatment, so as to compare the risks and 
benefits of those options with those of the recommended treatment’.675 The chapter 
now turns to the requirements for the disclosure of alternative treatment options and 
in particular the requirements warranting the disclosure of CAM options. 
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3.4.2 The legal duty to disclose alternatives 
A search of English case law has uncovered a few cases where the disclosure of 
alternatives was considered
676
 although it has only been the ratio in one case.
677
 
Skegg argues that the reason for this negligible emphasis placed on the disclosure of 
alternatives by English case law and academic discussion is the greater emphasis 
placed on consent and informed consent, rather than on choice.
678
 The reason may 
also be the earlier strict application of the prudent doctor test to the disclosure duty. 
As Maclean points out: ‘what this means is that, if the treatment is not something 
that the professional would recommend, and it is reasonable under the Bolam test to 
take this stance, then there may be no duty to disclose the treatment even if another 
doctor would have recommended it’.679 Recommendation of a treatment is of course 
not the same as simply disclosing the existence of the treatment to the patient.  
Interestingly, in Sidaway it was Lord Scarman (dissenting) who first spoke of the 
duty to disclose alternatives.
680
 Referring to the prudent patient test as enunciated in 
Canterbury v Spence,
681
 his Lordship commented: 
I think the Canterbury propositions reflect a legal truth which too much 
judicial reliance on medical judgment tends to obscure. In a medical 
negligence case where the issue is as to the advice and information given to 
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the patient as to the treatment proposed, the available options (my italics), 
and the risk, the court is concerned primarily with a patient's right.
682
 
Lord Diplock, who favoured the unmodified Bolam test in Sidaway, mentioned 
alternative treatment only in the context of the doctor acting for the benefit of the 
patient rather than the patient having a choice: 
Advances in the ability to heal resulting from the volume of research, clinical 
as well as technological … will present doctors with alternative treatments to 
adopt and a choice to select that treatment (it may be one of several) that is in 
their judgment likely at the time to prove most efficacious or ameliorating to 
the health of each particular patient committed to their care.
683
 
The case of Gold v Haringey HA
684
 decided shortly after Sidaway concerned a 
claimant who brought an action for damages when she became pregnant after a 
sterilisation operation. She alleged that she should have been informed of the risk of 
failure and also of the alternative to her sterilisation, namely that her husband could 
have a vasectomy, which was a less invasive procedure and had a greater chance of 
success. At first instance, Schiemann J agreed with the claimant and distinguished 
Sidaway, holding that the Bolam standard only applied to diagnosis and treatment 
but not to non-therapeutic contraceptive advice. The consultant should have 
discussed the possibility of a vasectomy and the failure rates of both sterilisation and 
vasectomy with Mrs Gold. On appeal the judgment was reversed. Lloyd LJ only 
referred to the speech of Lord Diplock in Sidaway as speaking for the House. Bolam 
applied and ‘there was a body of responsible medical opinion which would not have 
given any warning as to the failure of female sterilisation, and the possible 
alternatives’.685 The distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic advice was 
                                                 
682
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‘wholly unwarranted and artificial’.686 The Bolam standard applied to all of the 
doctor’s duties.687  
In Smith v Salford Health Authority,
688
 a window cleaner was informed of the risks 
to his health if he did not have corrective cervical surgery on his neck. He underwent 
the surgery and as result of the surgery became tetraplegic. The surgeon was found 
negligent in the advice he gave to the plaintiff pre-operatively. There was failure 
properly to inform the plaintiff of the nature of the surgery, including the benefits of 
both surgical and non-surgical management. However, the negligent advice was not 
held to have any causal link with Mr Smith’s injuries so he did not succeed in this 
respect. All the same, Mr Smith was fortunate in succeeding in his claim for 
negligent performance of the surgery because of the surgeon’s use of an incorrect 
surgical instrument to perform the operation. What is remarkable about the judgment 
is that Potter J’s judgment made no reference to Sidaway or Bolam and turned solely 
on its facts. 
The subsequent cases of Pearce
689
 and Chester
690
 both considered the disclosure of 
alternative treatments. In Pearce the issue was of course not whether Mrs Pearce had 
been informed of the different treatment options open to her, namely natural 
childbirth, induced labour and caesarean section – she had begged the consultant to 
be induced or have a caesarean section – the issue was whether she should have been 
advised of an increased risk of still birth with natural childbirth.
691
 Nevertheless it is 
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clear from Lord Woolf’s judgment with its more patient-centred disclosure standard 
that the disclosure of risks is relevant in a patient’s treatment choice.692  
Chester
693
 concerned a working journalist who had suffered from back pain for some 
years. An MRI scan showed a degeneration of her spinal discs leading to her referral 
to Mr Afshar, a consultant neurosurgeon. The referring doctor advised Mr Afshar 
that Mrs Chester was averse to surgery. The latter, however, recommended surgery 
and performed the operation three days later. The surgery resulted in severe nerve 
damage and partial paralysis. One of the main aspects of Mrs Chester’s case 
concerned the allegation that the defendant ‘failed to advise … her as to the real 
risks attached to the surgical procedure, thereby depriving her of an opportunity to 
reflect, consider and/or seek alternative medical or other opinion in respect of 
options which might be open to her’.694 One of the experts in the case, for example, 
suggested that physiotherapy would have been his preferred treatment, at least for 
the time being, before considering surgery of the same or different kind which the 
claimant underwent. At first instance Taylor J stated: 
If the Claimant had gone to another consultant, because of her aversion to 
surgery and her anxiety about the risk of being crippled, it seems to me more 
probable than not that such a consultant would have tried to meet her 
concerns … by suggesting some alternative course, if only some different 
form of surgery … It is unlikely that two or more neurosurgeons would have 
been unanimous in their advice to the Claimant, and that between them they 
could have presented her with a number of different options, both surgical 
and conservative.
695
 
The main finding of the trial judge was that Mr Afshar had failed to disclose the 
small risk of the surgery, that the risk had eventuated and a proper warning of the 
risk would have dissuaded Mrs Chester from undergoing the surgery when she did. 
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Therefore, sufficient causation had been established between the breach of duty and 
her injury. The appeal by the defendant surgeon on the issue of causation was 
dismissed by both the Court of Appeal
696
 and the House of Lords.
697
 Arguably, 
however, although this is now a moot point, Mrs Chester was more concerned with 
the disclosure of other treatment options than with the disclosure of the small but 
significant risk of the surgery: ‘given her pre-existing aversion to surgery …, the 
very least that she would have done, would have been (as she says) to seek a second, 
or even third, opinion’.698 It was the lack of disclosure of risk that directly led to her 
not obtaining information about alternatives. She might have accepted the same risks 
at some time in the future, but she had been deprived of the opportunity to make a 
fully informed choice. As Jackson concludes:  
In a sense, then, it could be argued that the majority [of the House of Lords] 
found for the claimant not because she had proved that the lack of proper 
information caused her to be exposed to a risk to which she would not have 
been exposed if she had been properly informed, but rather because she had 
been deprived of the right to weigh up the risks in order to make an informed 
choice.
699
 
Weighing up of risks always suggests at least two alternatives, even if one of these 
alternatives is simply ‘conservative treatment’.700 For the patient, information about 
alternatives will often be as important as information about the proposed procedure. 
The only two English cases where the duty to disclose alternatives was directly on 
point are Sem
701
 and Birch.
702
 In the former case, liability was admitted, so that the 
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case primarily turned on the issue of causation, whereas the latter case concerned the 
duty to disclose alternative diagnostic methods rather than alternative treatments. 
Sem, a case decided after Chester, concerned Mrs M, who presented with various 
symptoms including uterine prolapse. She underwent a surgical procedure which 
included a vaginal hysterectomy. The primary complaint by Mrs M was not directed 
at the performance of the operation by the consultant surgeon but to the pre-
operative advice which she had not received, namely she had not been advised about 
other treatments which might have been available. The expert witnesses were agreed 
that Mrs M should have been informed of the options of doing nothing apart from 
physiotherapy, the use of medical devices, a surgical alternative to vaginal 
hysterectomy and three different surgical options. The defendant Trust accepted that 
failure by the consultant to give any such advice was negligent. Mrs M lost her claim 
on the issue of causation.
703
 Therefore, although the doctor breached his duty to 
disclose alternatives, the patient did not succeed.  
In Birch, the patient, Mrs Birch, suffered a stroke caused by a cerebral catheter 
angiogram. She claimed that the decision to use the angiogram was negligent, and 
that the investigation of her condition should have been instead by MRI, a non-
invasive imaging technique without any major risks. In addition, she alleged that she 
should have been informed of the availability of both imaging techniques and their 
comparative risks and benefits.
704
 Mrs Birch’s condition, painful third nerve palsy, 
was said to have three possible causes:
705
 cause A which might resolve itself 
spontaneously and was the most likely cause, and causes B and C which were 
potentially life threatening but C more so than B. B could only be detected by MRI 
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but not with a cerebral catheter angiogram; C could be detected by MRI with 90–
95% certainty but with 100% certainty with the angiogram. The angiogram carried a 
1% risk of stroke whereas the MRI had no serious risks. Cranston J found the use of 
the angiogram to rule out an aneurysm was not negligent because there was a 
responsible body of neurosurgeons who would have taken the same decision, and 
this decision was capable of withstanding logical analysis. 
The case therefore turned on the disclosure issue. Mrs Birch had been informed of 
the 1% risk of stroke with the angiogram procedure but she was not informed of the 
comparative risks associated with both procedures. Stating that English law was 
mainly concerned with the disclosure of ‘objectively significant risks’,706 Cranston J 
held that, although no authority had been cited to this effect, there will be 
circumstances where a patient has to be informed of comparative risks: 
consistently with Lord Woolf MR’s statement of the law in Pearce v United 
Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust the duty to inform a patient of the significant 
risks will not be discharged unless she is made aware that fewer, or no risks, 
are associated with another procedure. In other words, unless the patient is 
informed of the comparative risks of different procedures she will not be in a 
position to give her fully informed consent to one procedure rather than 
another.
707
 
The judge came to the conclusion that the defendant hospital Trust was liable as ‘no 
reasonable, prudent medical practitioner would have failed to discuss the respective 
modalities and risks with [Mrs Birch] along the lines outlined. In their absence she 
was denied the opportunity to make an informed choice.’708 In case this test was the 
incorrect one to apply, the judge then sought refuge in Bolitho: ‘Even, if I am wrong 
on this, the failure to discuss with Mrs Birch these matters could not be described in 
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law as reasonable, responsible or logical’709 and then concluded: ‘on either 
approach, therefore, the failure to provide her with this information was in breach of 
duty’.710 As Jackson argues, the test employed by Cranston J was that of the 
reasonable doctor while following in the footsteps of Lord Woolf’s modified 
prudent doctor test in Pearce with its more patient-centred outlook.
711
 
The judge limited his ruling to the ‘unusual circumstances’ of the case, but he did 
not explain what these circumstances were. Heywood suggests that the unusual 
circumstances the judge referred to might be that there were two options available of 
which one was slightly more effective than the other at ruling out a potentially 
serious condition and that both could have reached a similar diagnosis’.712 This leads 
Heywood to conclude that  
where alternative medical (diagnostic) procedures differ substantially in what 
they are aiming to achieve and the frequency of their success … the 
alternative medical procedure may simply not be a feasible option and thus it 
would be inappropriate for the law to hold medical practitioners liable for 
failure to disclose it.
713
  
This argument is unlikely to stand: in Birch itself the two imaging techniques were 
not broadly similar in what they aimed to achieve:  the angiogram was unable to 
exclude condition B
714
 and the MRI was not able to exclude condition C
715
 with 
100% certainly. They were very different diagnostic options with different aims. The 
unusual circumstances of the case to which Cranston J referred were more likely that 
Mrs Birch, although referred to the Queen Square centre by one of its consultant 
neurologists,
716
  unfortunately had been admitted to the neurosurgical department 
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rather than the neurology department as there were no neurology beds available at 
that point in time,
717
 and neurosurgeons were more likely to consider a cerebral 
catheter angiogram rather than MRI as their first line diagnostic method in a case 
presenting as Mrs Birch did.
718
  
While the similarity of the diagnostic procedures may therefore not be decisive, the 
case can be read subject to the standard of disclosure applied in Pearce as requiring 
the disclosure of less risky, feasible and available alternatives. Furthermore, the case 
is unlikely to be read as restricted to the disclosure of different diagnostic techniques 
but Cranston J’s decision may also have implications regarding the disclosure of less 
risky, feasible and available alternative treatment options.
719
 However, the judge 
was concerned by the uncertainty in the law and was unable to state in general terms 
when the duty to inform about comparative risks arises.
720
 Because of this 
uncertainty and the paucity of English decisions in this area it is necessary to look to 
other common law jurisdictions, particularly Canada and the United States with their 
larger number of disclosure cases, including cases concerning non-conventional 
treatments.  
3.4.3 A legal duty to disclose complementary alternative 
therapies? 
Despite the decision in Birch suggesting a legal duty to disclose less risky, feasible 
and available alternatives, whether doctors could be under a legal duty to disclose 
CAM options is difficult to establish not only because the common law develops on 
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a case-by-case basis.
721
 After all, can there be a legal duty of disclosing what is seen 
by many as ‘fringe medicine’ and not ‘mainstream’? To hold doctors liable to 
disclose all possible treatments, both orthodox and CAM, might subject them to an 
insurmountable burden and be impossible within the time constraints of the 
consultation. In any case, the disclosure standard adopted in Birch following Pearce 
and Sidaway does not suggest the disclosure of options which the subjective patient 
may wish to have to enable her to make a choice. It suggests the disclosure of 
options which the prudent doctor knows the reasonable patient would wish to have 
and the determination of this ‘abstract hypothetical reasonable patient’ is arrived at 
by the court.
722
 
The legal position in Canada and the US 
There are some Canadian and US cases on the issue of disclosure of non-orthodox 
alternative treatments. With its more expansive view of what information the 
reasonable patient would want in order to make her treatment decision,
723
 there is 
Canadian authority for the duty to inform patients of less dangerous,
724
 more 
conservative,
725
 even less effective treatments
726
 which may not be the preferred 
                                                 
721
 It also needs to be remembered that many patients, particularly those affected by intractable 
long-term chronic conditions, may raise the possibility of CAM with their GPs of their own accord, so 
that the duty regarding the disclosure of the treatment itself is likely to be a moot point. 
722
 E Jackson, ‘Informed Consent to Medical Treatment and the Impotence of Tort’ in SA McLean 
(ed), First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate 2006) 281 where the author takes the 
argument a step further by assimilating the test with that of the reasonable doctor since doctors, 
due to small numbers of cases in this area, will seek guidance not from past legal decisions but from 
other doctors as to what patients would want to know. 
723
 The common law jurisdictions of Canada apply a modified objective test of disclosure which is 
concerned with what the reasonable patient in that particular patient’s situation would have 
wanted to know see, eg Reibl v Hughes 1980 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1980] 2 S C R 880. 
724
 Haughian v Paine (1987) 37 DLR (4th) 624 (Sask CA) concerning non-disclosure of non-treatment 
or conservative treatment such as supervised rest, muscle relaxants, physiotherapy and pain-
relieving medication; Ferguson v Hamilton Civic Hospitals 1983 Carswell Ont 705, 40 O R (2d) 577, 
aff’d (1980) 50 O R (2d) 754 concerning the failure to inform of alternatives to an angiogram, such as 
no treatment or treatment with heparin and aspirin, although it was recognised that the risks of the 
alternatives were potentially greater in the long run. 
725
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treatment of the doctor as long as it is an acceptable and known treatment.
727
 There 
is, however, no direct Canadian authority as to whether the duty also applies to 
complementary therapy options, although dicta exist in a few Canadian cases 
concerning such disclosure.  
For example, in her judgment in Seney v Crooks
728
 in the Alberta Court of Appeal, 
based on the particular facts, Conrad JA was careful to restrict a general principle in 
favour of disclosure of any alternatives and sided with the appellants who argued 
against overextending this duty:  
The duty to inform of alternative treatments placed an unpredictable and 
monumental responsibility upon the medical profession and one that is much 
too onerous. For instance, would it be necessary to inform of every possible 
alternative available, whether or not generally considered reliable by the 
profession? Would each professional need to become knowledgeable on and 
inform patients of, alternative medicine practices such as chiropractic 
treatment or holistic medicine treatments? If the treatment performed 
complies with the local standard, why should it be negligent to fail to inform 
of another?
729
 
Since the alternative treatment in this case was not complementary or alternative the 
judge avoided any discussion of whether non-conventional therapies would ever 
have to be disclosed.  
The case of Santos v Traff,
730
 a decision of the Queen’s Bench in Alberta, sheds 
slightly more light on this question suggesting that there is no duty to advise of 
fringe or dangerous alternatives. This case concerned a morbidly obese female 
patient who underwent a hysterectomy and claimed that she had not been told of the 
                                                 
727
 Seney v Crooks 1998 ABCA 316 concerning non-disclosure of a surgical option for a broken wrist 
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728
 Seney v Crooks 1998 ABCA 316. 
729
 Seney v Crooks 1998 ABCA 316 [57]. 
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various surgical alternatives prior to her operation. Although she won her case on the 
issue of negligent performance of the operation, she did not win on the issue of lack 
of disclosure of alternative treatment options. The conventional alternatives 
envisaged by the patient were not considered to be reasonable and the court opined 
on the disclosure of other, non-conventional alternatives:  
[Conrad JA in Seney v Crooks] suggests that the plaintiff be advised of any 
available alternatives. I am satisfied that this characterisation is too wide if 
taken literally and absent the connection to the reasonable patient. In fact, 
there is no duty to advise of fringe or dangerous alternatives. Common sense 
suggests that the failure to advise of alternatives might be applied most 
successfully against the doctor who uses the fringe alternative, or one not 
generally accepted by the medical profession as within the standard of care, 
and fails to inform of the medically mainstream alternative.’731 
In contrast, in two US cases the doctor’s duty to disclose complementary alternative 
therapies was the main issue. Schiff v Prados
732
 was decided in California, with its 
patient-based standard of disclosure,
733
 and Moore v Baker
734
 in Georgia, where the 
disclosure standard at the time of the decision was the professional standard.
735
  
Schiff concerned a child diagnosed with a rare and aggressive form of brain cancer. 
The defendant oncologist suggested different orthodox treatment options including 
chemotherapy and radiation but did not disclose any non-conventional treatment 
options. The parents had read of antineoplastons offered as a cancer cure by a doctor 
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 See eg Cobbs v Grant 502 P 2d 1, Cal SC (1972). 
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 Moore v Baker 989 F 2d 1129 C A 11 (1993). 
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in Texas which was, however, opposed by the defendant doctor as toxic and 
ineffective.
736
 As the orthodox treatment had left residual tumour mass, the father 
took his daughter to Texas where she started the treatment with antineoplastons and 
then returned home to California with a further supply to be administered 
intravenously, although he understood that the treatment was not approved by the 
FDA and that the American Medical Association was critical of it. The child later 
died, although the tumour had first regressed, with the apparent cause of her death 
being aspiration pneumonia brought on by radiation necrosis. The parents sued the 
defendant for lack of informed consent because he had failed to advise them of the 
antineoplaston treatment. In his defence the oncologist argued that there are many 
alternative treatments for cancer, including laetrile, vitamin C, immune-
augmentative therapy, coffee enemas and Chinese herbal medicine amongst others 
and, although a patient is free to explore these potentialities, the standard of care 
does not require controversial and/or alternative methods which have not been 
subjected to scientific scrutiny to be discussed as possible options with the patient. 
The plaintiff parents did not succeed in their claim because the antineoplaston 
treatment was outlawed as a cancer treatment in California and its legality was being 
litigated in Texas at the time.  
Moore concerned a patient who was suffering from a partial blockage of her carotid 
artery due to atherosclerosis. The defendant doctor recommended that she undergo a 
neurosurgical procedure known as a carotid endarterectomy but he did not advise her 
of any alternative, non-conventional treatment options such as EDTA chelation 
therapy.
737
 Following surgery, the patient suffered permanent brain damage. She 
sued for failure to inform her of the availability of EDTA chelation therapy, an 
allegedly safer, equally effective therapy, as an alternative to surgery
738
 but did not 
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 Antineoplastons are peptides distilled from human urine. The treatment is based on the alleged 
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737
 EDTA chelation therapy is claimed to correct the cholesterol metabolism by removing calcium, 
copper and zinc from the vessel and decreasing platelet aggregation and plaque formation involved 
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738
 According to a Cochrane review there is insufficient evidence of efficacy of EDTA therapy, see E 
Ernst and others, The Desktop Guide to Complementary and Alternative Medicine: An Evidence-
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succeed with her claim. The court held that she had not shown that reasonably 
prudent physicians generally recognise and accept EDTA chelation therapy. The 
defendant surgeon had produced evidence that EDTA chelation therapy was not 
taught in medical schools, was not FDA-approved for treating blocked arteries and 
had been criticised as unproven by a number of professional associations. 
Specifically, the court accepted the defendant’s evidence that the American Medical 
Association had concluded that chelation treatment was not an acceptable treatment 
for atherosclerosis, that the American Heart Association did not recommend it for 
the treatment of heart disease because the benefits had not been proven 
scientifically, and that the American College of Cardiology and the American 
College of Physicians opposed it except on an experimental basis.
739
  
Thus, from the decided cases in these two common law jurisdictions, two lines of 
arguments emerge for disclosure of non-conventional treatment: the treatment has to 
be open to the patient (available, feasible and legal)
740
 and reasonable (medically 
reasonable and accepted),
741
 both requirements that support and expand on Birch 
and Pearce. 
Are CAM options open to the patient in England? 
The requirement for CAM options to be open to the patient, in the sense of being 
feasible and available,
742
 in order to make disclosure legally mandatory is consistent 
with the judgment in Birch turning on the duty to disclose available and feasible 
                                                                                                                                         
Based Approach (2nd edn, Mosby 2006) 311–13 citing MV Villaruz, A Dans, and F Tan, ‘Chelation 
Therapy for Atherosclerotic Cardiovascular Disease’ (2002) The Cochrane Database of Sys Rev, issue 
4. Art No. CD002785. 
739
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to Good Practice (OUP 1993) 5–8 emphasises that under the Medical Act 1858 medical practitioners 
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also C Zollman and A Vickers, ‘ABC of Complementary Medicine’ (1999) 319 BMJ 901, 903 arguing 
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diagnostic alternatives. Whether CAM is considered feasible will depend to a 
considerable extent on whether the doctor is aware of CAM or a CAM modality for 
the condition the patient presents with. CAM itself is defined as ‘health ideas and 
practices not taught in most medical schools’,743 comprising a multitude of 
treatments from chiropractic to Reiki, traditional Chinese medicine to Indian 
Ayurveda, to herbal medicine, homeopathy and prayer for healing.
744
 Doctors are of 
course trained in conventional medicine rather than in alternative therapies. A doctor 
trained in conventional medicine may not be aware of the vast number of treatments 
and procedures available under the CAM umbrella.  
All the same, according to a study in the primary care sector, almost half of the 
general practices in England provide access to one of the main CAM therapies,
745
 
either in the practice itself or through referrals.
746
 There are CAM familiarisation 
courses available in some medical schools in England, for example at the Peninsula 
Medical School, the University of Southampton and University College London 
although, according to the BMA, coverage is patchy.
747
 There is statutory regulation 
of some CAM therapies.
748
 CAM, including homeopathy, is available within the 
NHS.
749
 There is NICE guidance on some CAM for specific conditions.
750
 There are 
publications of clinical trials involving CAM and articles on CAM in all the major 
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medical journals.
751
 There is also guidance for general practitioners by the BMA 
concerning referral and delegation to CAM practitioners.
752
 A report has been 
published on CAM by the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee
753
 
and a further one has been published by the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee on homeopathy.
754
  
While CAM or some CAM modalities can therefore be regarded as feasible, the 
availability of CAM is a different matter. Publicly funded CAM is only available to 
a limited extent in the English NHS.
755
 It is more widely available through private 
healthcare, for which consumers pay considerable sums. The personalisation and 
‘responsibilisation’ agenda of policy-makers, illustrated by personal healthcare 
budgets for patients with long-term chronic conditions, may lead to more public 
funding of some CAM modalities and make CAM available to patients who were 
previously unable to afford it privately.
756
 There is therefore no easy answer as to 
whether a doctor could be under a legal duty to disclose CAM treatment options 
which are only publicly funded to a limited extent. Maclean argues that privately 
available treatment options ought to be disclosed unless the healthcare professional 
can be certain that the patient will be unable to pay for the treatment although it 
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may, of course, be difficult to ascertain that the treatment is affordable for the 
patient.
757
  
Is CAM a medically reasonable and accepted treatment in England? 
Case law from Canada and the US also points to the requirement for the non-
conventional treatment to be a medically reasonable and accepted treatment to make 
disclosure legally mandatory. According to Santos, for a doctor to have to disclose 
every possible treatment alternative would be against common sense. Only 
reasonable alternatives or treatments which are not entirely unreasonable have to be 
disclosed. Lack of recognition and acceptance of CAM by the medical community 
as in Moore and also Seney therefore negate the disclosure duty. In a litigated case 
expert evidence as to accepted medical practice will play a significant role, leaving 
the decision as to the reasonableness of the treatment options in dispute and their 
disclosure largely in the hands of the medical profession, subject to the court’s 
scrutiny in accordance with Pearce and also Birch.  
The content of the doctor’s duty to disclose, following Birch, not only includes the 
disclosure of the alternatives available but also their comparative benefits and risks. 
Accordingly, the doctor would need to evaluate the benefits and risks of CAM. 
However, much of CAM has not undergone rigorous scientific testing, so that 
information disclosure about CAM may present the doctor with considerable 
difficulty. Even without insisting on CAM adhering to the gold standard validation 
for its results (proven to be efficacious by double-blind randomised, placebo-
controlled clinical trials) most of the currently available CAM remedies do not have 
scientifically valid proof of efficacy.
758
 The lack of validation of the efficacy of 
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147 
 
many of these therapies is therefore a major problem, and might effectively bar them 
from ever becoming available within the NHS.
759
 In addition, there is a 
misconception about the lack of side-effects of some CAM treatments with generally 
insufficient information about the safety of CAM.
760
  
3.4.4 The causation hurdle  
Even if the court finds that there is a duty to disclose which has been breached, the 
patient needs to overcome a further hurdle. She has to prove that the failure to 
disclose the information has caused her injury. The requirement for causation means 
that the patient has to show that, but for the doctor’s failure to disclose the available 
treatment option, she would have adopted a different course of action and would 
have chosen an alternative treatment that was not disclosed and so avoided the 
harm.
761
 In effect, the patient has to show what she would have done in a 
hypothetical situation if the doctor had not breached her duty of disclosure subject to 
the modification of the causation principle in Chester.
762
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The failure to give information about alternative treatments will generally not tend to 
result in physical injury.
763
 English law uses a hybrid objective/subjective test to 
determine whether or not the claimant would have consented to the treatment he or 
she actually received if he or she had had the missing information, coupled with a 
consideration of extraneous factors to substantiate the patient’s assertion.764 As 
Jones points out, it is the rules of causation as much as the rules on breach of duty 
which lead to the low success rate of claimants in informed consent cases.
765
 The 
difficulty of proving causation may even form the greater impediment to success. 
The English courts may well have attempted to balance patients’ informational 
requirements with policy-based considerations to stem the escalation of costs of 
medical negligence cases.
766
 In the tort of trespass there may also have been an 
unwillingness to label well intentioned doctors ‘batterers’.767 In the tort of 
negligence there may have been an unwillingness to accept what, in practice, 
amounts to strict liability for adverse events on the basis of a failure of information 
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disclosure.
768
 Thus, despite macro-level policies, tort law is not protecting the 
patient’s rights to adequate information about orthodox treatment and even less 
about CAM treatment. While the law of trespass has almost completely failed to 
help the uninformed patient, patients have only been successful in a minority of 
cases in cases of informed consent in the law of negligence.
769
 However, despite this 
legal imbalance between doctor and patient, litigation and the risk of litigation by 
uninformed patients suing medical practitioners in tort law has not been without 
effect. They have had destabilising effects and led to changes in healthcare practices. 
It is to these the chapter now turns.   
3.5. Patients’ rights to information under GMC guidance  
Litigation, albeit infrequent, by inadequately informed patients has clearly had an 
effect on medical practice and regulation. Litigation in medical tort law does not 
operate as a mere system of dispute resolution with precedential effects. As Sabel 
and Simon assert, litigation and adjudication in tort law have polycentric effects; 
they act as a system of social regulation.
770
 Medical informed consent litigation has 
provided a stimulus to the debate about the nature of the doctor-patient relationship 
generally.
771
 Litigation and subsequent adjudication, although of little benefit to 
most patients immediately involved, have encroached on the doctor/patient 
relationship generally and on the regulation of medical practice. Doctors have 
become more sensitive to the risk of litigation and pay increased attention to the 
question of obtaining patients’ consent and ensuring that they are adequately 
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informed.
772
 As Jones pointed out over a decade ago, in the UK, leaders of the 
medical profession have begun to respond to the demands for greater openness and 
information disclosure with the issuing of detailed guidance by the GMC.
773
 
Although its guidance is not legally enforceable, doctors look to the GMC for 
guidance on professional and ethical standards. As Jackson states, ‘[D]octors 
wanting to know what they should disclose to [a] patient will usually consult 
professional guidance, rather than the law reports and so in practice the inadequacies 
of tort law may have little practical impact upon the provision of information to 
patients.’774 However, professional guidance goes beyond the common law 
regarding the information a doctor has to give to the patient.
775
   
The first specific guidance on consent, Seeking Patients’ Consent776 published by the 
GMC in 1998, placed much more onerous duties on the doctor regarding the 
provision of information than the common law. Before this specific guidance the 
issue of ‘informed consent’ had not been spelt out in any great detail by the GMC. 
Rather, consent had only been dealt with in the form of general bullet points as 
generic guidance in the GMC’s core guidance Good Medical Practice.777 Seeking 
Patients’ Consent dealt with detailed issues of informed consent including the 
disclosure of treatment options and the need to explain for each option the likely 
benefits and the probabilities of success.
778
 However, more importantly, it 
emphasised the importance of effective communication and open helpful dialogue to 
strengthen the doctor/patient relationship and to provide a framework within which 
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the doctor can respond effectively to the individual needs of the patient.
779
 The 
doctor must do her best to find out about patients’ individual needs and priorities 
including their ‘beliefs, culture, occupation or other factors which may have a 
bearing on the information they need to reach a decision’.780 Doctors should not 
make assumptions about patients’ views. They should also provide patients with 
appropriate information including explanations of any risk to which patients may 
attach particular significance.
781
 In addition and contrary to the common law 
position, the guidance also spoke of the patient’s right to make informed decisions 
as a right protected in law.
782
  
As has been demonstrated, the common law does not provide the patient with the 
right to be given sufficient information but restricts the duty of the doctor under the 
law of negligence to provide information according to a standard which lies 
somewhere between that of the reasonable doctor and the reasonable patient and 
further requires proof of causation to establish liability. The 1998 guidance, on the 
other hand, described a disclosure standard which comes close to that of the 
subjective patient, imposing a duty on doctors to tailor their disclosure to the 
patient’s priorities.783 While a subjective test may be impractical as a test to ground 
legal liability in negligence,
784
 increased informed consent litigation since the early 
1980s has clearly motivated the GMC to adopt this more stringent test in its 
guidance, whether or not erroneously believing at the same time that case law backs 
the patient’s right to information.785  
                                                 
779
 ibid [3]. 
780
 ibid [6]. 
781
 ibid [6]. 
782
 ibid [2]; see also M Jones, ‘Informed Consent and other Fairy Stories’  (1999) 7 Med L Rev 103, 
133. 
783
 E Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 190. 
784
 ibid, arguing that within the increasingly impersonal healthcare system doctors cannot be 
expected to know enough about the values and experiences of individual patients to realise what 
factors matter for their decision-making.  
785
 M Jones, ‘Informed Consent and other Fairy Stories’ (1999) 7 Med L Rev 103, 130.  
152 
 
The current guidance on consent, Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions 
Together,
786
 published in 2008, is even more detailed regarding the exchange of 
information between doctor and patient than the previous guidance. It emphasises 
that the approach to discussion about treatment will vary between patients, with 
individual patients wanting more or less information than others.
787
 It stresses that 
discussions about treatment must include information about treatment options and 
their potential benefits, risks and burdens and the likelihood of success.
788
 Like the 
1998 guidance, the current guidance also adopts a higher disclosure standard than 
the common law and adopts an approach approximating to the subjective standard of 
disclosure. Thus, doctors should tailor the exchange of information with the patient 
according to the patient’s needs and wishes, their level of knowledge about, and 
understanding of, their condition, prognosis and the treatment options, the nature of 
their condition and the complexity of treatment.
789
 Doctors should not make 
assumptions about the information a patient might want or need and the clinical or 
other factors a patient might consider significant.
790
 The guidance is also more 
detailed about the discussion of side effects, complications and other risks, stating 
that the doctor must identify the adverse outcomes that may result from the proposed 
options including the failure of an intervention to achieve the desired aim.
791
 The 
doctor should do her best to understand the patient’s views and preferences about 
any proposed investigation or treatment, and the adverse outcomes patients are most 
concerned about.
792
  
While the 1998 guidance emphasised the link between the provision of information 
with patient autonomy and patient rights, seeing them as a prerequisite for patient 
cooperation with treatment, the 2008 guidance emphasises the need for partnership 
                                                 
786
 General Medical Council, Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together (GMC 2008). 
787
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between doctor and patient when making decisions about treatment and care.
793
 With 
its continuing trend towards a disclosure standard which is more respectful of 
patients’ informational requirements than the common law, and read together with 
the GMC’s core guidance Good Medical Practice794 which asks doctors to support 
patients’ self-care795 and encourages the involvement of the expert patient in 
treatment decisions,
796
 the 2008 guidance may even suggest the disclosure of 
alternative treatment options to include disclosure of some of the more common 
CAM modalities.
797
 Patients, especially those with long-term chronic conditions, 
may wish to be informed of CAM options and many will be raising the subject of 
CAM use with their GP. Many conditions, especially chronic ones, do not respond 
well to biomedical treatments,
798
 and most CAM tends to be used for problems such 
as chronic illness or chronic pain, for which conventional medicine sometimes has 
little to offer.
799
 As witnessed by the use of CAM and referral for CAM in general 
practice, the standard of medical practice clearly far exceeds the restrictive legal 
disclosure duty concerned with the feasibility, availability and general medical 
acceptance of treatment options. While tort law may provide little comfort for the 
uninformed patient, its destabilising effects have led to a change in professional 
guidance regarding information disclosure. 
                                                 
793
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 See General Medical Council, Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together (GMC 
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 MF Ruggio, ‘Complementary and Alternative Medicine: Longstanding Legal Obstacles to Cutting 
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Complementary and Alternative Medicine at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: Filling in the Void 
in Conventional Biomedicine’ (2004) 20 J Contemp Health L & Pol’y 329, 358. 
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2002) 15; MF Ruggio, ‘Complementary and Alternative Medicine: Longstanding Legal Obstacles to 
Cutting Edge Treatment’ (2009) 2 J Health & Life Sci L 137 citing H Morreim, ‘A Dose of Our Own 
Medicine: Alternative Medicine, Conventional Medicine, and the Standards of Science’ (2003) 31 J L 
Med & Ethics 222, 230; see also DM Eisenberg and others, ‘Trends in Alternative Medicine Use in 
the United States, 1990–1997’ (1998) 280 JAMA 1569, 1573 mentioning chronic conditions such as 
back problems, neck problems, depression, headaches and anxiety as the conditions for which CAM 
modalities are most used. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
Although information is central to the current policy-makers’ policy of treatment 
choice it has been demonstrated that the doctrine of informed consent under both the 
torts of trespass and negligence has been of little benefit to safeguard patients’ rights 
to information. If the interest in providing information involved the patient’s right to 
make an informed choice it would be more logical for the failure to disclose to 
vitiate the patient’s consent, turning the treatment into trespass. The courts have 
preferred to impose liability for lack of information in negligence rather than 
trespass, making it necessary for the claimant to show physical injury in the form of 
the risk materialising. The problems of proving a breach of duty to disclose 
treatments which are not mainstream, based on the standard as expounded in 
Sidaway and Pearce and followed in Birch, together with the likely requirements of 
feasibility, availability and medical acceptance of these treatments drawn from the 
case law of other common law jurisdictions, and of proving causation, are 
minimising claimants’ chance of success.800 These problems contribute to what was 
described by Jackson as the ‘impotence of tort’ in protecting patients’ interest in 
information disclosure.
801
  
However, as has been argued, informed consent litigation although mostly 
unsuccessful has had implications for medical practice. It has led to changed 
guidance by the GMC regarding information disclosure and has therefore increased 
attention by doctors to ensuring that their patients are adequately informed. Both 
Seeking Patient’ Consent802and Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions 
Together
803
 have encouraged more detailed disclosure by doctors with a disclosure 
standard that fulfils the requirements of patient autonomy in its liberal sense. Read 
                                                 
800
 J Manning, ‘Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: the Common Law and New Zealand's Code 
of Patient's Rights’ (2004) 12 Med L Rev 181, 207. 
801
 E Jackson, ‘Informed Consent to Medical Treatment and the Impotence of Tort’ in SA McLean 
(ed), First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate 2006). 
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together with the GMC’s core practice guidance804 doctors may be under the 
impression that they are required to inform patients about CAM, particularly patients 
with long-term chronic conditions where orthodox treatments may be of little 
benefit.   
Thus, tort law litigation and adjudication, rather than destabilising because of the 
occasional payment of damages to the patient or because of the precedential effect of 
adjudicated cases, has destabilising effects with much wider implications for the 
healthcare system, destabilising and changing medical practice
805
 and leading to 
some redress in the power imbalance between patient and doctor. The next chapter 
discusses the even greater destabilising effects demonstrated by litigation or possible 
litigation at the meso-level where the patient wishes to assert her treatment choice 
against the health authority as a quasi- consumer in the healthcare market.  
                                                 
804
 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (GMC 2006). 
805
 C Sabel and W Simon, ‘Destabilisation Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds’ (2003) 117 
Harv L Rev 1016, 1057. 
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Chapter 4 
Meso-level destabilisation: 
Judicial review litigation as a driver for change 
supporting patient choice of low-priority treatments 
4.1. Introduction 
Despite the claim of comprehensiveness
 
in the NHS Constitution,
806
 financial 
constraints mean that limits are placed on healthcare so that it is affordable. At the 
meso-level it is the health authorities, at present PCTs and in future Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs), that are entrusted to make resource allocation 
decisions from their fixed yearly budgets.
807
 For this purpose some treatments such 
as CAM are not generally available, either because the PCT has placed them on a list 
of so-called low-priority treatments
808
 or, as in the case of novel cancer drugs, they 
have not been approved or are pending approval by the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE). However, a patient can make an individual funding 
request (IFR) to her PCT supported by her GP to obtain such a drug or treatment on 
the basis of her exceptional circumstances and, if her request is refused, may look to 
the courts for judicial review of the decision. The role of the court is to oversee the 
legitimacy, procedural propriety and reasonableness of the decision, rather than 
assessing the merits of the patient’s claim.809 In reaching its decision the court will 
review and rule on the appropriateness of the criteria considered by the PCT for 
judging a case as exceptional. 
This chapter discusses the definition of exceptionality and the exceptionality criteria 
emerging from judicial review case law which are very general and sometimes 
                                                 
806
 NHS Constitution 2012, 1. 
807
 National Health Service Act 2006 s 230; see also Health and Social Care Act 2012, s 223I with 
regard to CCGs. 
808
 R v North West Lancashire Health Authority, ex p A, D and G [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 399 (CA); see 
also C Newdick, ‘Resource Allocation in the National Health Service’ (1997) 23 Am J L & Med 291, 
307. 
809
 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410. 
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ambiguous,
810
 leading to uncertainty for patients as well as health authorities. To 
analyse the principles developed by the courts in this context, the cases have been 
grouped into judicial review of IFRs concerning the treatment of life-threatening 
conditions
811
 and of IFRs for low-priority, non-life-threatening treatment.
812
 Both 
groups share a series of criteria which are appropriate for judging a case as 
exceptional. However, factors such as the effectiveness and the cost-effectiveness
813
 
may be particularly difficult to assess where the IFRs concern low-priority, non-life-
threatening CAM treatments.  
It is argued that the ambiguity of the criteria for judging a case as exceptional is not 
only likely to encourage increased litigation by patients who are refused the low-
priority treatment of their choice but will also have a destabilising impact on health 
authorities. Whether or not the individual patient achieves the desired result, a 
judicial review challenge has implications beyond the particular parties to the case. 
Although it is a vehicle by which the individual patient can bring pressure on the 
PCT – PCTs may often negotiate an agreement with the patient rather than incur the 
costs of litigation and encourage further claims –, judicial review adjudication can 
lead to a change in the status quo, leading to public engagement, deliberation and 
negotiation, with effects on other institutions and practices.
814
 In view of the macro-
policies of choice, personalised healthcare agenda and personal healthcare budgets, 
                                                 
810
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Care Trust [2011] EWCA Civ 247. 
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412; see also C Newdick, ‘Resource Allocation in the National Health Service’ (1997) 23 Am J L & 
Med 291, 313 stressing that evidence of effectiveness may often be incomplete, ambiguous or 
uncertain; A Ford, ‘The Concept of Exceptionality: A Legal Farce?’ (2012) 20 Med L Rev 1, 28 and 
n138. 
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 C Sabel and W Simon, ‘Destabilisation Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds’ (2003) 117 
Harv L Rev 1016, 1055 making this argument in the context of judicial review of the decisions of 
public authorities in the US. 
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the destabilising effects of judicial review challenges have the potential to lead to a 
greater role for CAM within the NHS. 
The chapter first discusses the roles of the PCT, NICE clinical guidelines and the 
court in judicial review litigation, before turning to the case law defining 
exceptionality and exceptionality criteria.  
4.2. Resource allocation decisions 
Rationing of healthcare has been a necessity from the inception of the NHS, despite 
the value of comprehensiveness underlying its foundation and enshrined in the NHS 
Constitution.
815
 Rationing is, however, no longer a purely implicit restriction of 
healthcare by the medical practitioner, but has, with the introduction of the internal 
market, become more explicit and visible.  
4.2.1 The roles of the PCT and NICE 
It is the local health authorities or primary care trusts (PCTs) that have the 
unenviable task of deciding which treatments are available and which are restricted 
for a variety of reasons.
816
 PCTs have the statutory duty, delegated to them by the 
Secretary of State, to commission medical services as they consider necessary to 
meet the healthcare needs of the local population and within allocated resources.
817
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 NHS Constitution 2012, 1; see also chapter 1. 
816
 Since 2005 PCTs have been able to transfer their responsibilities to GP practices to commission 
services enabling ‘practice based commissioning’ under which GP practices will take on 
responsibility from their PCTs for commissioning services that meet the health needs of their local 
population; see Department of Health, Commissioning a Patient-Led NHS, 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalass
et/dh_4116717.pdf, accessed on 6 September 2011; see generally M Brazier and E Cave, Medicine, 
Patients and the Law (5th edn, Penguin Books 2011) 8. In the context of a demand for CAM by the 
patient, the definition of appropriateness and also availability is then left to the GP and the GP 
practice. It remains to be seen whether the Health and Social Care Act 2012 may not have a similar 
effect on decision-making regarding the availability and appropriateness of CAM by CCGs. Unlike 
PCTs, the CCGs do not make decisions at arm’s length from patients and may therefore be exposed 
to greater external pressure from patients, patient support groups, the media etc.; see also A Ford, 
‘The Concept of Exceptionality: A Legal Farce?’ (2012) 20 Med L Rev 1, 31 commenting on the 
possible increased pressure on GPs under CCGs.  
817
 National Health Service Act 2006 s 1 imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to promote a 
comprehensive health service and s 3 describes these duties in more detail, stating that the 
Secretary of State must provide ‘to such extent as he considers necessary to meet all reasonable 
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In doing so, PCTs must not exceed their annual financial allocations.
818
 As each 
PCT makes its own budgetary choices, one of the inevitable consequences is the so-
called postcode rationing or lottery, leading to inequitable geographical access to 
treatment.
819
  
NICE was established in order to end unequal access to treatments and to increase 
consistency in local decision-making. PCTs are under a legal obligation to make 
available, within three months, health interventions recommended by NICE in a 
technology appraisal guidance (TAG).
820
 Having to cover the costs of these 
mandatory TAGs from their existing budgets causes inevitable funding implications 
for PCTs.
821
 PCTs will have to divert funds and reduce expenditure on other 
treatments or be in breach of their legal duties.
822
 However, not all guidance issued 
by NICE is mandatory. In contrast to TAGs, clinical practice guidelines, such as 
                                                                                                                                         
requirements’ (e) such facilities for the prevention of illness, the care of persons suffering from 
illness and the after-care of persons who have suffered from illness as he considers are appropriate 
as part of the health service, [and] (f) such other services as are required for the diagnosis and 
treatment of illness and under s 7 these duties are executed by the PCTs on behalf of the Secretary 
of State; cf under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 s 13 these duties are executed by the Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs). 
818
 National Health Service Act 2006 s 230; see also Health and Social Care Act 2012, s 223I with 
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 See eg J Maybin and R Klein, Thinking about Rationing (King’s Fund, London 2012) 37 where the 
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820
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Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 2010’ reinstating the Directions of 2003, which 
require PCTs to set aside funds from their existing budgets to cover the costs of positive technology 
appraisals conducted by NICE, 
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87.pdf, accessed on 5 August 2012. 
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 C Newdick, ‘Accountability for Rationing – Theory into Practice’ (2005) J L Med & Ethics 660, 666 
querying whether the funding of the technology appraisal guidance should take priority over 
everything else; K Syrett, Law, Legitimacy and the Rationing of Healthcare (CUP 2007) 31. 
822
 C Newdick, Who Should We Treat? (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 94; C Newdick, ‘Accountability for 
Rationing – Theory into Practice’ (2005) J L Med & Ethics 660, 666 referring to the wide variation 
among PCTs in the uptake of NICE guidance on the treatment of cancer in breach of their statutory 
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NICE guidelines concerning the use of CAM in specific conditions, are not 
mandatory.
823
  
The greater visibility of rationing since the 1990s
824
 has brought the issue of 
treatment denial into public consciousness.
825
 Maybe partially encouraged by the 
NHS choice policy, the number of IFRs by patients for treatments which have been 
restricted in some form by their PCT is considerable.
826
 The means to challenge the 
refusal of an unsuccessful IFR is by judicial review of the decision of the PCT.  The 
role of the courts in reviewing and shaping the decision-making of health authorities 
will be discussed next before considering the principles for funding on the basis of 
exceptional circumstances which emerge from the judicial review cases. 
4.2.2 Judicial review challenges and the perceived role of the 
courts 
Not only are judicial challenges to resource allocation decisions considered to be 
difficult for patients to win
827
 but the nature of judicial review, which sets limits to 
challenging the substance of policy decisions, limits the ability of the court to 
influence the decision-making of the health authority. The courts are not concerned 
with the substantive merits of the decision but with the propriety and the 
transparency of public authority decision-making. As Sir Thomas Bingham MR 
opined in the case of Child B: 
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Healthcare Resources in Canada and the United Kingdom’ [2003] Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis 149, 151. 
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the courts are not, contrary to what is sometimes believed, arbiters as to the 
merits of cases of this kind. Were we to express opinions as to the likelihood 
of the effectiveness of medical treatment, or as to the merits of medical 
judgment, then we should be straying far from the sphere which under our 
constitution is accorded to us. We have one function only, which is to rule 
upon the lawfulness of decisions. That is a function to which we should 
strictly confine ourselves.
828
 
Even where a challenge is successful the court will generally not invalidate the 
decision but refer the matter back to the authority for re-consideration in the light of 
the court’s observations.829 As long as the defects in the original decision-making 
process are remedied, the PCT is entitled to come to the same decision.
830
  
Orthodox theory refers to four public law grounds, namely the grounds of 
illegality,
831
 unreasonableness,
832
 procedural impropriety
833
 and proportionality,
834
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upon which a patient’s challenge might succeed against the decision by a health 
service body to refuse a particular treatment, and have her case remitted for 
reconsideration. There is a certain fluidity between the relevant heads of judicial 
review, so it is not always easy to ascertain upon which basis the courts have arrived 
at their conclusions.  
Since judicial review is concerned with the process of administration rather than the 
merits of a case the courts permit considerable discretion to health service bodies to 
establish priorities of expenditure in whichever manner they choose,
835
 and the 
discretion permitted tends to be broader still where financial constraints are admitted 
by the health authority.
836
 However, despite their wide discretionary power when 
deciding on the allocative priorities in their geographical area, any general policies 
set by health service bodies must admit of exceptional cases. As Auld LJ stated in A, 
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D and G,
837
 a case concerning the blanket refusal of gender reassignment surgery by 
the PCT: 
The precise allocation and weighting of priorities is clearly a matter of 
judgment for each Authority … It makes sense to have a policy for the 
purpose – indeed, it might well be irrational not to have one – … It is proper 
for an authority to adopt a general policy for the exercise of such an 
administrative discretion, to allow for exceptions from it in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’…838 
At the same time, however, when exercising their discretion health authorities are 
entitled to make lists of treatments which are of low priority. Thus in A, D and G
839
 
Auld LJ stated the principle: 
It is natural that each Authority, in establishing its own priorities, will give 
greater priority to life-threatening and other grave illnesses than to others 
obviously less demanding of medical intervention … and it makes sense too 
that, in settling on such a policy, an Authority would normally place 
treatment of transsexualism lower in its scale of priorities than, say, cancer or 
heart disease or kidney failure.
840
 
Therefore certain marginal but possibly life-saving treatments, such as many of the 
novel and expensive cancer drugs, may not be funded by some PCTs because they 
have not been approved by NICE or they are still awaiting approval. Other 
treatments which are non-life-saving treatments such as CAM, or so-called ‘luxury’ 
treatments
841
 such as cosmetic surgery or treatments for non-critical illness,
842
 may 
be ranked as low priority by different health authorities. 
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While PCTs have therefore wide discretionary powers the courts have developed 
exceptionality criteria in a series of judicial review cases
843
 which PCTs need to 
consider when patients make individual funding requests.
844
 In the following, the 
chapter discusses exceptionality case reviews by the courts of treatment requests 
refused by PCTs and discusses the sometimes vague and ambiguous exceptionality 
criteria as defined in the case law potentially causing legal uncertainty for both 
patients and PCTs.   
4.3. Exceptionality case reviews 
Subject to the different public law grounds, as long as their policies allow for 
‘exceptions’ or for ‘exceptional circumstances’ PCTs have considerable discretion in 
determining how to allocate resources and set priorities.
845
 While it is not necessary 
to define the specific exceptional circumstances it has to be possible to envisage 
there being exceptions, such as the possibility of there being an overriding clinical 
need, since ‘if it is not possible to envisage such circumstances the policy would in 
practice be a complete refusal’.846 Although it may be difficult to determine 
exceptional circumstances in advance, as Ford argues, ‘to leave the circumstances 
undefined presents a considerable challenge for PCT policy makers and results in 
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their decisions being vulnerable to legal dispute’.847 Litigation in the courts since the 
decision in A, D and G is evidence of the accuracy of this conclusion, as is the fact 
that some PCTs have attempted to formulate a definition of what constitutes 
‘exceptional circumstances’.848  
Thus, in AC, the Berkshire West PCT described their exceptionality case policy as 
considering cases which are significantly outside the normal range by comparing the 
patient with the cohort of patients with the same condition.
849
 In the Court of 
Appeal, Hooper LJ added that exceptional circumstances tell the decision-maker that 
the number of persons who will succeed is expected to be a small minority.
850
 There 
needs to be a comparator for something to be exceptional against, with the baseline 
or comparator being the cohort of people with the condition.
851
 If the patient is one 
of the eligible group but cannot show relevant clinical circumstances by comparison 
with others in the group, then the case is not exceptional.
852
 To define exceptional as 
requiring some unusual or unique clinical factor was, however, held to be 
unlawful.
853
 Requiring uniqueness would disqualify any person automatically if he 
can be likened to another rather than having to be merely exceptional.
854
 
Exceptionality was to be interpreted in its dictionary sense of being ‘out of the 
ordinary course’ or ‘unusual’ or ‘special’ rather than in the sense of being unique.855  
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This still leaves some ambiguity to the term exceptionality, as it will of course 
always be possible for other patients to emerge who are appropriately comparable. It 
will depend on how wide the group label is drawn.
856
 How unusual or special does a 
patient wanting to avail himself of publicly funded CAM have to be to qualify? 
What is an exceptional case to qualify for treatment not generally available from a 
PCT?
857
 Are requests by more than one patient for a particular treatment always 
automatically excluded from consideration as being a case for a service development 
rather than individual funding requests?
858
 
The chapter discusses the exceptionality factors drawn from judicial review cases 
which are divided into funding requests for the treatment of life-threatening 
conditions, mainly involving novel cancer drugs, and funding requests for low-
priority treatments for non-life-threatening conditions. Although there are many 
similarities regarding the criteria for judging cases as exceptional between these two 
groups, the differences justify a separate discussion of the cases.  
4.3.1 Exceptionality criteria in funding requests for the treatment 
of life-limiting conditions 
Due to a considerable number of very expensive novel cancer drugs becoming 
available in the recent past, health authorities have come under increasing pressure 
by patients to exercise their discretion and fund these drugs on an exceptional case 
basis. These drugs had either not yet been approved by NICE or had been rejected 
                                                 
856
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by NICE as not being cost-effective. The judgments show the significance the courts 
attach to the relevance of the factors and the weight attached to them in the decision-
making by health authorities, together with the need to justify any refusal of 
treatment to avoid invalidation of the decision. The judgments, however, also point 
to inconsistency in the interpretation of exceptionality in funding requests for novel 
cancer drugs. 
Rogers
859
 was the first in a series of exceptionality review decisions concerning such 
drugs where the claimant was refused treatment. The claimant suffered from stage I 
breast cancer and asked to be given Herceptin, a drug suitable for patients who test 
positive for HER2. However, Herceptin had not been licensed for the indication of 
early-stage breast cancer, and the policy of the PCT was not to fund off-licence 
drugs, although where the patient had a healthcare problem that presented an 
exceptional need for treatment her case would be considered on individual merits.
860
 
It did not consider Mrs Rogers to be an exceptional case as she was in the same 
situation as all other HER2-positive women with stage I breast cancer. Her 
application for judicial review was rejected at first instance, but the decision was 
overturned on appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the PCT had acted irrationally, 
as its policy in clinical terms did not allow for any exceptional circumstances. The 
PCT, in an attempt to comply with a guidance by the Secretary of State,
861
 had 
decided that the cost of Herceptin should be disregarded. While claiming that the 
decision was not based on resource constraints, the PCT had not been able to 
identify any clinical circumstances which would distinguish between patients. The 
clinical needs of all women with early stage HER2-positive breast cancer were the 
same. As Syrett points out, the downfall for the PCT was as a result of its decision 
not to treat resources as an issue when formulating its policy. Thus, ‘once financial 
considerations had been deemed irrelevant, the PCT was to be taken as possessing 
                                                 
859
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available funding for all eligible women for whom Herceptin had been 
recommended by their clinician.’862 Accordingly, if the PCT had argued scarcity of 
resources as a relevant consideration, ‘[it] would have possessed wide discretion to 
take account of factors other than clinical need in determining which patients should 
receive priority as exceptional cases.’863 For example, it could then also have taken 
account of personal and social characteristics, such as whether the woman had a 
disabled child she needed to care for, and could make the difficult choice ‘to fund 
treatment for a woman with a disabled child but not a woman in different personal 
circumstances’.864 This might well constitute the recognition of the role of the carer 
in society rather than an unwarranted discrimination on the basis of some other 
personal characteristics.
865
 
Care responsibilities were also mentioned in the case of Gordon
866
 as a possible 
factor to show exceptional circumstances.
867
 Mrs Gordon suffered from terminal 
metastatic lung cancer which was beyond treatment with surgery or conventional 
chemotherapy. Standard practice at this stage was best supportive care, although a 
new drug, Tarceva, while licensed for this indication, was not funded by the PCT 
and NICE approval had not been given. She had obtained private funding for four 
weeks’ treatment privately and sought another four weeks’ treatment to be funded by 
the PCT. The PCT’s exceptional funding review had rejected her application, 
deciding that she was not an exceptional case. The patient applied for judicial 
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review, claiming that the PCT was in fact operating a blanket exclusion of all 
candidates from the use of Tarceva as a third-line treatment. The court referred the 
matter back for reconsideration because the PCT had not considered the existence of 
exceptions and there had been a lack of transparency of the reasons for the original 
decision.
868
 Ousley J stressed that Mrs Gordon may find it impossible to challenge a 
further refusal of funding if the PCT grappled with the relevant issues.
869
 The PCT 
may well conclude that the drug would not be funded because of insufficient routine 
clinical benefit.
870
 Demonstrating a greater likelihood to benefit from treatment than 
many others did not mean that Mrs Gordon had to be treated as an exception. The 
PCT could legitimately conclude that it would not fund the treatment because of the 
limited survival benefit to her and the limited resources available to the PCT.
871
 
Short-term prolongation of survival may, however, constitute exceptional 
circumstances, for example where someone needed to make care arrangements for 
young children, but this was not applicable in this case.
872
  
In contrast, the increased likelihood of benefiting from the drug in question was 
considered a relevant factor for the determination of exceptionality in the later case 
of Otley.
873
 The claimant suffered from metastatic colorectal cancer, and again all 
treatment such as surgery and conventional chemotherapy had been exhausted. The 
patient financed five cycles of the biological drug Avastin privately. This treatment 
was well tolerated by her and appeared to reduce the tumour size. The claimant then 
applied for funding from her PCT on an exceptional case basis which was, however, 
refused since the panel argued other treatment was available to her. Mitting J held 
that the panel had acted irrationally and that her case was exceptional. Although the 
exceptional case policy of the PCT was entirely rational and sensible, its application 
to this case was not so. The panel had not taken into account the slim but important 
                                                 
868
 R (Gordon) v Bromley NHS Primary Care Trust [2006] EWHC 2462 (Admin) [43]; C Newdick, 
‘Judicial Review: Low Priority Treatment and Exceptional Case Review’ (2007) Med L Rev 236, 241. 
869
 R (Gordon) v Bromley NHS Primary Care Trust [2006] EWHC 2462 (Admin) [44]. 
870
 ibid [39]. 
871
 ibid [40]. 
872
 ibid [41]. 
873
 R (Otley) v Barking and Dagenham NHS Primary Care Trust [2007] EWHC 1927 (Admin); A Ford, 
‘The Concept of Exceptionality: A Legal Farce?’ (2012) 20 Med L Rev 1, 20–21. 
170 
 
chance that the drug could prolong the patient’s life by more than a few months, that 
there were, in practice, no other treatments available to her, and that on any fair-
minded view of the panel’s exceptionality criteria her case was exceptional.874 She 
was young and fit and had responded well and without major side-effects to 
Avastin.
875
 In addition, the judge also found that the allocation of resources is not 
capable of being the decisive factor when making a funding decision and only small 
sums are involved;
876
 the cost of five cycles amounted to approximately £6,000.
877
 
Thus: 
The policy properly provides that the allocation of resources is an element in 
every decision of this kind. But the course proposed … was at least in its 
initial stages a course which required the allocation of only relatively small 
resources. [The] proposal was for four or five cycles of treatment … The 
course proposed … did not on any reasonable view require this Trust to put 
at risk the interests of other patients or, in the words of its own policy on 
difficult decisions, require it ‘to consider the impact of funding on the health 
of the whole population’.878  
The further case of Murphy
879
 underlines the fact that when exercising their 
discretion PCTs must consider all exceptional circumstances of the claimant in their 
totality, rather than individually. In this case, a patient had developed a serious drug 
reaction to interferon which she received for her kidney cancer. Her consultant 
oncologist had applied to the PCT to fund the novel cancer drug Sunitinib on an 
exceptional case basis. The PCT, however, refused funding, but its refusal was 
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challenged on the basis that the decision was irrational. The patient argued seven 
specific factors as relevant to the question whether the drug should be made 
available to her including, for example, that she was unable to take part in a trial 
with Sunitinib because she also suffered from breast cancer, that due to the adverse 
reaction to interferon she had not been able to take the maximum effective dose, and 
that despite her serious illness she remained the principal carer of her husband who 
suffered from a number of difficult medical conditions. The panel considered each 
and every one of the seven factors but concluded that none was exceptional. The 
court quashed the decision and remitted the case back to the PCT because, although 
the panel had considered the factors individually, they had not looked at them 
together. As Burnett J held, ‘there are many factors which on their own might be 
sufficient to persuade a decision-maker to exercise a discretion exceptionally … But 
having looked at all factors individually it seems to me it is necessary to consider 
them in the round …’880 If the judge had been satisfied that the panel would come to 
the same decision if it looked at all the circumstances together, he would have 
refused the application.  
In Ross,
881
 the claimant, who suffered from multiple myeloma, challenged the 
decision of the PCT not to fund the new cancer drug Lenalidomide on an exceptional 
case basis. Previous treatment with other drugs, in particular Thalidomide, had to be 
stopped because of the side-effect of severe peripheral neuropathy experienced by 
the patient. The only alternative open to the patient was Lenalidomide, which does 
not cause this adverse reaction. Grenfell J stated that he found against the PCT on 
the ground of Wednesbury unreasonableness in ‘that the decision of the PCT was 
one which no reasonable authority could have made on the application before it’,882 
and he subjected the decision to more intense or anxious scrutiny because the 
claimant’s life was at stake.883 The PCT’s policy was not only unlawful, as it was 
not a policy for exceptional cases because the patient had to show in effect that he 
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was unique and could not be likened to another, the PCT had also made a mistake of 
fact in its understanding of the clinical effectiveness of Lenalidomide and the 
meaning of cost-effectiveness in the context of exceptional cases.
884
 The 
misunderstanding of the effectiveness of Lenalidomide had made it impossible for 
the PCT to assess the cost-effectiveness rationally.
885
 The claimant had sought four 
cycles of treatment, with the potential of more cycles only if the treatment was 
effective; if he did not respond, the treatment was unlikely to be continued, so that 
further costs would not arise.
886
 The PCT had also not taken into account the saving 
of not having to provide the expensive previous treatment to which the claimant had 
developed intolerance.
887
 Although the PCT had considered the issue of clinical and 
cost-effectiveness, the court went further, delving into the substance of these 
factors.
888
  
The need to have an exceptional case policy does not only apply in the context of 
expensive cancer drugs for life-threatening conditions, however, but also in the 
context of treatments generally considered to be of low priority by PCTs. The 
definition of low-priority treatments and the factors which have been considered 
relevant in these exceptionality decisions will be considered next.  
4.3.2 Exceptionality and low-priority treatment 
Low-priority treatments have been defined by Newdick as ‘luxury’ care or ‘too 
peripheral to the objectives of the NHS to deserve treatment’.889 They could also be 
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defined as treatments for non-life-threatening conditions or treatments of low 
clinical value.
890
 Different PCTs have nominated different treatments as low-
priority, ranging from surgery for varicose veins, hair transplantation, face lifts, 
tattoo removal, vasectomy, circumcision, bariatric surgery, tonsillectomy, knee 
arthroscopy, IVF, breast augmentation, gender reassignment surgery, to 
complementary alternative medicine including homeopathy.
891
 Such treatments have 
been described as falling in the lowest 10% in terms of priority of treatment and 
would therefore only be provided in cases of overriding clinical need.
892
 The 
relevant factors considered in cases of low-priority treatment can be distinguished 
from those considered in cases of treatment for life-limiting malignancies and are 
also given different weight in the decision-making. The case law again demonstrates 
the ambiguity of the exceptionality factors in play.  
Exceptionality criteria in IFRs for low-priority, non-life-threatening conditions 
In the case of A, D and G,
893
 the applicants, who suffered from gender identity 
dysphoria, applied for judicial review of the PCT’s refusal to pay for their 
                                                                                                                                         
acceptable shape and appearance (cosmetic surgery and treatment for obesity) then the distinction 
becomes even more blurred. Thus lifestyle or luxury treatment is an ‘overelastic hold-all. What such 
treatments appear to have in common is that they are defined by consumer demand and not by 
technical medical criteria or a medical definition of appropriateness.’ 
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transsexual surgery because of its policy not to fund such treatment in the absence of 
‘overriding clinical need or other exceptional circumstances’. In 1995, the health 
authority had adopted a policy allocating low priority to treatments which it 
considered to be clinically ineffective, in the sense of achieving no or little clinical 
gain. The PCT’s avowed policy was described as providing effective healthcare, in 
the sense of ‘medically effective’ healthcare.894 Specifically, it stated in its policy:  
a wide variety of medical procedures currently in use within the NHS cannot 
be demonstrated in research trials to have any clinical effectiveness. The 
NHS Executive has, therefore, urged health authorities to reallocate 
purchasing priorities to promote the use of more effective treatments at the 
expense of those which are of no proven benefit.
895
  
To the medical effectiveness criterion, the health authority later added the criterion 
of appropriateness for public funding. The policy was held to be unlawful, in part 
because the PCT refused to recognise the effectiveness of the treatment for gender 
identity dysphoria despite ‘a strong and respectable body of medical opinion’ to the 
contrary.
896
 The PCT had argued that the effectiveness of the treatment had not been 
subjected to randomised controlled trials, and that research conducted was likely to 
be biased and did not indicate the long-term results of surgery. For Auld LJ, the 
PCT’s argument of the lack of effectiveness, despite the existence of medical 
opinion supporting surgery, was not relevant. The authority had accepted 
transsexualism as an illness and therefore should ‘accord the condition a place on the 
scale of its priorities for illnesses instead of relegating it to the outer regions of 
conditions which it plainly does not so regard’.897 Buxton LJ, on the other hand, 
engaged with the effectiveness argument, concluding that there was no need to 
submit a respectable body of opinion in favour of gender reassignment surgery to 
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research trials.
898
 In addition, where such evidence exists, ‘it is not open to a rational 
health authority simply to determine that the procedure has no clinical benefit while 
giving no indication why it considers that is so’.899 ‘Since the authority did not 
regard gender reassignment surgery as an effective form of treatment for 
transsexualism it would in practice be impossible for an individual to make out a 
case for such surgery, even if an overriding clinical need was successfully 
established.’900 In effect, therefore, the authority was operating a ‘blanket policy’ 
which failed to admit of exceptions whereas the degree of consideration required by 
the decision-maker also depended on the importance of the interest of the citizen 
affected by the decision.
901
  
An earlier case which turned on the question of effectiveness, or the likelihood of 
success of a treatment and the weight to be attached to conditions which did not 
amount to ‘critical illness’, was the earlier case of R v Sheffield Health Authority, ex 
p Seale.
902
 The court held that a ban on women over 35 receiving IVF treatment was 
justified, on the grounds that the chances of achieving a pregnancy decreased in 
women over that age, and the application failed. However, the case may not be good 
law. Rather than considering each case on its merits and allowing for exceptional 
circumstances, Auld J stated it was not unreasonable not to consider each case 
individually where the case did not involve a ‘critical illness’: 
[A] clinical decision on a case by case basis is clearly desirable and, in cases 
of critical illness, a necessary approach … However, … I cannot say that it is 
absurd for this authority, acting on advice that the efficacy of this treatment 
decreases with age and that it is generally less effective after the age of 35, to 
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take that as an appropriate criterion when balancing the need for such a 
provision against its ability to provide it …903 
As Newdick points out, it is unlikely that applications for transsexual surgery 
demand greater scrutiny than applicants wanting IVF, as blanket bans will more 
likely only be upheld where evidence of inefficacy of treatment was over-
whelming.
904
  
The more recent case of AC
905
 concerned the exceptional case review of a 
transsexual who was seeking funding for breast augmentation surgery, rather than 
core gender reassignment surgery which would have been funded by the Berkshire 
PCT. The claimant had been diagnosed with gender identity disorder and had 
undergone hormonal treatment which had not led to the desired breast development. 
Breast surgery of transsexuals was classified by the PCT as a non-core gender 
reassignment procedure, and was considered, in the same way as cosmetic breast 
surgery or cosmetic procedures generally, as low-priority treatment. The claimant 
AC sought judicial review of the PCT policy in view of a natal female patient’s 
success in obtaining funding for her breast augmentation surgery on an exceptional 
case basis. Bean J rejected the application of the transsexual claimant as not being 
one of exceptionality when compared to that of the natal patient. The natal patient’s 
case was exceptional because of the severity of the psychological disorder from 
which she suffered due to her perceived physical shortcoming, in contrast to the mild 
to moderate distress suffered by AC. The judge also found that there was no general 
medical consensus on the effectiveness of breast augmentation surgery as providing 
considerable medical benefit to patients, whether natal or transsexual, and that the 
PCT had not acted irrationally in taking the view that the clinical effectiveness of the 
treatment in this sense was uncertain.
906
 As Hooper LJ confirmed in the Court of 
Appeal dismissing the transsexual appellant’s case, there were no exceptional 
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904
 C Newdick, Who Should We Treat? (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 107. 
905
 R (AC) v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust [2010] EWHC 1162 (Admin); appeal dismissed in R 
(AC) v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust [2011] EWCA Civ 247. 
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circumstances as there was no evidence of significant health impairment of the 
patient and no evidence of the intervention improving health status.
907
  
The case of Condliff
908
 considered the relevance of non-clinical factors in the 
determination of exceptionality. Mr Condliff, a 62-year-old retired policeman, 
applied for exceptional funding from his PCT for bariatric surgery, as a treatment for 
his obesity. He suffered from diabetes and a number of other health problems such 
as renal impairment, hypertension and obstructive sleep apnoea. His weight gain – 
he was morbidly obese with a body mass index (BMI) of 40 – was allegedly due to 
his treatment with insulin. Although he had attempted to lose weight using standard 
non-surgical methods, including dietary, lifestyle and drug therapies, it had been 
unsuccessful. The PCT rejected Mr Condliff’s application for funding as his BMI 
had not reached the threshold for routine funding and his case was not exceptional. 
His condition deteriorated further: he became reliant on the use of a wheelchair and 
was housebound. His BMI had reached 43. He could no longer attend church nor 
could he play his guitar due to swelling and pain in his hands, and he had developed 
retinopathy and renal failure due to his diabetes. He also became incontinent and 
was unable to dress and shower himself. The second application for funding of 
bariatric surgery was again refused as the applicant did not meet the eligibility 
criteria of a BMI of 50, nor had he met the grounds for exceptionality under the 
PCT’s policy. Mr Condliff applied for judicial review regarding the criteria set by 
the PCT for determining exceptionality which excluded social factors.
909
 This was 
argued to contravene his human rights under Article 8 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR). The PCT’s policy stated: 
In reaching a decision as to whether a patient’s circumstances are 
exceptional, the Panel is required to follow the principle that non-clinical or 
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social factors including social value judgments about the underlying medical 
condition or the patient’s circumstances are never relevant.910  
According to Waksman J, Article 8 did not make it unlawful for a PCT to adopt a 
policy by which an individual funding request had to be determined exclusively by 
reference to clinical factors. Although the Strasbourg Court has recognised that 
Article 8 can be relied on to impose a positive obligation on the state to take 
measures to provide support for an individual, Article 8 rights ‘are not, generally, 
engaged in healthcare resource allocation given the margin of appreciation afforded 
to states when making such decisions’.911 ‘Article 8 cannot be considered applicable 
each time an individual’s everyday life is disrupted, but only in exceptional 
circumstances, where the state’s failure to adopt measures interferes with the 
individual’s right to personal development…’912 The Social Factors Exclusion 
policy of the PCT did not violate Article 8 as it did not create a positive obligation in 
the context of an individual funding request.
913
 Waksman J did, however, consider 
the possibility of social factors which had direct clinical implications, in contrast to 
non-clinical social factors.
914
 Pure social factors, such as a social value judgment 
about smokers, an applicant’s contribution to society, the value of keeping an 
employed person in work or a person engaged in dangerous sports, would be ruled 
out.
915
 It is less clear what factors would constitute clinical social factors, although 
the judge cited the IFR non-discrimination policy of East Lancashire, Blackburn 
with Darwen PCT suggesting that factors such as a person’s religion, lifestyle, social 
                                                 
910
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911
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the following Strasbourg Court decisions: Sentges v The Netherlands App no 20677/02 (ECtHR, 3 July 
2003) where the court rejected the admissibility of an Article 8 claim to a robotic arm; Pentiaca v 
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position, family or financial status, or intelligence might be relevant to the clinical 
effectiveness of an intervention and the capacity of an individual to benefit. 
However, this leaves open the question when a social factor takes on clinical 
significance.
916
  
Mr Condliff appealed the first instance decision unsuccessfully. The Court of Appeal 
held that the adoption of the IFR policy by the PCT did not contravene the 
Convention.
917
 According to Strasbourg jurisprudence, a policy that IFRs should be 
determined exclusively by reference to clinical factors was not unlawful.
918
 ‘The 
Strasbourg Court had shown a strong reluctance to entertain complaints of that kind 
because of the difficult assessments required in the fair administration of a 
healthcare system with limited resources.’919 The PCT had grappled with the 
difficult ethical questions involved and had struck what it considered to be a fair 
balance between the interests of the individuals and the community, including the 
question of what constitutes clinical and non-clinical factors, and between different 
patients with similar health conditions.
920
 A PCT was entitled to set an IFR policy 
which reflects what it reasonably considers to be the fairest way of treating patients 
claiming exceptional clinical need.
921
  
                                                 
916
 Arguably distinguishing patients on the basis of clinical social factors is not the same as on the 
basis of their personal circumstances, see eg A Ford, ‘The Concept of Exceptionality: A Legal Farce?’ 
(2012) 20 Med L Rev 1, 13 where the author asks, in the context of the allocation of expensive 
cancer drugs, whether, on the grounds of justice, it is not time to move away from the idea that 
some patients are exceptional on the basis of social circumstances; cf C Newdick, ‘Resource 
Allocation in the National Health Service’ (1997) 23 Am J L & Med 291, 309 where the author states 
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920
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Although there has not been a judicial review of refused IFRs for CAM to date,
922
 
there is anecdotal evidence that patients have had requests for acupuncture for lower 
back pain and also osteopathy for lower back pain refused by PCTs.
923
 In the 
following the chapter examines the hypothetical situation of a health authority’s 
decision being challenged in court by a patient demanding CAM treatment, 
highlighting some of the uncertainties of the definition of exceptionality criteria.   
4.4. Exceptionality review and complementary alternative 
medicine 
As has been stated, the National Health Service Act 2006
924
 does not prohibit the 
provision of CAM under the NHS and, furthermore, section 1 of the Act provides 
that the Secretary of State has a duty to provide a comprehensive health service.
925
 
The growing popularity of CAM has led to an expansion of its use, funded both 
privately and within the NHS.
926
 Patients unwilling or unable to pay may consider 
asking for funding of the treatment by their PCT to obtain the treatment under the 
                                                 
922
 There is variation in access to CAM between different PCTs with some PCTs providing some NHS 
funded CAM, see chapter 1; see also GP Online,  
http://www.gponline.com/bulletin/daily_news/article/1154606/pcts-abandon-funding-
homeopathy/ accessed on 30 October 2012, suggesting that 15% of PCTs were providing NHS 
funding for homeopathy in 2011/2012. 
923
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English NHS’, presentation on 28 February 2012 at Queen Mary University of London, commented 
on two cases of IFRs that were refused: Case 1: Acupuncture for back pain was refused, despite the 
NICE guideline on lower back pain, as the panel was directed to a literature search including 
systematic reviews showing that there was no evidence that acupuncture works for lower back pain. 
Case 2: Funding for osteopathy for lower back pain was refused because (a) the patient had already 
paid for private treatment and the PCT had a policy of not funding private treatment retrospectively; 
(b) the patient was not covered by the NICE guideline on lower back pain as he had had back pain 
for more than 12 months; (c) there was limited evidence of effectiveness for osteopathy for lower 
back pain and it may not be more effective than drugs and (d) NICE recommendations are service 
developments that need to be prioritised by PCTs. 
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Population Based Survey’ (2001) 9 Complementary Therapies in Medicine 2, 8; see also generally S 
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NHS.
927
 PCTs have a statutory duty to commission medical services as they consider 
necessary to meet the healthcare needs of the local population and must not exceed 
their annual financial allocations.
928
  
In summary, the following principles regarding the discretionary powers of PCTs 
can be established from case law: 
 It is a matter for the PCT how it allocates its resources, so long as it does so 
reasonably.
929
 
 When deciding whether to fund a treatment in an individual patient’s case, 
a PCT is entitled to take into account the financial restraints on its budget as 
well as the patient’s circumstances.930 
 It is within the discretion of the PCT to consider some treatments as low 
priority and to decline funding for these treatments save in exceptional 
circumstances, provided such circumstances can be envisaged.
931
 PCTs 
cannot operate blanket bans on treatments.
932
 
 Exceptionality needs to be understood in the ordinary sense of the word.933 
A patient need not show that he or she is unique in order to qualify as an 
exceptional case.
934
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 J Stone and J Matthews, Complementary Medicine and the Law (OUP 1996) 72 stating that 
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Most PCTs do not routinely fund CAM treatments but include them on their list of 
low-priority treatments.
935
 Patients who claim access to these low-priority treatments 
therefore need to demonstrate exceptional circumstances to be successful with their 
individual funding request.
936
 At least in part to avoid costly litigation
937
 PCTs will 
attempt to navigate the criteria that have emerged from exceptionality review cases 
of orthodox treatment. Although there is considerable variation in the definition of 
exceptionality policies amongst PCTs, many have adopted the formulation 
publicised by the NHS Confederation and based on case law: 
In making a case for special consideration, it needs to be demonstrated that: 
that the patient is significantly different to the general population of patients 
with the condition in question; and the patient is likely to gain significantly 
more benefit from the intervention than might be normally expected for 
patients with that condition. The fact that the treatment is likely to be 
efficacious for that patient is not in itself, a basis for exceptionality.
938
 
As discussed, the problem for PCTs and patients alike is the ambiguity of the 
exceptionality criteria developed by the courts. Indeed, the NHS Confederation 
admits that ‘the law is not yet clear as to the exact nature’ of exceptionality and that 
                                                 
935
 eg the Kent and Medway referral and treatment criteria document lists acupuncture, chiropractic 
therapy, herbal remedies, homeopathy, osteopathy etc. as low-priority treatments not routinely 
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 J Maybin and R Klein, Thinking about Rationing (King’s Fund, London 2012) 25; NHS 
Confederation, ‘Priority Setting: Managing Individual Funding Requests’(2008) 4, 
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the very nature of exceptionality makes it ‘impossible to anticipate every exceptional 
case’.939  
4.4.1 Exceptionality criteria and CAM treatment 
With this lack of certainty of any exceptionality policy in mind, health authorities 
will be driven by values such as the consistency, fairness and equity of the decision-
making and most PCTs will have general decision-frameworks to this effect.
940
 They 
will attempt to reconcile the tensions between the needs of the many and the claims 
of the individual while being concerned with fidelity to the law.
941
 When deciding 
on funding any low-priority treatment on an exceptional case basis the factors a PCT 
will take into account will clearly depend on the individual situation of the patient. 
According to the case law, only clinical factors or social factors with clinical 
implications need to be assessed by PCTs in the determination of a patient’s 
exceptionality.
942
 However, many of the clinical factors which emerge from case law 
and are appropriate for judging a case as exceptional
943
 remain in general terms and 
are difficult to interpret, particularly in the context of low-priority, non-life-
threatening treatment. Thus, a health authority ought to consider: 
 Whether the patient demonstrates overriding clinical need.944 
o However, does the need depend on the severity or acuteness of the 
condition? Does the need depend on the length of the patient’s 
expected survival?  
                                                 
939
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 Whether the patient has exhausted conventional treatments.945  
o Is this a relevant factor for patients wanting low-priority treatments 
or only for patients requiring novel cancer drugs?  
 Whether the patient is intolerant of, or hypersensitive to conventional 
treatment.
946
  
o Would this factor also apply to a patient requesting CAM and 
complaining of severe side-effects from orthodox treatment? 
 Whether he has previously benefited from the particular therapy, possibly if 
the patient has purchased it privately, since this consideration would be part 
of the patient’s specific clinical history and prognosis.947  
o How long would the prolongation of survival have to be to constitute 
a sufficiently good prognosis? Is the prognosis of the patient relevant 
where he suffers from a long-term chronic condition rather than from 
a cancer with a short life expectancy? 
  Whether he is likely to benefit from treatment more than others.948 
o However, can the likelihood to benefit ever be defined objectively? 
With regard to the clinical benefit for a particular patient of the requested treatment, 
PCTs will need to consider the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the treatment 
generally. In the context of CAM treatment, it is these factors that may represent 
major stumbling blocks in the exceptionality assessment. Both these factors are 
singled out for more detailed discussion. 
                                                 
945
 R (Otley) v Barking and Dagenham NHS Primary Care Trust [2007] EWHC 1927 (Admin). 
946
 R (Ross) v West Sussex Primary Care Trust [2008] EWHC 1908 (Admin) [76]. 
947
 E.g. R (Otley) v Barking and Dagenham NHS Primary Care Trust [2007] EWHC 1927 (Admin) [20] cf 
R (Gordon) v Bromley NHS Primary Care Trust [2006] EWHC 2462 (Admin). 
948
 R (AC) v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust [2011] EWCA Civ 247 [54]; cf R (Gordon) v Bromley 
NHS Primary Care Trust [2006] EWHC 2462 (Admin) [39] where Ouseley J opined that greater clinical 
benefit to the applicant does not necessarily make her case exceptional; see also C Newdick, 
‘Resource Allocation in the National Health Service’ (1997) 23 Am J L & Med 291, 312–14 where the 
author makes the valuable point, albeit in the context of futile treatment, that that clinical benefit is 
not an absolute notion and opportunity costs need to be considered.   
185 
 
The criteria of clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
From judicial review cases of funding requests for novel cancer low-priority 
treatments, the following principles can be formulated regarding the consideration of 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in the determination of exceptionality by a 
health authority. Again many of the legal pronouncements remain in very general 
terms or are open to various interpretations.  Thus: 
 In reaching a decision, the health authority should consider the nature and 
seriousness of each type of illness and the effectiveness of various forms of 
treatment.
949
 
 A decision which seriously affects the citizen’s health will require 
substantial consideration and will be subject to careful scrutiny by the 
court.
950
 
 A health authority cannot simply determine that the procedure has no 
proven clinical benefit while giving no indication of why it considers that is 
so.
951
 
 A health authority may not simply dismiss responsible medical opinion, 
even if there are differing opinions on the effectiveness of a treatment. Such 
opinion is relevant and must be given proper weight.
952
 
 The health authority needs to understand the clinical efficacy data and the 
quality of the evidence.
953
 
 Where there are differing opinions on clinical effectiveness and the health 
authority’s conclusions are not irrational, the court will not decide which 
opinion is right.
954
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 A health authority needs to understand the effectiveness data in order to be 
able to assess cost-effectiveness.
955
 
Effectiveness and, consequently, cost-effectiveness are of course not absolute 
notions. Scientific evidence will often be insufficient to provide clear conclusions as 
to the benefits of a particular treatment in biomedicine.
956
 This problem for the 
PCT’s exceptionality assessment is magnified when considering CAM treatment 
modalities which are assessed for their effectiveness and cost-effectiveness within 
the dominant healthcare system.  
The problem of the proof of effectiveness  
Orthodox medicine and CAM represent two treatment paradigms
957
 with diverging 
views of the meaning of ‘effectiveness’. Orthodox medicine is generally regarded to 
be evidence-based medicine (EBM), i.e. what Sackett terms ‘the conscientious, 
explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the 
care of individual patients’.958 EBM has been enthusiastically promoted within the 
NHS, with reliance on research evidence rather than clinical judgment as the major 
concern.
959
 However, Sackett includes in the definition of EBM the integration of 
clinical expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic 
research.
960
 Provision of CAM treatment is contested because of the perceived or 
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actual lack of research evidence.
961
 Because of the opposition to CAM, at least 
partly due to the political influence of evidence-based medicine,
962
 resources are 
directed by government and health funders towards the areas of health where 
evidence can be demonstrated and away from interventions which have not been 
shown to be effective.
963
 Therefore, as Stone argues, ‘evidence-based healthcare has 
an inherent bias against therapeutic interventions in which outcomes cannot be 
adequately measured or easily defined.’964 Whereas orthodox medicine gauges the 
success of treatment with reference to the alleviation of symptoms,
965
 how to 
measure the success or lack of success of treatment is a major issue for many CAM 
modalities.
966
 For a health authority’s assessment of an individual funding request 
the lack of scientific validation of efficacy of the desired CAM therapy is therefore 
likely to present a considerable obstacle.
967
 Although PCTs can examine the 
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nullify or fend off claims of outsiders. 
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evidence about treatments and services they commission themselves they may also 
look to NICE for guidelines on the use of CAM for specific conditions.
968
 
NICE guidelines on CAM 
Although NICE has never carried out a health technology appraisal on CAM, so that 
there has never been mandatory positive guidance on the use of CAM in the NHS,
969
 
it has evaluated CAM treatments when developing standards for non-mandatory 
clinical guidelines for the treatment of specific conditions.
970
 The Department of 
Health expects NICE guidance to be implemented consistently across the NHS,
971
 so 
PCTs should take steps towards the implementation and funding also of non-
mandatory NICE clinical practice guidelines.
972
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Care Trusts Are Cutting Referrals, Shows Survey’ (2011) BMJ 343 arguing, that due to current cuts in 
PCT funding, 64% of PCTs have restricted referrals for low-priority treatments including IVF 
treatment. 
972 
The need for treatment to be evidence-based is official policy for the NHS, see S Harrison, ‘The 
Politics of Evidence-Based Medicine in the United Kingdom’ (1998) 26 Policy and Politics 15, 15. NICE 
was created to encourage evidence-based practice by providing the NHS in England and Wales with 
authoritative, robust and reliable guidance on current best practice, see NICE, A Guide to Our Work 
(NICE 1999), Introduction. The reliance on scientific evidence is thought to have the advantage of 
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Four possible scenarios with regard to clinical practice guidelines and the 
assessment of a specific CAM modality can be envisaged, which need to be 
considered in turn.   
Scenario 1: Where the evidence of effectiveness of a particular CAM modality is 
ambiguous or the NICE recommendations are neither favourable nor 
unfavourable,
973
 a PCT will be able to use the NICE findings in rationalising its 
refusal of CAM treatment to a patient. As long as the PCT can show that it has 
considered and understood the data and the quality of the evidence
974
 and has 
explained the reasoning for its refusal,
975
 the court is unlikely to demand a 
reconsideration of the case on the basis of this factor.  
Scenario 2: The same principles will apply where the NICE recommendations are 
unfavourable.
976
 A refusal of an IFR is unlikely to be referred for reconsideration by 
the court, even if some effectiveness data can be adduced.
977
 
Scenario 3: Where there is a favourable NICE clinical practice guideline about the 
effectiveness of CAM in a specific condition, the refusal of treatment will be more 
difficult to justify by the PCT. Examples of NICE clinical guidelines pointing to 
                                                                                                                                         
enabling resources to be freed from ineffective treatments while also helping to reduce 
inappropriate variation in clinical practice and unequal access to treatment, so-called post-code 
prescribing, see K Syrett, ‘NICE Work? Rationing, Review and the “Legitimacy Problem” in the New 
NHS’ (2002) 10 Med L Rev 1, 3 fn 16, referring to A First Class Service, para 2.11; cf C Newdick, Who 
Should We Treat? (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 208 arguing that postcode prescribing is inevitable absent 
any central guidance as disinvestments from other areas will take place to accommodate mandatory 
NICE guidance; see also chapter 1 and the discussion of the value of equity of access. 
973 
An example would be use of acupuncture in opioid detoxification, see E Ernst, ‘Assessment of 
Complementary and Alternative Medicine: the Clinical Guidelines from NICE’ (2010) J Clin Pract 
1350, 1352. 
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R (Ross) v West Sussex Primary Care Trust [2008] EWHC 1908 (Admin) [84], [85]. 
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R v North West Lancashire Health Authority, ex p A, D and G [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 399 (CA) 
412. 
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 See eg E Ernst, ‘Assessment of Complementary and Alternative Medicine: the Clinical Guidelines 
from NICE’ (2010) J Clin Pract 1350, 1350–56: the NICE recommendation of homeopathy is 
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977
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see E Ernst, ‘Assessment of Complementary and Alternative Medicine: the Clinical Guidelines from 
NICE’ (2010) J Clin Pract 1350, 1352. 
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positive evidence of effectiveness are for reflexology for multiple sclerosis, exercise 
therapy for chronic fatigue syndrome, hypnotherapy and/or psychological 
intervention for irritable bowel syndrome, acupuncture or spinal manipulation for 
non-specific low back pain.
978
 However, even in such a situation, if the PCT can 
show that there are differing opinions about the clinical effectiveness,
979
 the court 
will not decide which opinion is right as long as the health authority’s conclusions 
are not irrational
980
 and it gives proper weight to the differing opinions. 
Scenario 4: In conditions where NICE has not evaluated CAM at all, or has omitted 
part of the available evidence on CAM in its recommendations,
981
 but evidence of 
the effectiveness of some CAM modalities is available,
982
 the PCT may still be able 
to demonstrate that there are different opinions concerning the effectiveness of the 
CAM treatment in question and that its conclusions as to the lack of efficacy are not 
irrational in order for the court not to order a reconsideration of the case.  
Where the evidence of effectiveness of a CAM modality in a particular condition is 
unambiguous – although this will not often be the case – the cost-effectiveness 
factor will be an additional relevant consideration in the PCT’s assessment of 
exceptionality. Of course, cost-effectiveness data are only relevant once the 
effectiveness of a treatment has been established. However inexpensive a treatment, 
it makes little sense to provide it if there is no proof that it is effective because of the 
opportunity costs involved, i.e. the range of ‘opportunities that will be foregone if 
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the money to pay for them is diverted elsewhere’.983 If a CAM modality cannot 
conclusively be shown to work or be validated scientifically, its cost-effectiveness 
must remain in doubt.
984
 
Considerations of cost-effectiveness  
Cost-effectiveness analysis, unlike effectiveness which does not compare different 
treatments for different conditions, provides ‘a lowest common denominator concept 
in terms of which the outcome of any intervention may be assessed and provides the 
unit costs of producing such outcomes’.985 One of the methods of achieving this 
outcome measure is the Quality-Adjusted Life Year, or QALY, used by NICE in its 
cost-effectiveness assessments.
986
 Problems become apparent when the QALY cost-
effectiveness analysis is applied to CAM. 
Firstly, one of the difficulties in making a QALY assessment
987
 and calculating a 
cost per QALY is the need to know the overall cost of the treatment. The costs of 
many CAM treatments are, however, difficult to calculate as treatment tends to be 
long term so that costs are often simply estimates.
988
  Secondly, as CAM therapies 
generally do not claim a curative or a life-extending effect, it is the quality of life 
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improvement
989
 which is relevant in the QALY calculation of a CAM treatment.
990
 
However, the QALY framework gives precedence to life-extending treatments over 
quality of life improvements. The life expectancy before and after treatment, part of 
the QALY measurement, is unlikely to change in a patient being treated for a 
chronic or recurrent condition.
991
 Thirdly, QALYs measure only treatment outcome 
and not the process of health care. However, proponents of CAM emphasise that the 
process of health care also contributes to a patient’s quality of life.992 QALYs ignore 
the health care process in the quality of life assessment. 
Thus the currently used generic QALY assessment of a CAM modality may not 
produce relevant estimates of the health benefits to the patient because it is 
insensitive to the values of patients, to patients’ subjective judgment.  
PCTs aiming to avoid litigation by patients will try to demonstrate that they have 
properly considered all the relevant factors in their exceptionality assessment.
993
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They must be able to explain coherently why they have arrived at their decision in 
order to reduce the threat of judicial review. Avoiding litigation and its collateral 
costs may be unsettling for PCTs in light of the rather ambiguous criteria developed 
by the courts for judging exceptionality. PCTs may prefer to approve a large 
percentage of individual funding requests to avoid being challenged in the courts.
994
  
Threatened or actual judicial review challenges may, however, exert much more far 
reaching influences and lead to PCTs arriving at new policies and budgeting 
priorities.   
4.5. The destabilising effect of judicial review challenges 
As has been suggested above, the threat of judicial review may have a destabilising 
impact on a health authority’s efforts to resolve the tension between individual 
demands and the needs of the local population in a consistent, fair and equitable 
manner. From the point of view of the health authority, judicial review litigation 
turning on the definition of ambiguous exceptionality criteria involves considerable 
expenditure in terms of finances and staff time devoted to the case.
995
 The threat of 
judicial review may therefore encourage authorities to do what they can to avoid the 
risk of litigation.
996
 
While a judicial review challenge where the case does not reach judgment carries no 
legal weight, the adjudication of judicial review litigation is likely to have a greater 
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impact on health authorities. A judgment provides an authoritative decision in a 
particular case, has a significant impact on the parties involved and creates legal 
precedent. Thus, in the context of judicial review challenges of local authority 
decisions by individual claimants, Platt and others found that local authorities were 
often willing to reconsider their decisions and settle challenges early on in the 
judicial review process rather than having to respond to the outcome of the 
litigation.
997
 However, as has been argued, judicial pronouncements on 
exceptionality criteria in judicial review proceedings may not provide clarity and are 
often ambiguous. Authorities investing resources responding to the perceived 
interpretation in one decision may find that other interpretations or decisions lead to 
a different conclusion.
998
 In addition, responding to a judgment may be costly and 
unsettling and entail revisiting policies or budgeting priorities that have been 
carefully arrived at.
999
 Even if there is no ambiguity, judgments are in the public 
domain and may encourage more potential claims by individual patients wanting to 
access low-priority treatments.     
The destabilising effects of judicial review litigation, however, may have even more 
far reaching effects, effects beyond the immediate parties to the case, health 
authorities generally and potential future individual litigants. Thus according to 
Sabel and Simon, public law litigation destabilises the status quo generally, leads to 
public engagement, deliberation and negotiation, with consequences not only for the 
defendant institution but also for other institutions and practices.
 1000
 The need for 
transparency by the health authority, the need to account for its rationing decisions 
in public and the media involvement in such cases opens the system to broader 
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interests and voices.
1001
 For Sheldrick judicial review litigation is a vehicle by which 
individuals and groups can bring pressure to bear on state institutions
 
.
1002
 The 
‘institutional leverage’ provided by the courts may help ‘in securing rights to 
participate in decision making or altering/expanding the parameters governing the 
implementation of a policy’.1003  
From this standpoint it is then feasible to consider government policies on 
personalised healthcare and patient choice as a result and not simply the cause of the 
destabilisation of meso-level litigation and adjudication. The destabilisation may 
lead to an  opening of the healthcare system to a new ‘medical pluralism’ to extend 
the provision of CAM in the NHS, already foreshadowed by the personal health 
budget pilots empowering patients to make choices regarding their treatment.
1004
  
However, this softening approach towards CAM needs to be seen at the same time in 
the light of the ‘responsibilisation’ of the patient and the escalating costs of 
healthcare.
1005
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The chapter has demonstrated that the exceptionality factors which have emerged 
from judicial review case law of IFR refusals are often ambiguous and may be of 
little assistance to the patient who has been refused CAM, absent illegality, 
procedural impropriety and unreasonableness, even with the greater intensity of 
scrutiny of the decision by the courts. As judicial review does not generally concern 
itself with the substance of the decision, as long as the PCT has explained the 
reasons for refusing the treatment, has taken into account all the relevant factors and 
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given appropriate weight to these factors – the requirements of the reasonableness 
framework of decision-making –, the patient is unlikely to be successful in an 
application for judicial review. If the PCT can demonstrate that it has considered the 
effectiveness of the CAM modality and also its cost-effectiveness, it is unlikely that 
the court will invalidate its decision.  
However, as has been demonstrated, from the point of view of the health authority, 
judicial review proceedings involve considerable expenditure in terms of finances 
and staff time devoted to the case. In the view of the difficulty of interpreting the 
often ambiguous exceptionality criteria which have emerged from judicial review 
cases, PCTs may therefore concede an individual funding request that does not 
involve major treatment costs simply to avoid the expense of court proceedings and 
the possibility of a negative outcome for the PCT and the risk of setting a precedent 
that encourages yet more potential claims. This may in turn encourage patients to 
claim exceptional circumstances to obtain funding for CAM. 
Public law litigation, apart from being costly and time-consuming for a health 
authority and setting new precedents, has, however, wider ramifications extending 
beyond the parties involved. The need for transparency by the health authority and 
the media interest in judicial review litigation opens the system to broader interests 
and voices and can be a means to bring pressure on public institutions.
1006
 Public law 
litigation destabilises, leads to public engagement, deliberation and negotiation, and 
may lead to a restructuring of practices and of defendants’ and other institutions in 
the long term.
1007
 It can be seen as an incentive to change and as expanding the 
parameters governing the implementation of policies.
1008
 In view of macro-level 
patient choice policies and the personalisation of healthcare policy public law 
litigation may therefore open up a greater space for CAM in NHS provision, already 
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foreshadowed by the personal health budget pilots for patients with complex, long-
term chronic conditions.  
Patient choice of CAM funded by the NHS may receive further impetus from 
another direction. In the EU, patients have access to cross-border healthcare funded 
by their ‘home’ Member State. A new EU Directive on the application of patients’ 
rights in cross-border healthcare, initiated by the national governments in 2002 and 
brought to fruition by the Commission (DG SANCO) in 2011
1009
 will be transposed 
into national law by October 2013. The patient cross-border rights in the EU and the 
relevance for a treatment choice of CAM will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
The destabilising effect of EU healthcare law: patient 
choice of CAM across borders 
5.1. Introduction 
The right of patients to receive healthcare in another EU Member State (host state), 
and to be reimbursed by the healthcare system of their ‘home’ Member State (home 
state), has been established in a series of judgments of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). This is despite the fact that the EU has no formal competence to regulate 
national healthcare.
1010
 Cross-border healthcare was interpreted by the Court as 
being an economic service,
1011
 within the meaning of the Treaty, which also applied 
to national healthcare systems. Prior authorisation in case of hospital care had to be 
based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria.
1012
 For non-hospital care, prior 
authorisation was found to constitute a barrier to the freedom to provide services.
1013
  
The chapter demonstrates that despite the paucity of cases which have been referred 
to the ECJ, the litigation of patients claiming rights to reimbursement from their own 
healthcare systems for healthcare services obtained in another EU Member State had 
the effect of destabilising the national healthcare systems, with effects far beyond 
the number of patients who used these rights.
1014
 Litigation created legal uncertainty 
due to the risk of patients obtaining treatment, including CAM treatment, abroad to 
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which they were not entitled in their home state, uncertainty as to the levels of 
reimbursement that should apply and when patients’ home state could lawfully 
refuse prior authorisation.
1015
  
These cases set in motion a restabilisation process which prompted political activity 
by the UK government and the NHS, from lobbying to a ‘creative’ adaptation of 
national healthcare policy.
1016
 It led to the adoption of the EU Directive on cross-
border healthcare, or the Patient Mobility Directive,
1017
 expected to end the legal 
uncertainty about the care patients can receive abroad while allowing the NHS to 
maintain control over patients’ entitlements,1018 thus setting limits on the potential of 
expanding patient choice further within the EU. The chapter suggests that although 
the Directive forms part of a cycle of restabilisation in the EU it is unlikely to end 
legal uncertainty. It is argued that rather than ending legal uncertainty, the Directive 
perpetuates some of the issues that have caused the destabilising effects of ECJ case 
law on the English NHS and threatens potential legal challenge by patients claiming 
reimbursement for cross-border treatment. Thus, possible uncertainties regarding 
prior authorisation of cross-border treatment, the level of reimbursement and the 
undefined health benefit basket of the NHS remain. The scope for patients’ claims 
for reimbursement from their health authorities
1019
 causes further instability and may 
possibly expand the availability of CAM within the NHS.  
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The chapter first explains the legal framework underlying patient mobility in the EU. 
This is  followed by the analysis of two CAM cases decided by the European Court 
of Justice, highlighting the greater emphasis placed on the economic nature of 
healthcare services than on scientific credentials, and the analysis of the case of 
Watts
1020
 showing the applicability of ECJ case law to the NHS. The chapter then 
proceeds to discuss the destabilising effects of the ECJ’s patient mobility case law 
generally and the likely impact of the new Patient Mobility Directive on the NHS 
patient claiming cross-border healthcare rights to CAM.  
5.2. The legal framework 
Prior to the decisions of the European Court of Justice in Decker
1021
 and Kohll
1022
 in 
1998, patients were able to access treatment in another EU Member State under the 
social security legislation, the Regulation on the coordination of social security 
schemes, which is intended to cover people who either study or work abroad or 
require necessary medical treatment as tourists.
1023
 It entitles the patient to the same 
benefits as the patients of the host state. In addition, the Regulation enables planned 
treatment abroad, as long as the patient has received prior authorisation from the 
competent institution in her home state.
1024
 Such authorisation cannot be refused 
where the treatment is covered in the healthcare benefit basket of the home state and 
cannot be given without undue delay.
1025
  
The activist approach to the interpretation of the social security legislation by the 
ECJ led to the EU Member States amending the social security legislation on several 
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occasions
1026
 in order to restrict the effect of the ECJ’s pronouncements.1027 Since 
1998, the Regulation on the coordination of social security schemes has been 
interpreted by the Court in the light of the freedom of movement provisions of the 
Treaty, which is beyond easy amendment by the Member States.
1028
 The relevant 
Article of the Treaty
1029
 provides that restrictions on the freedom to provide
1030
 
services
1031
 within the Community shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of 
Member States.
1032
 Consequently, patients now seek to use the free movement rights 
under the Treaty provisions as a means of accessing cross-border healthcare and then 
claim reimbursement of the cost of treatment from their home state, or seek to 
combine their claims under the Treaty provisions and the social security 
legislation.
1033
  
                                                 
1026
 The original Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71/EEC provided that authorisation may not be 
refused ‘where the treatment in question cannot be provided for the person concerned within the 
territory of the Member State in which he resides’. After the Pierik decisions in Case 117/77 Bestuur 
van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Dreuthe-Platteland v Pierik (No 1) [1978] ECR 825 and Case 182/78 
Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Dreuthe-Platteland v Pierik (No 2) [1979] ECR 1977, Article 22 
was altered to provide that authorisation may not be refused ‘where the treatment in question is 
among the benefits provided for by the legislation of the Member State on whose territory the 
person concerned resides and where he cannot be given such treatment within the time normally 
necessary for obtaining the treatment in question in the Member State of residence taking account 
of his current state of health and the probable course of the disease’. 
1027
 V Hatzopoulos, ‘Health Law and Policy: The Impact of the EU’ in G de Burca (ed), EU Law and the 
Welfare State (OUP 2005) 125. 
1028
 ibid. 
1029
 Article 56 TFEU. 
1030
 The freedom to provide services includes the freedom to receive services, see Joined Cases 
286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v Ministero de Tesoro [1984] ECR 377, para 16. 
1031
 Medical treatment constitutes services according to Article 57 TFEU (ex-Article 50 EC) see Case 
C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan [1991] ECR 
I-4685, para 16; Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v. Union de caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931, 
para 17. 
1032
 See generally AP van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community: 
Cross-Border Access to Public Benefits (Hart 2003) 235 and V Hatzopoulos, ‘Health Law and Policy: 
The Impact of the EU’ in G de Burca (ed), EU Law and the Welfare State (OUP 2005) 127. 
1033
 eg Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust, 
Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325 concerning an English patient; see also J McHale, 
‘Commentary. Rights to Medical Treatment in EU Law. R (Watts) v Bedford Primary Care Trust and 
Another’ (2007) 15 Med L Rev 99, 100. 
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5.3. CAM and the interpretation of the Treaty provisions 
Despite the relatively small number of patient mobility cases that have been referred 
to the Court, the results of these cases have raised concerns within the Member 
States about the impact on the solidarity base of their healthcare systems and the 
deleterious effect on resource allocation decisions.
1034
 A surprising outcome of these 
cases is the finding that cross-border access to healthcare includes a right to access 
not only orthodox medicine but also complementary alternative medicine (CAM), 
which is generally not publicly funded, or only to a very limited extent, in many EU 
Member States.
1035
  A total of four cases referred to the ECJ to date have concerned 
CAM
1036
 and two of these cases are discussed in more detail.  The cases of Geraets-
                                                 
1034
 K Veitch, ‘Juridification, Medicalisation, and the Impact of EU law: Patient Mobility and the 
Allocation of Scarce NHS Resources’ (2012) Med L Rev 362; C Newdick, ‘The European Court of 
Justice, Trans-National Healthcare, and Social Citizenship – Accidental Death of a Concept’ (2009) 
Wisconsin Intl L J 844.  
1035
 eg Health Systems in Transition, Italy (European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 
Brussels 2009) 147; Health Systems in Transition, France (European Observatory on Health Systems 
and Policies, Brussels 2010) 219; Health Systems in Transition, The Netherlands (European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, Brussels 2010) 166; Health Systems in Transition, 
Belgium (European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, Brussels 2010) 198; cf Case C-8/02 
Ludwig Leichtle v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [2004] ECR I-2641, which concerned climotherapy and 
balneotherapy, recognised as an appropriate and effective treatment by the patient’s home state. 
Authorisation for reimbursement of the associated expenditure of the spa treatment was refused, 
because under the applicable German legislation it had not been established that it was absolutely 
necessary that the cure be provided outside Germany on account of the greatly increased prospects 
of success. The ECJ decided that Member States were precluded by the Treaty provisions on the 
freedom of movement from subjecting the reimbursement of such expenditure to conditions which 
were different from those applicable to cures taken in the patient’s home state. These conditions 
had the effect of inhibiting cross-border receipt of healthcare services. 
1036
 Case 117/77 Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Dreuthe-Platteland v Pierik (No 1) [1978] 
ECR 825 and Case 182/78 Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Dreuthe-Platteland v Pierik (No 2) 
[1979] ECR 1977 were not decided under the freedom of movement provisions but under a previous 
version of the Social Security Regulation changed in 1981, in the wake of the ECJ’s Pierik decisions. 
The Dutch patient claimed reimbursement for hydrotherapy treatment obtained in Germany, a 
treatment which was considered of little value and inappropriate in Holland but was not specifically 
excluded from the benefits basket. The treatment had, however, shown considerable effectiveness 
in the patient’s case. In Pierik (No 1), paras 15–18 the ECJ held that ‘appropriate treatment’ included 
treatment calculated to be effective for the condition from which the person suffers wherever it was 
provided and that authorisation for treatment may not be refused where the treatment in the 
Member State of residence is less effective than that which is available in another Member State. In 
Pierik (No 2) a further question was referred to the Court, namely whether authorisation of 
treatment could be refused where the treatment for medical reasons was not considered as falling 
within the field of health treatment or was not considered of any value. The Court stated, at paras 
10–13, that it is for the institution objectively to assess the medical grounds for refusing 
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Smits
1037
 and Inizan
1038
 help to underline that the questions of the lack of availability 
and lack of recognition of CAM as effective treatment in the patient’s home state 
were given short shrift by the Luxembourg Court.  
5.3.1 The case of Geraets-Smits  
Geraets-Smits
1039
 involved a Dutch national who suffered from Parkinson’s disease. 
She was admitted to a German hospital for several weeks where she obtained multi-
disciplinary treatment consisting of medication together with physiotherapy, 
ergotherapy and socio-psychological care.
1040
 The Dutch sickness insurance 
institution refused to reimburse the costs incurred by the patient because, firstly, 
adequate treatment for Parkinson’s disease was available in the Netherlands1041 and, 
secondly, the specific clinical treatment provided in Germany was not regarded as 
normal treatment within the professional circles concerned.
1042
 Rather than the 
sickness insurance system being based on a pre-established list of types of 
treatment,
1043
 the Netherlands legislature had enacted a rule that the test for a 
                                                                                                                                         
authorisation, having regard to the effectiveness of the treatment in question, but where the 
institution acknowledges that the treatment constitutes an effective treatment then it cannot refuse 
authorisation. Thus patients would be able to obtain authorisation for treatment which was not 
included or even deliberately excluded from the healthcare package of their Member State of 
residence; see generally AP van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons within the European 
Community: Cross-Border Access to Public Benefits (Hart 2003) 255 arguing that the judgment comes 
close to the recognising the free movement of patients under the social coordination legislation. 
1037
 Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473. 
1038
 Case C-56/01 Patrizia Inizan v Caisse primarie d’assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine [2001] 
ECR I-12403. 
1039
 Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473 combined the reference of two cases to the ECJ 
but, while Peerbooms involved intensive care therapy of a patient in a coma, only Geraets-Smits 
involved treatment falling in the category of CAM.  
1040
 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, ibid, para 3. 
1041
 The expert neurologist appointed by the national court also concluded that there was no clinical 
or scientific evidence that the specific approach used in Germany was more appropriate, see ibid, 
para30. 
1042
 ibid, para 29; Article 3 Verstrekkingenbesluit Ziekenfondsverzedering 1966 (Holland). 
1043
 Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473, para 63. 
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treatment to be regarded as a qualifying benefit
1044
 was that it had to be considered 
‘normal within the medical professional circles concerned’.1045 This is not unusual in 
that many Member States leave it up to healthcare professionals to define the 
insurance package according to open criteria such as ‘adequate and appropriate’ 
treatment or treatment ‘normal in the professional circles concerned’ rather than 
establish fixed treatment lists which would require frequent updating due to rapidly 
changing developments in medicine.
1046
 
Whilst the European Court of Justice in principle accepts such open criteria,
1047
 it 
considered the Dutch national requirement for the treatment to be regarded as 
‘normal within the professional circles concerned’, to constitute an obstacle to the 
freedom to provide services.
1048
 In essence, the argument of the Dutch sickness 
insurance funds meant that treatments would only be recognised as health benefits if 
they are considered normal within Dutch medical circles.
1049
 Although foreign 
expertise through contributions to medical science made by specialists from other 
states at international conferences and in specialist literature would have an impact 
on Dutch medical circles,
1050
 the fact that it was up to the sickness insurance funds in 
the Netherlands to decide what was normal, and therefore a benefit under its social 
security legislation, might lead to non-recognition of new, revolutionary or 
                                                 
1044
 ibid, para 91; Article 3 Verstrekkingenbesluit Ziekenfondsverzedering 1966 (Holland) and see 
Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71EC providing that authorisation for a treatment may not be refused 
where the treatment is a benefit provided for under the Member State’s legislation. 
1045
 Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473, para 23. 
1046
 See AP van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community: Cross-Border 
Access to Public Benefits (Hart 2003) 302.  
1047
 Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473, paras 85 and 87. 
1048
 ibid, para 67 and 90 although the ECJ also accepted that there could be overriding reasons to 
justify barriers to the freedom to provide services, paras 72–74. 
1049
 A Kaczorowska, ‘A Review of the Creation by the European Court of Justice of the Right to 
Effective and Speedy Medical Treatment and its Outcomes’ (2006) 12 Eur L J 345, 355. 
1050
 Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473, para 93 referring to the argument advanced by 
the Netherlands government. 
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experimental treatments regarded as normal in other EU Member States.
1051
 The ECJ 
held that determination of what is normal required reference to international medical 
science and standards, as without such reference, national scientific views would 
prevail over international opinions, leading to treatment habitually carried out on 
national territory always being preferred in practice.
1052
 Therefore where a treatment 
is ‘sufficiently tried and tested according to international medical science’ it should 
be regarded as ‘normal’ and recognised as a benefit under the sickness insurance 
scheme.
1053
  
In order to assess what criteria satisfy treatments that are ‘sufficiently tried and 
tested according to international medical science’, the national institution must take 
into account all relevant information including ‘existing scientific literature and 
studies, the authorised opinions of specialists and the fact that the proposed 
treatment is covered or not covered by the sickness insurance system of the Member 
State in which the treatment is provided’.1054 With regard to the latter consideration, 
Koutrakos’ point is interesting to note, namely that the Member State’s assessment 
of what should be covered in its own sickness insurance system is irrelevant 
whereas, according to the principle of free movement, it matters whether the 
treatment is covered in the Member State where treatment is provided.
1055
 The Court 
also did not clarify how the Member State should determine the relevant 
‘international medical science’ considering the constant developments in the 
                                                 
1051
 A Kaczorowska, ‘A Review of the Creation by the European Court of Justice of the Right to 
Effective and Speedy Medical Treatment and its Outcomes’ (2006) 12 Eur L J 345, 356. 
1052
 Case C-157/99 B.S.M.Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473, para 96; A Kaczorowska, ‘A Review of the Creation 
by the European Court of Justice of the Right to Effective and Speedy Medical Treatment and its 
Outcomes’ (2006) 12 Eur L J 345, 356. 
1053
 Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473, paras 94 and 108. And see A Kaczorowska, ‘A 
Review of the Creation by the European Court of Justice of the Right to Effective and Speedy 
Medical Treatment and its Outcomes’ (2006) 12 Eur L J 345, 356. 
1054
 Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473, para 98; see also P Cabral, ‘The Internal Market 
and the Right to Cross Border Medical Care’ (2004) 29 EL Rev 673, 684 pointing out that the Court 
did not provide any indication as to the weight to be attached to each of these criteria. 
1055
 P Koutrakos, ‘Healthcare as an Economic Service under EC Law’ in M Dougan and E Spaventa 
(eds), Social Welfare and EU Law (Hart 2005) 118.  
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understanding of disease and treatment, the educational and cultural differences 
between healthcare professionals in the EU, and even more so healthcare 
professionals outside the EU.
1056
 Van der Mei, for example, asks whether there is 
such a thing as an international standard in medical circles.
1057
 Medical scientists 
may not always recognise the progress made by scientists in other Member States
1058
 
nor agree on the adequacy or appropriateness of treatments provided in other 
Member States.
1059
 Are ergotherapy and socio-psychology recognised as effective, 
tried and tested treatments for Parkinson’s Disease in the EU generally? Is it 
sufficient that the treatment is available in any Member State and covered by its 
healthcare system? What if the healthcare cover of that Member State changes? As 
van der Mei points out, the Court did not interpret ‘international standards’.1060 
Rather, what the Court focused on was whether the Dutch rules were a barrier to the 
freedom to provide services and protected national healthcare providers.  
5.3.2 The case of Inizan 
Divergent views by healthcare professionals on the appropriateness of the treatment 
were also apparent in the case of Inizan.
1061
 The patient in the case had undergone 
pain relief and psychological treatment for her acute back pain at specialist centres 
in France where she was insured, but the treatment had proved unsuccessful. She 
applied for authorisation from her sickness insurance fund to undergo integrative 
medicine and natural therapy at a German hospital which was equipped with a 
natural therapy and integrative medicine unit.
1062
 Authorisation for the treatment, 
                                                 
1056
 TK Hervey and L Trubek, ‘Freedom to Provide Healthcare Services within the EU: An Opportunity 
for a Transformative Directive’, Law in New Governance Law Taskforce II Conference Paper, UCL 
London, May 2006, 9. 
1057
 AP van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community: Cross-Border 
Access to Public Benefits (Hart 2003) 303. 
1058
 ibid. 
1059
 TK Hervey and JV McHale, Health Law and the European Union (CUP 2004) 137 arguing that 
especially regarding new treatment there is likely to be a difference of professional opinion.  
1060
 AP van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community: Cross-Border 
Access to Public Benefits (Hart 2003) 303. 
1061
 Case C-56/01 Patrizia Inizan v Caisse primarie d’assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine [2001] 
ECR I-12403. 
1062
 Facts stated in Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, ibid 12406. 
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which under French law would be given only if the same or equally effective 
treatment could not be obtained in France without undue delay,
1063
 was refused.  
The national court referred questions on the compatibility of the Regulation on the 
coordination of social security schemes
1064
 with the freedom of movement 
provisions of the Treaty,
1065
 and on the lawfulness of the refusal of authorisation by 
the sickness insurance fund to the European Court of Justice. One of the points 
raised by the defendant sickness insurance fund was that treatment of pain by means 
of natural therapy and integrative medicine was not scientifically recognised, and 
was therefore not a benefit available under the French social security system.
1066
 The 
French government added that, although the German treatments were not practised 
in France under the same name and in the same form, it was possible to keep the 
condition under control by using the range of different treatments available in 
France. The fundamental difference was that the treatments were not available at one 
centre, unlike in Germany,
1067
 but they were available without undue delay, 
therefore justifying refusal of authorisation under the Regulation on the coordination 
of social security schemes. The patient contended that she had already undergone 
these treatments in the past without success, and that, in accordance with the 
principle of freedom to receive services, she was entitled to move freely to another 
Member State to receive treatment not available under the French healthcare system 
and be reimbursed for the cost of that treatment.
1068
 She also adduced evidence that 
the treatment sought in Germany was covered by the public sickness insurance 
scheme in Germany.
1069
  
                                                 
1063
 Social Security Code (France), L.332-3, L.766-1 and R.332-2 providing for similar conditions as 
Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71/EEC and see V Hatzopoulos, ‘Health Law and Policy: The Impact of 
the EU’ in G de Burca (ed), EU Law and the Welfare State (OUP 2005) 133. 
1064
 Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71/EEC. 
1065
 Ex-Article 49 EC, now Article 56 TFEU. 
1066
 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-56/01 Patrizia Inizan v Caisse 
primarie d’assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine [2001] ECR I-12403, 12411, para 17. 
1067
 ibid 12413, para 19. 
1068
 ibid 12411, para 16. 
1069
 ibid 12407, para 8. 
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As Montgomery points out, the case was a dispute about the effectiveness of 
complementary alternative therapy.
1070
 However, neither the question of the 
effectiveness of the treatment nor its scientific rationale was mentioned by the ECJ. 
Rather, the Court viewed the case as concerning authorisation procedures for 
hospital care under the Regulation on the coordination of social security schemes 
and the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement,
1071
 and decided that the prior 
authorisation was compatible with the Treaty provisions.
1072
 Despite the protestation 
by the sickness insurance funds that the treatment sought in Germany was not 
scientifically recognised and therefore not covered by the insurance,
1073
 the Court 
found that the treatment was ‘among the benefits provided for by the legislation of 
the Member State on whose territory the insured person resides’1074 and that ‘the 
same or equally effective treatment’ could not be given without undue delay in that 
Member State.
1075
 As a consequence, by supporting the patient’s case1076 the ECJ 
required
1077
 treatment considered inappropriate by the medical healthcare 
professionals in the patient’s home state to be funded by its insurance system.1078 
Moreover, the concept of ‘the same or equally effective treatment’ is likely to be 
                                                 
1070
 J Montgomery, ‘The Impact of European Union Law on English Healthcare Law’ in M Dougan and 
E Spaventa (eds), Social Welfare and EU Law (Hart 2005) 153.  
1071
 Case C-56/01 Patrizia Inizan v. Caisse primarie d’assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine [2001] 
ECR I-12403, para 39. 
1072
 ibid, para 60. 
1073
 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in ibid 12406, para 17. 
1074
 ibid 12403, para 42. 
1075
 ibid 12403, paras 37 and 45. 
1076
 ibid, para 60 where the Court stated that although the freedom of movement provision did not 
preclude prior authorisation, such authorisation was subject to the condition that the patient could 
not receive treatment appropriate to his illness in his Member State of insurance (home state), but 
that authorisation can be refused where treatment which is the same or equally effective can be 
obtained without undue delay in the patient’s Member State of insurance, and see P Cabral, ‘The 
Internal Market and the Right to Cross Border Medical Care’ (2004) 29 EL Rev 673, 679–80. 
1077
 Reminiscent of the decision in Case 117/77 Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Dreuthe-
Platteland v Pierik (No 1) [1978] ECR 825, 830. 
1078
 J Montgomery, ‘The Impact of European Union Law on English Healthcare Law’ in M Dougan and 
E Spaventa (eds), Social Welfare and EU Law (Hart 2005) 153 pointing out that the decision 
subordinates professional control of which treatments are effective (and also which are covered by 
the health system) to the freedom of movement and the market in services. 
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subject to disagreement and might encourage further litigation,
1079
 and this may be 
especially so in the context of unproven complementary alternative medicine. 
5.4. The English patient’s access to cross-border 
healthcare 
The ECJ, with its wide interpretation of the definition of healthcare benefits, 
therefore brought non-orthodox CAM treatment within the reach of the EU patient 
who would otherwise not have been able to obtain it free of charge in her home 
state. Both these cases, however, did not concern a national healthcare system based 
on taxation but rather reimbursement
1080
 or benefits-in-kind
1081
 systems which were 
insurance based.
1082
 Until the case of Watts,
1083
 none of the cross-border patient 
mobility cases before the European Court of Justice had involved a national 
healthcare system based on taxation such as the English NHS. 
5.4.1 The case of Watts 
Although already foreshadowed in the case of Müller-Fauré and van Riet,
1084
 Watts 
finally settled that the principles of free movement were applicable to the NHS and 
                                                 
1079
 TK Hervey and JV McHale, Health Law and the European Union (CUP 2004) 137. 
1080
 In a reimbursement system, the patient pays the healthcare provider for the treatment received 
and is later reimbursed by the sickness insurance fund for the costs incurred; P Cabral, ‘The Internal 
Market and the Right to Cross Border Medical Care’ (2004) 29 EL Rev 673 fn 18; see eg Case C-
158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union de caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931. 
1081
 In a benefits-in-kind system based on insurance, patients can receive care from any contracted 
provider who in turn is paid directly by the sickness insurance institutions on the basis of agreed 
fees for services; P Cabral, ‘The Internal Market and the Right to Cross Border Medical Care’ (2004) 
29 EL Rev 673 fn 20; see eg Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and 
H.T.M. Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473 concerning hospital-based 
services; Case C-385/99 V.G. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ 
Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO 
Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509 concerning non-hospital-based services. 
1082
 V Hatzopoulos, ‘Health Law and Policy: The Impact of the EU’ in G de Burca (ed), EU Law and the 
Welfare State (OUP 2005) 117 and P Cabral, ‘The Internal Market and the Right to Cross Border 
Medical Care’ (2004) 29 EL Rev 673, 675. 
1083
 Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust, 
Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325. 
1084
 Case C-385/99 V.G. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA 
and E.E.M. van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509 
where the ECJ appeared to reject the UK argument that the NHS did not provide services for 
remuneration, despite the fact, that the connection between medical services and the remuneration 
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that NHS patients were entitled to receive treatment in another EU Member State at 
the expense of the NHS. As the Court held:
1085
 
The fact that reimbursement of the hospital treatment in question is 
subsequently sought from a national health service … does not mean that the 
rules on the freedom to provide services guaranteed by the Treaty do not 
apply …1086 It must therefore be found that Article 49 EC applies … 
regardless of the way in which the national system with which [a] person is 
registered and from which reimbursement of the cost of those services is 
subsequently sought operates.
1087
 
In 2003, Mrs Watts, a patient from Bedfordshire, had gone to France for hip 
replacement surgery to avoid the long waiting time for treatment under the NHS. 
She had been informed by her PCT that she would have to wait for about one year 
before the operation would be carried out in England. This waiting time was later 
reduced to a few months, as her condition had deteriorated, but she preferred to 
undergo the operation in France where it had been scheduled earlier. However, she 
had not obtained prior authorisation from her PCT as required under the Regulation 
on the coordination of social security schemes.
1088
 Mrs Watts later sought 
reimbursement for the costs of treatment incurred abroad. Her application to the 
High Court for judicial review of the decision by the Secretary of State’s refusal to 
cover these costs failed. On appeal, two of the key issues of EU law concerned the 
definition of ‘undue delay’ and the question of the grant or refusal of prior 
authorisation. The ECJ held that Mrs Watts had simultaneous rights to cross-border 
                                                                                                                                         
for these services is indirect; see also P Cabral, ‘The Internal Market and the Right to Cross Border 
Medical Care’ (2004) 29 EL Rev 673, 677–78. 
1085
 J McHale, ‘Commentary. Rights to Medical Treatment in EU Law. R (Watts) v Bedford Primary 
Care Trust and Another’ (2007) 15 Med L Rev 99, 104. 
1086
 Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust, 
Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325, para 89. 
1087
 ibid, para 90. 
1088
 Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71/EEC, now Article 20 of Regulation 883/2004/EC; see text of 
Regulation n17. 
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healthcare under the freedom of movement provisions
1089
 and the Regulation on the 
coordination of social security schemes.
1090
 The criteria for assessing whether there 
is ‘undue delay’ under the former or whether a period of waiting is acceptable under 
the latter are the same. The waiting time must not exceed a period that is acceptable 
on the basis of an objective medical assessment of the patient’s clinical needs.1091 
Nevertheless, the Court accepted that a system of prior authorisation of treatment 
abroad was compatible with the Treaty, but that the criteria for authorisation had to 
be available in advance, objective and non-discriminatory.
1092
  
5.5. The destabilising effects of the ECJ’s case law  
While the rulings on the cases discussed cover different factual situations and 
different points of law, the decision in Watts specifically, and ECJ patient mobility 
case law generally, has created uncertainty for national healthcare systems. They do 
not only pose problems regarding the need to change existing healthcare policy and 
the implementation of new policies,
1093
 but also regarding the risk of further legal 
challenge. New European rights have been created, such as the right to obtain 
elective, non-emergency hospital treatment in another EU Member State without 
                                                 
1089
 Article 49 EC, now Article 56 TFEU. 
1090
 Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71/EEC, now Article 20 of Regulation 883/2004/EC. 
1091
 Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust, 
Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325, paras 79 and 119; J McHale, ‘Commentary. Rights to 
Medical Treatment in EU Law. R (Watts) v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Another’ (2007) 15 Med L 
Rev 99, 103-104; M Cousins, ‘Patient Mobility and National Health Systems’ (2007) 34 LIEI 183, 185. 
1092
 Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust, 
Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325, para 116 and see discussion in J McHale, 
‘Commentary. Rights to Medical Treatment in EU Law. R (Watts) v Bedford Primary Care Trust and 
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prior authorisation.
1094
 To change financial and administrative policies and 
procedures so that they do not violate EU internal market law is not an easy 
undertaking. As Greer and Rauscher point out, an unstable legal environment is not 
desirable for running a bureaucracy.
1095
 It is not an attractive option, even if just a 
few people choose to challenge a policy and the impact of cross-border mobility is 
expected to be minor.
1096
 The existence of legal uncertainties was acknowledged by 
the NHS European Office in its report on the implications of the EU Directive on 
cross-border healthcare.
1097
 These uncertainties also pertain to the patient accessing 
CAM across borders, and regard issues such as prior authorisation and the 
distinction between hospital and non-hospital care, the level of reimbursement and 
the calculation of costs for a national health system without tariffs, and the problem 
of an undefined healthcare benefit basket.   
5.5.1 CAM and the issue of prior authorisation for hospital versus 
non-hospital treatment 
The dual routes of cross-border patient mobility under the Treaty provisions and the 
Regulation on the coordination of social security schemes developed in the case law 
of the ECJ distinguish between the need for prior authorisation for hospital and non-
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hospital treatment or extramural and intramural care. Much of the ECJ case law 
turns on the restrictive policies applied by Member States refusing patients 
authorisation to obtain healthcare outside their home state.  
Although the Regulation on the coordination of social security schemes
1098
 lays 
down a prior authorisation scheme for treatment sought in another EU Member 
State, the ECJ had already held, in Kohll, that a prior authorisation requirement is 
incompatible with the freedom of movement provisions of the Treaty in the case of 
non-hospital treatment.
1099
 The orthodontic treatment obtained in Germany by Mr 
Kohll, a Luxembourg resident, was a type of service that, despite being of a special 
nature, was considered to be within the ambit of the fundamental principle of 
freedom of movement.
1100
 An authorisation scheme for treatment was only held to 
be justified where it served the objective of maintaining a balanced medical and 
hospital service open to all
1101
 or was necessary to ensure the financial balance of the 
social security regime.
1102
  
The judgment in Kohll, involving the Luxembourg healthcare system which was 
based on reimbursement, was confirmed and extended by the ECJ in relation to the 
benefits in kind system of the Netherlands in the Müller-Fauré case
1103
 concerning a 
Dutch national who had received dental treatment in Germany without prior 
authorisation. The ECJ held that the removal of the requirement of prior 
authorisation in respect of non-hospital services was unlikely to seriously undermine 
the financial balance of a healthcare system,
1104
 although the removal of such a 
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requirement might cause financial imbalance in the case of hospital services.
1105
 
However, the Court conceded that it recognised the concerns of the Member 
States.
1106
 The Court suggested that, while an individual case would not have a 
significant impact on the financing of a system, it was necessary to adopt an overall 
approach in assessing the consequences of the freedom to provide health-related 
services.
1107
 For reimbursement to be lawfully refused for non-hospital treatment 
obtained abroad, the healthcare institution would have to argue more than that 
paying for one patient would lead to paying for all the other patients in a similar 
situation and that this would exceed its budget.
1108
 The burden would be on the 
institution to show that the number of patients accessing cross-border healthcare is 
so large that the financial balance of the entire health system is put at risk.
1109
 Thus, 
if a Member State were to submit evidence in future about the exodus of its patients 
for extramural cross-border care jeopardising its healthcare system, the prior 
authorisation requirement may be justified.
1110
 Such evidence may not be easy to 
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come by when data on cross-border care under the Treaty provisions is 
inaccurate,
1111
 with the consequence that healthcare systems are left open to the 
possibility of a set of interest groups raising legal challenges as part of broader 
political strategies.
1112
  
A wide interpretation of non-hospital services 
In Müller-Fauré
1113
 the Court also suggested that it may not always be easy to draw 
a distinction between intramural and extramural care. For example, there are 
services which are capable of being provided either in a hospital environment or by a 
healthcare practitioner in her surgery or in a health centre and, in the ECJ’s view, 
such services should be placed on the same footing as non-hospital services.
1114
 Van 
der Mei reasons, from the broad interpretation given to the meaning of extramural 
care, that it is unimportant where the treatment is actually provided, rather what 
matters is that the treatment is capable of being provided outside a hospital.
1115
 Thus 
intramural care most likely only refers to treatment which can only be provided in 
hospital, and the mere fact that the treatment is provided in hospital or by a 
healthcare practitioner based in a hospital would not suffice to class it as hospital 
care.
1116
 Complementary alternative treatments, often provided in English hospitals 
to cancer patients, to pregnant women during delivery, or in pain clinics, would most 
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likely be considered extramural care, as the administration of CAM generally does 
not require a hospital environment. The definition of what constitutes extramural 
care was not touched on by the ECJ in the case of hospital-based CAM in Inizan
1117
 
and in the case of CAM provided in a spa setting in Leichtle.
1118
 CAM treatment 
provided within organised facilities, on the reasoning in Müller-Fauré, might well 
be considered extramural treatment and would not require prior authorisation.
1119
 
Since the distinction between the two types of care is, however, also decisive in 
determining the applicable reimbursement regime, precise criteria ought to be set to 
distinguish between them.
1120
 As van der Mei predicts, future legal challenge is 
likely since doctors, hospital managers and policy-makers in the various Member 
States are likely to have different views as to which types of treatment require intra- 
or extramural care.
1121
  
The argument of small numbers 
In Müller-Fauré the Court contends that cross-border patient mobility for extramural 
care is limited for practical and psychological reasons. Practical barriers include 
linguistic differences, geographical distance, the cost of staying abroad and the lack 
of information about treatment facilities in other Member States.
1122
 Psychological 
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factors are related to the medical practitioner’s proximity to the residence and the 
home environment of the patient, cultural affinities, and the relationship of trust with 
the treating doctor.
1123
 As Koutrakos points out, the Court, by relying on its own 
assessment of what it views as objective factors, concluded that the requirement for 
prior authorisation in the case of non-hospital treatment is unjustified.
1124
 According 
to him, patients benefit from the existence of these non-legal barriers which maintain 
the distinct healthcare markets in the EU.
1125
 Patients therefore gain from the lack of 
integration of healthcare markets, without which they would not be able to obtain the 
reimbursement of unauthorised extramural cross-border healthcare. Ironically, if a 
considerable number of patients fled their own country to benefit from healthcare 
across the borders, the objective, non-legal barriers enumerated by the ECJ would no 
longer reflect reality accurately. Greater integration of the healthcare markets would 
then possibly justify national regulatory criteria restricting patients’ access to 
extramural healthcare abroad,
1126
 although the onus would be on the home state to 
prove that there was an exodus of patients to other Member States.
1127
  
5.5.2 CAM and the issues of the level of reimbursement and the 
calculation of costs 
Patients using the social coordination route under the Regulation on the coordination 
of social security schemes
1128
 have the cost of their treatment covered as if they were 
insured in the state of treatment, the host state.
1129
 Depending on the healthcare 
system of the host state, the patient does not have to make any advance payment, in 
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contrast to the Treaty-based access route, which necessitates the patient applying for 
reimbursement of the cost of her treatment from her home state.
1130
  
Reimbursement regimes  
The level of reimbursement under the two routes varies. Under the Regulation on the 
coordination of social security schemes route, the patient will receive a refund of the 
costs according to the legislation of the Member State where treatment was 
provided.
1131
 Where the treatment has been authorised, the costs of the patient’s 
treatment are generally refunded direct by the home state to the host state. Where 
authorisation has been refused but the patient still travels abroad to obtain 
healthcare, the patient will have to pay all the costs upfront and takes a considerable 
financial risk.
1132
 Since the rules as to reimbursement vary from one Member State 
to another, the patient who has been refused prior authorisation may face different 
upfront costs depending on the regulations in the host state.
1133
 However, as the 
European Court of Justice decided in Vanbraekel,
1134
 a patient may in such a case 
receive more money than he actually expended if the cost of treatment in the host 
state was lower than in her home state. Ms Descamp received not only 
reimbursement of the actual costs paid in France for her treatment, which was lower 
than the tariff for the same treatment in Belgium, her home state, but the additional 
amount corresponding to the difference between the tariffs in France and in 
Belgium.
1135
 The reasoning of the ECJ for granting such a bonus to the patient was 
that this did not impose any additional burden on the home state, and the additional 
reimbursement did not have a significant effect on that state’s social security 
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system.
1136
 Not to guarantee an equally advantageous level of cover for the patient in 
another EU Member State would have the effect of making the provision of services 
between Member States more difficult, and would constitute an obstacle to the 
freedom to provide services.
1137
  
In contrast to the Regulation on the coordination of social security schemes 
framework, under the Treaty provisions the patient always has to pay for her 
treatment in advance in the host state and will receive reimbursement at the tariff 
applicable in her home state.
1138
 As the ECJ pointed out in Müller-Fauré,
1139
 nothing 
prevents a Member State from fixing the amounts of reimbursement of foreign care, 
provided those amounts are based on objective, non-discriminatory and transparent 
criteria. This may of course lead to a patient only being reimbursed a fraction of the 
money he has expended in the host state.
1140
 At the same time it would potentially 
leave the home state open to an influx of patients from other states benefiting from 
its low treatment costs. Thus, whilst the Regulation on the coordination of social 
security schemes route may enable the patient to profit from her treatment because 
of a favourable tariff in her home state, under the Treaty provision the patient may 
be financially penalised where he has paid more for the treatment than the 
refundable amount under the tariff of her home state.
1141
 Hatzopoulos suggests that 
this conclusion is imposed by common sense, since a healthcare institution which 
has not authorised treatment abroad may not be compelled to pay more for treatment 
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abroad than if the treatment had been delivered within its borders.
1142
 Arguably, 
Hatzopoulos’ reasoning is difficult to square with the fact that there is no need for 
prior authorisation in the case of non-hospital care. Of course, in the event that 
authorisation has been granted for non-hospital care the patient could choose which 
route will be more profitable. Where there has been no authorisation for non-hospital 
treatment, the patient will have to rely on the reimbursement at the tariff of her home 
state under the Treaty provisions. However, one of the problems for tax-based health 
systems such as the NHS is that there are no comparable tariffs for reimbursement, 
as the treatment is free to the patient.
1143
 As a consequence, there is uncertainty as to 
the level of reimbursement a patient will be entitled to and the need to set up a 
system of tariffs and of reimbursement for healthcare services.
1144
  
Calculation of cost 
In the context of hospital treatment, the ECJ ruled in the case of Watts that treatment 
that was authorised or should have been authorised under the Treaty provisions must 
be reimbursed by the national health system based on objectively quantified costs of 
equivalent treatment.
1145
 The need for quantification of treatment costs will also 
apply to claims for reimbursement of cross-border non-hospital care, whether such 
treatment will be orthodox medical treatment or CAM. Under the current system of 
public funding it may not always be possible to say what the cost of a particular 
treatment is.  
As Davies argues, where the NHS attributes costs to a particular procedure or 
treatment, this may be challenged.
1146
 In his view, in order for the NHS to avoid 
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writing blank cheques to patients claiming reimbursement of cross-border treatment, 
it is necessary to establish the costs of treatments objectively and transparently, and 
for these costs to be made publicly available.
1147
 However, the prices which are set 
may be open to legal challenge since they involve controversial and difficult 
assessments. The costs of personnel, equipment and the costs of the infrastructure 
will have to be included; what about the costs of any additional consultations and 
tests, treatment of any side-effects or complications arising from the treatment of a 
patient’s condition? As the NHS European Office stresses, defining the level of 
reimbursement is difficult when prices are set by PCT commissioners, or subject to 
negotiations between commissioners and providers and therefore subject to local 
variations. In addition, a tariff may also cover a package of care rather than a simple 
procedure, and may need to be ‘unbundled’ if the patient receives a different 
package of care abroad.
1148
 
Apart from likely legal challenges, keeping costs artificially low may discourage 
English patients from seeking cross-border care under the Treaty provisions, and 
would therefore constitute a significant barrier to freedom of movement to EU 
Member States with higher medical treatment costs.
1149
 Patients would not only have 
to pay the higher costs upfront but would also not be reimbursed the total cost of 
extramural treatment where the tariff in their home state was lower.
1150
 However, 
although the English patient travelling abroad to receive extramural CAM treatment 
will have the same level of healthcare cover she would have had at home, she may 
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have gained by obtaining low-priority treatment which her PCT might have refused 
to fund on an exceptionality basis.
1151
  
5.5.3 CAM and the problem of an undefined healthcare benefit 
basket 
The final problem giving rise to destabilisation is the lack of restriction of the ambit 
of the healthcare package of the NHS. Under the Regulation of the social 
coordination schemes,
1152
 reimbursement need only be granted for costs of treatment 
considered a benefit under the legislation of the Member State of insurance (home 
state). From the ECJ’s patient mobility case law it can also be concluded1153 that 
patients do not have a right to be reimbursed for non-covered benefits under the 
Treaty provisions.
1154
 Thus Member States are not obliged to pay for the costs of 
treatments or benefits that are not covered by their own legislation, and patients 
going to another EU Member State to receive treatment can only claim 
reimbursement of costs within the limits of the cover provided by the healthcare 
system in their home state.
1155
  
Member States are entitled to establish limitative lists excluding certain medical 
treatments from reimbursement. As the ECJ held in Geraets-Smits, EU law ‘cannot 
in principle have the effect of requiring from a Member State to extend the list of 
medical services paid for by its social insurance system’.1156 However, a list of such 
                                                 
1151
 See also chapter 4. 
1152
 Article 20 of Regulation 883/2004/EC replacing Regulation 1408/71 EEC. 
1153
 eg Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union de caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-
157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v Stichting CZ 
Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473 and Case C-385/99 V.G. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet v Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509. 
1154
 Article 56 TFEU replacing Article 49 EC; see generally AP van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons 
within the European Community: Cross-Border Access to Public Benefits (Hart 2003) 302; C Newdick, 
‘The European Court of Justice, Trans-National Healthcare, and Social Citizenship – Accidental Death 
of a Concept’ (2009) Wisconsin Intl L J 844, 861–62. 
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 Case C-385/99 V.G. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA 
and E.E.M. van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509, 
para 97. 
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 Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473, para 87. 
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non-covered benefits would have to be drawn up in accordance with objective, non-
discriminatory criteria which are known in advance.
1157
  
The problem therefore is to define what treatments are covered, whether included or 
excluded, as benefits under any particular health system. As Newdick argues, 
healthcare systems throughout Europe do not generally create lists of treatments for 
which funding is or is not available, as the creation of such lists is too fraught with 
difficulty.
1158
 Not only would it be difficult to decide on the inclusion criteria but 
also on who should be charged with making these decisions and keeping the list up 
to date.
1159
 Instead, some EU Member States entrust the task of defining the 
insurance package to health professionals by using open criteria,
1160
 such as 
including treatment which is ‘adequate and appropriate’ or which is ‘normal in the 
professional circles concerned’.1161 In England, the generic words describing the 
duty of the Secretary of State for Health are to promote ‘a comprehensive 
service’.1162 Such terms are too vague to define the precise parameters of the 
healthcare menu available to the population of a Member State, thus making it 
difficult to state precisely which specific treatments are not part of the benefit 
package.  
                                                 
1157
 ibid, paras 115–116, confirmed in Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts 
v Bedford Primary Care Trust, Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325, paras 115–116. 
1158
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Corroding Social Solidarity’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1645, 1661; see also R Klein, ‘Defining a Package of 
Healthcare Services the NHS is Responsible for – the Case Against’(1997) 314 BMJ 505, 508 where 
he argues that health authorities may also retreat from blanket exclusions of certain treatments 
because of pressure from the medical profession claiming that only its members are qualified to 
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Corroding Social Solidarity’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1645, 1661. 
1160
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Access to Public Benefits (Hart 2003), 302. 
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Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473. 
1162
 National Health Service Act 2006 s 1 and Health and Social Care Act 2012 s 1; see also discussion 
in C Newdick, ‘Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual rights by 
Corroding Social Solidarity’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1645, 1661. 
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There are no specific exclusions from the benefits package available under the NHS. 
Local health authorities, at present PCTs charged with commissioning health 
services for their local population, design purchasing plans which may designate 
certain treatments such as CAM as low-priority. However, not only do the policies 
of low-priority treatments vary in different PCTs, there are no blanket exclusions of 
treatments, as health authorities are obliged to exercise their discretion in 
exceptional cases.
1163
 Bowden asserts that where a patient obtains such low-priority 
treatment abroad it will be very difficult to determine retrospectively whether such 
treatment would have been available from her PCT on an exceptional case basis and 
whether she should therefore have her costs reimbursed.
1164
 Thus, as long as a 
treatment is not banned outright, a treatment that is potentially available as a low-
priority treatment from a PCT is likely to constitute a benefit.
1165
 The concession 
made by the ECJ to national authorities to determine the list of treatments available 
to their nationals, which may then be reimbursed when accessed across borders, will 
therefore, in Newdick’s words, have limited effect.1166 Since CAM treatments are 
not completely excluded from NHS cover, patients wishing to access such 
treatments across borders may claim reimbursement of their costs from the NHS and 
potential legal challenges may lead to further destabilisation of the healthcare 
system.  
                                                 
1163
 See chapter 4.  
1164
 H Bowden, ‘EU Cross-Border Health Care Proposals: Implications for the NHS’ (2009) 15 
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Corroding Social Solidarity’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1645, 1661. 
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5.6. The Patient Mobility Directive 2011 as response to 
legal uncertainty 
The uncertainty created by the ECJ’s patient mobility case law led to only contained 
national implementation in England 
1167
 with directions and guidance by the 
Department of Health to NHS commissioners regarding the authorisation and 
reimbursement arrangements for NHS patients seeking treatment under the cross-
border rules.
1168
  However, it had the consequence of extensive lobbying in Brussels 
by the Department of Health and NHS managers.
1169
 The destabilisation threatening 
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 See eg E Zanon, ‘Health Care across Borders: Implications of the EU Directive on Cross-Border 
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case’, London, 16 April 2007 
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and Restabilization Politics: Policy and Political Reactions to European Union Healthcare Services 
Law’ (2011) Journal of European Public Policy 220.   
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<www.nhsconfed.org/Documents/CrossBorderHealthcare_final_20110511_EZ.pdf> accessed 24 
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influence EU policy, see NHS European Office 
<www.nhsconfed.org/NationalAndInternational/NHSEuropeanOffice/Pages/Home.aspx> accessed 
20 August 2012.   
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healthcare finances, policies and administrative procedures therefore led to 
significant engagement by the UK government and the NHS in EU politics.
1170
  
It was to end the legal uncertainty and to reduce the possibility of legal challenge 
from patients which finally led to the adoption of the Patient Mobility Directive
1171
 
by EU Member States in January 2011 to be transposed into national legislation by 
October 2013.
1172
 The aim of the Directive is not to encourage patients to receive 
treatment outside their Member State,
1173
 but rather the Directive is expected to lead 
to clearer guidance for patients, administrators and healthcare professionals.
1174
 To 
ensure that the rules under the Directive would not have a negative impact on the 
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 S Greer and S Rauscher, ‘Destabilization Rights and Restabilization Politics: Policy and Political 
Reactions to European Union Healthcare Services Law’ (2011) Journal of European Public Policy 220, 
231 stating that while UK government influence was apparent in the Council, for example, with the 
contribution to the Council resolution on shared healthcare service values, the NHS also engaged 
significantly with EU policy-making.   
1171
 Directive 2011/24/EU (Directive on the Application of Patients’ Rights in Cross-Border 
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Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy (CUP 2010) 521. 
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information, redress and liability, and protection of privacy of personal health data. In total, these 
obligations constitute a set of patients’ rights although the Directive’s main purpose is the setting up 
of a specific framework for cross-border healthcare; see generally W Gekiere and others, ‘Free 
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Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy (CUP 2010) 502; W Palm and I A 
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the EU’ (2008) 39 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1277110> accessed 5 May 2012. 
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 W Gekiere and others, ‘Free Movement of Services in the EU and Health Care’ in E Mossialos and 
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European Union Law and Policy (CUP 2010) 560; NHS European Office, ‘Patient Choice beyond 
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NHS, the NHS European Office engaged with the lengthy decision-making process 
by extensive lobbying.
1175
  
The new Directive, as a partial codification of the ECJ’s case law, leaves intact the 
general principle that the basket of healthcare to which a citizen is entitled is the 
decision of the patient’s home state,1176 but that at the same time the free movement 
of persons within the internal market, non-discrimination, and necessity and 
proportionality of any restrictions on free movement, need to be respected.
1177
 The 
Directive does not affect an EU citizen’s rights to necessary healthcare during a 
temporary stay in another Member State, nor does it affect the healthcare services of 
employed or self-employed persons and their families moving within the 
Community. These continue to be covered by the Regulation on the coordination of 
social security schemes.
1178
 Thus the Directive leaves the two parallel systems for 
healthcare provision across borders to a large extent intact. Patients are entitled to 
the more beneficial rights guaranteed by the EU regulations on the coordination of 
social security systems when the conditions are met.
1179
 However, as no doubt a 
critical reference to the ECJ’s judgments, it is made clear in the Preamble that the 
two cross-border systems of obtaining healthcare will now be coherent, with the 
effect that either the Directive applies or the EU Regulation on the coordination of 
social security schemes.
1180
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1177
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Although aiming to end legal uncertainty and to re-introduce stability it is debatable 
whether the Patient Mobility Directive achieves this as regards all cross-border 
healthcare. In the context of non-hospital-based or extramural treatment such as 
CAM, the new Directive appears to be perpetuating some of the existing legal 
uncertainties of the ECJ’s patient mobility case law. The remainder of the chapter 
will consider the likelihood of further instability regarding the issues of prior 
authorisation, of the level of reimbursement with the difficulty of cost calculations, 
and of the undefined health benefit basket of the NHS. 
5.6.1 The prior authorisation requirement regarding intra- and 
extramural treatment 
The Directive allows Member States the option of introducing prior authorisation 
requirements for patients seeking cross-border healthcare.
1181
 However, to justify 
prior authorisation by the home state, cross-border healthcare must be subject to 
planning requirements,
1182
 and require either overnight hospital accommodation for 
at least one night
1183
 or highly specialised or cost-intensive treatment.
1184
 The 
Directive therefore codifies the ECJ’s existing case law concerning the requirement 
for prior authorisation, but at the same time clarifies the definition of what 
constitutes hospital care, a term which had been left wide open by the ECJ.
1185
 In 
keeping with the Directive being an initiative of the Directorate-General for Health 
and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO),
1186
 prior authorisation of healthcare is also 
necessary where it might involve treatment presenting a particular risk to the 
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 E Zanon, ‘Health Care across Borders: Implications of the EU Directive on Cross-Border Health 
Care for the English NHS’ (2011) Eurohealth 34, 34. 
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1184
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others (eds), Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy (CUP 
2010) 501. 
229 
 
population,
1187
 or where the healthcare provider raises concerns relating to the 
quality or safety of care, unless the healthcare provided is subject to EU legislation 
concerning a minimum level of safety and quality standards.
1188
 No other cross-
border healthcare cannot be made subject to the requirement of prior 
authorisation.
1189
 As under the current case law, non-hospital-based CAM treatment 
will therefore not require prior authorisation as it is not subject to planning 
requirements and does not generally require highly specialised or cost-intensive 
medical equipment. There may be some uncertainty, however, regarding hospital-
based CAM as in Inizan, or CAM treatment provided as part of a stay at a spa as in 
Leichtle.
1190
 Would such treatment require authorisation as subject to planning 
requirements because the treatment was received in a hospital setting with overnight 
accommodation? It may of course be the case that providers, to avoid being caught 
by the Directive, will switch the treatment to an extramural setting with patients 
staying in hotel accommodation.  
5.6.2 The level of the reimbursement and the issue of cost 
calculation 
The Patient Mobility Directive confirms that the home state has to reimburse the 
costs incurred by an insured person
1191
 who receives cross-border healthcare, as long 
as the healthcare in question is among the benefits provided by the Member State of 
insurance, or the patient’s home state.1192 Where the treatment is among the 
healthcare benefits, the home state must reimburse the patient the costs of the cross-
border healthcare incurred, although it may also pay the costs directly to the host 
state.
1193
 In the case of extramural care, where there is no prior authorisation, the 
patient will have to pay for the treatment first and then apply for reimbursement 
                                                 
1187
 Patient Mobility Directive, Article 8(2)(b). 
1188
 ibid, Article 8(2)(c). 
1189
 ibid, Article 7(8). 
1190
 Although reimbursement of the costs of the accommodation at the spa is unlikely to be granted 
to an English patient cf Inizan. 
1191
 Article 3(b) defines ‘insured person’ as a person who has a right to social security benefits in the 
competent Member State under Regulation 883/2004/EC,  Article 1(c). 
1192
 Patient Mobility Directive, Article 7(1). 
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from her home state. The Preamble states that patients must not be deprived of the 
more beneficial rights guaranteed by the social coordination route when the 
conditions are met.
1194
 Where a patient is entitled to cross-border healthcare under 
both the Directive and the Regulation on the coordination of social security 
schemes
1195
 and the application of the Regulation is more advantageous to the 
patient, the patient’s attention should be drawn to this.1196  
For the NHS patient who is treated with CAM in another Member State and is 
unlikely to have obtained prior authorisation, the possibility of parallel applicability 
of the two mechanisms is improbable.
1197
 It is therefore the reimbursement 
mechanism under the Directive which applies. Furthermore, the Directive clarifies 
that under this reimbursement mechanism NHS commissioners are not required to 
pay more than the cost of the patient’s treatment if it had been provided by the 
NHS.
1198
 Unlike under the case law of the ECJ,
1199
 patients no longer stand to 
benefit financially with reimbursement exceeding the actual costs of healthcare.
1200
 
However, in contrast to the case law of the ECJ,
1201
 where the treatment costs in the 
host state are higher than the level of costs for the same treatment in the home state 
the patient will still lose out financially.
1202
  
One of the major uncertainties concerning cross-border healthcare which continue to 
be relevant under the Directive is how domestic costs are determined.
1203
 Following 
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ECJ case law, the Directive requires a transparent mechanism for the calculation of 
the reimbursable costs of cross-border healthcare to which a patient is entitled, 
which is to be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria known in advance.
1204
 
Such a requirement will be difficult to fulfil where there is little existing cost 
information,
1205
 at least not as regards non-hospital treatment such as CAM where 
there is likely to be more variation in the healthcare provided.
1206
 As Sauter points 
out, there are likely to be immense difficulties associated with the introduction of 
sound cost accounting principles with a potential risk of significant litigation, and 
cross-subsidies and inefficiencies in the healthcare systems may become 
apparent.
1207
 In any case, NHS tariffs may cover a package of care rather than just 
one procedure or treatment.
1208
 Costs would therefore have to be broken down into 
the individual components where a patient receives a different package abroad, and 
lack of transparency may lead to potential challenges by patients. 
5.6.3 The problem of defining the healthcare benefit basket of 
the NHS 
Regarding the healthcare available to its citizens, the Directive confirms that it is for 
home states to decide, whether at local, regional or national level, to what healthcare 
benefits a patient is entitled, regardless of whether the patient is treated in her home 
state or across borders.
1209
 The Preamble clarifies that patients are not entitled to 
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reimbursement of costs of healthcare provided in another Member State if such 
healthcare is not among the benefits provided in the home state.
1210
 Patients have, 
however, the right to receive the benefits in another Member State which are also 
available in the home state.
1211
 Where the treatment method is not specified 
precisely in the list of benefits,
1212
 reimbursement should still be made available 
where the cross-border treatment corresponds to treatment provided for in the home 
state.
1213
 There is no requirement for the NHS to pay for travel, accommodation and 
other expenses if those would not be covered were the treatment to be provided in 
England.
1214
 
Several problems can be foreseen with regard to these provisions. Firstly, although 
reimbursement of a patient’s costs related to her cross-border healthcare is optional, 
the Directive also declares that the home state may decide to reimburse other related 
costs such as accommodation and travel costs that would have been incurred if the 
patient had been treated in its territory, as long as these extra costs can be 
documented.
1215
 The recital of the Preamble on this point suggests in addition that 
the Member State may reimburse such related costs even where these costs are not 
reimbursed in its own territory.
1216
 It remains to be seen whether the interpretation of 
the meaning of related costs might lead to litigation, as the provision of the 
Directive could be said to prevent the functioning of the internal market and the free 
movement of goods, persons and services.
1217
 In view of the decisions in Watts
1218
 
                                                 
1210
 Patient Mobility Directive, Preamble (33). 
1211
 ibid, Preamble (34). 
1212
 See Case C-56/01 Patrizia Inizan v Caisse primarie d’assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine 
[2001] ECR I-12403 and Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. 
Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473. 
1213
 Patient Mobility Directive, Preamble (34). 
1214
 ibid, Article 7(4). 
1215
 ibid. 
1216
 ibid, Preamble (34). 
1217
 See ibid Article 7(11) and also Preamble (21) which exhorts Member States to respect the 
principles of free movement of persons within the internal market, non-discrimination and necessity 
and proportionality of any restrictions on free movement; see also the decisions in Case C-372/04 
The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust, Secretary of State for 
Health [2006] ECR I-4325 and in Case C-8/02 Ludwig Leichtle v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [2004] ECR I-
2641. 
233 
 
and Leichtle,
1219
 the provision appears to be a derogation of the rights established 
under Article 56 TFEU, which was held to cover ancillary costs such as travel where 
such costs would be covered in the home state. 
Secondly, where a treatment method is not specified precisely in a Member State’s 
healthcare package but the cross-border treatment corresponds to treatment provided 
for in the home state, the definitional problem of what constitutes the same or 
similar treatment could equally lead to legal uncertainty, as demonstrated by the case 
of Inizan.
1220
 To include the same or similar treatments in the description of a 
healthcare benefit appears to contradict the principle that the patient can only obtain 
treatment which constitutes a defined benefit in her home state.
1221
 Furthermore, it 
would place an additional requirement on the healthcare institution to list the 
treatment methods together with the treatments available under the healthcare 
system.  
Thirdly, as the briefing report by the NHS European Office acknowledges, without a 
list of the types of healthcare covered or not covered there is a risk of legal challenge 
from patients trying to access treatments abroad which are not routinely available 
under the NHS.
1222
 There are no lists of treatments which are completely excluded 
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from cover, as the cases on exceptional circumstances have demonstrated.
1223
 This 
would also apply to CAM classified as a low-priority treatment but not completely 
excluded from cover by many PCTs. In order to minimise uncertainty for 
commissioners and patients the NHS European Office considers it a key issue for the 
implementation of the EU rules that clear lists are established.
1224
 Such lists would 
be drawn up locally by PCTs, and in future by CCGs, rather than nationally, with the 
NHS moving to a system of increasing local variation under the Health and Social 
Care Act 2012.  
The Nuffield Trust, an independent organisation carrying out analysis of UK 
healthcare policy, has recently undertaken extensive research considering the 
advantages of defining a national package of healthcare benefits, concluding that 
developing such a package for the NHS is likely to be unworkable and its 
implementation may have adverse consequences.
1225
 Some of the arguments against 
the national benefits package are equally applicable to a locally defined benefits 
package, which was also discounted by the Nuffield Trust. Thus, a local benefits 
package, whether inclusive or exclusive, would prove technically challenging to 
develop and enforce, might be inconsistent with promoting national strategic 
objectives such as cost-effectiveness and equity of access, could lead to a tendency 
to maintain historical patterns of use, give rise to variations in health funding 
decisions across the country, and would compromise the solidarity principle on 
which the NHS relies. ‘In practice, benefits packages often lack the detail necessary 
to be more than a guide to local clinical practice…’1226 With a positive list the 
contents of the package are explicit and all existing benefits would have to be 
reviewed, which would be a complex process. With a negative list, however, 
providers have to infer what the benefit package contains, with variations in benefits 
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provided being likely.
1227
 There would be the additional problem of deciding which 
criteria to apply, beyond cost-effectiveness criteria,
1228
 and how these criteria should 
be balanced against each other, in order to develop these lists. In addition, 
developing such a benefits package would involve considerable costs, especially as 
the positive or negative lists would have to be updated as new technologies or new 
evidence emerge.
1229
  
5.6.4 Expected impact 
Although future demand for cross-border care by UK patients is difficult to predict, 
the NHS European Office does not expect a large expansion of it.
1230
 The current 
low usage of cross-border healthcare is based on the assumption that patients prefer 
to be treated as close to home as possible. This assumption, however, neglects the 
lack of information available to the public about cross-border healthcare rights. As 
the NHS European Office states, ‘It will take time for the Directive to bed in, for the 
rules to be understood and the message to get out to the public’.1231 For example, the 
Directive enables a patient to access private healthcare providers in another Member 
State and obtain reimbursement of the treatment costs by her home state, although 
she would not be entitled to the same in her home state if the private healthcare is 
not part of its social security system.
1232
 As regards CAM, the Directive therefore 
permits the English patient access to a private or public CAM provider in another 
EU Member State with a right to reimbursement of the costs of treatment by the 
NHS. For the purposes of the Directive, a healthcare provider is any person or legal 
entity legally providing healthcare, including CAM, in another Member State which 
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is not the patient’s home state.1233 Such a person or legal entity could be, for 
example, a medical practitioner who has moved from the patient’s home state and 
set up practice in another EU Member State.
1234
 It could also be any healthcare 
professional or a group of healthcare professionals who lawfully provide CAM 
treatment in another EU Member State.
1235
 The Directive creates opportunities for 
healthcare providers to market their services to patients in other EU countries. As 
long as CAM is not excluded altogether from the NHS healthcare benefits basket, or 
from the local benefit basket of health authorities, CAM providers from the UK 
establishing themselves under the Treaty provisions in other Member States
1236
 may 
market their services to NHS patients in the knowledge that the treatment costs will 
be reimbursed. The Patient Mobility Directive may therefore risk further 
destabilisation of the English NHS.  
5.7. Conclusion 
As has been described, litigation by patients claiming healthcare rights beyond 
borders has had a destabilising effect on the UK national healthcare system creating 
legal uncertainty, particularly due to the risk of patients obtaining low-priority 
treatments in another EU Member State to which they were not entitled at home. 
The restabilisation process set in motion by the ECJ’s patient mobility case law led 
to the adoption of the patient mobility Directive,
 
which will be transposed into 
national law by October 2013. Although the Directive is expected to end the legal 
uncertainty about the care patients can receive abroad, it has been argued that 
uncertainties remain. Further legal challenge is possible regarding the issues of prior 
authorisation and the definition of intra- and extramural treatment, the issues of the 
level of reimbursement and the calculation of the treatment costs and problem of the 
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undefined health benefit basket of the NHS under the Directive. Unless precise lists 
of included and excluded treatments are established by local NHS commissioners, as 
recommended by the NHS European Office,
1237
 there is a risk of further instability. 
However, as has been concluded by the Nuffield Trust,
1238
 a defined package of 
healthcare benefits is complex to develop and to keep up-to-date. Patients wishing to 
access CAM in another EU Member State may therefore claim reimbursement for a 
low-priority treatment from their health authorities, rekindling a process of 
destabilisation of the NHS.  
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Conclusion 
As this research has suggested, there is considerable public demand for 
complementary alternative medicine (CAM) but very limited provision of it within 
the NHS. Complementary alternative therapy is challenged by many inside the 
medical profession for its lack of proven effectiveness and unproven safety record. 
At the same time a considerable number of GPs provide access to CAM, albeit CAM 
remains mainly privately funded. Despite these cost-disincentives, large numbers of 
people visit CAM practitioners for reasons that can only be surmised: discontent 
with biomedicine because of the side-effects of drugs and their lack of effectiveness 
in many chronic conditions, the belief that CAM is less invasive and more natural, 
the greater involvement by the patient in the treatment, and the different relationship 
between CAM practitioner and client.  
This research is a contribution to the question of whether the current government 
policy of patient choice reconfigures a space for CAM as a treatment within the 
NHS. It has been argued that government policy of patient choice is leading to a 
potential opening for CAM within the NHS, with one of the drivers of the patient 
treatment choice policy clearly being the desire to please the public. Government 
rhetoric ranges from a reference to choice as liberal choice to choice as consumer 
choice, but at the micro- and meso-levels where these interpretations of choice are 
applied in practice, and where it matters most, little seems to have changed for the 
experience of patients. Private and public law litigation by patients wishing to 
enforce their choice of treatment at the micro- and meso-levels, apart from resolving 
the dispute in question, does, however, exert destabilising effects on institutions and 
practices. These effects are unlikely to be intended by the parties to the litigation. 
They do, however, support policy-makers with an overall destabilisation agenda. My 
conclusion is that policy-makers are not only encouraging patient choice at the 
micro-and meso-levels but are also using it as a policy mechanism or lever to 
achieve change within the NHS, to destabilise the incumbent institutions, leading to 
the possible emergence of a medical pluralism with other potential benefits. The 
concurrent theme in the government’s healthcare policy of the responsibilisation of 
the patient fits with the emphasis of CAM on self-care and self-management, while 
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at the same time enabling policy-makers to claim support for the traditional values 
of the NHS.  
The different interpretations of patient choice  
My research has shown that choice carries different meanings in different contexts 
and that these different meanings are also employed by policy-makers in their 
political and policy discourse. The thesis explains that there are three discernible 
interpretations of patient choice; choice as a liberal value, choice as consumer choice 
related to market exchange or market principles, and patient choice as a policy 
mechanism. The interpretation of choice used at the micro- level is that of choice as 
a liberal value, whereas at the meso-level, which includes choice of cross-border 
healthcare, it is that of consumer choice. 
Choice as a liberal value 
The thesis has explained that at the micro-level patient choice is linked with the 
concept of the right or freedom to choose as a liberal value, also circumscribed by 
the concept of autonomy. The interpretation of choice is that of the liberal 
interpretation of autonomy limiting individuals’ demands on society. It is based on 
rational choosing, offering more than sheer choice. This reasoned choice is not 
unrestricted; the freedom of the individual to choose is not absolute. It is this 
conception of autonomy that comes closest to the interpretation of autonomy 
employed by judges in refusal of treatment cases. However, my research has shown 
that, even in refusal cases, judges’ interpretation of autonomy and therefore choice is 
inconsistent, and is often linked with a determination of capacity.  
Similarly, the research has suggested that a claim for a specific treatment, if based 
on a liberal understanding of autonomy, would be linked with the right to self-
determination but has never been interpreted as an obligation on doctors to satisfy 
that claim. The judicial conception of autonomy therefore rarely puts the patient in 
control. Rather than giving the patient the right to choose, the courts rely on the best 
interest test. The doctor owes a duty to her patient to administer such treatment as is 
in the patient’s best interests, a duty generally determined by the Bolam test, 
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meaning that the doctor should provide treatment regarded as proper by a 
‘responsible body of medical opinion’. A doctor can legitimately decide that certain 
treatments are not in the best interest of a patient and need not be made available. It 
is the doctor who decides whether a treatment is clinically indicated. In common 
law, patient choice is therefore decided in terms of the doctor’s duties rather than the 
patient’s rights. As the research has argued, the inconsistent interpretation of 
autonomy in human rights law also does not give the patient a legal right to compel a 
doctor to act against her clinical judgment. 
The situation of the patient at the micro-level is therefore in stark contrast to the 
choice rhetoric of policy-makers at the macro-level. While promising what appears 
to be a right to choose, policy-makers subject patient choice to the condition that 
treatment should be clinically ‘appropriate’. Thus policy-makers, while promising 
choice to the public on the one hand, retract this promise with an acknowledgement 
of the medical profession’s power in the healthcare arena and the continuing role of 
the doctor in implicit resource allocation decisions within the NHS. 
In the same vein, as regards the right of the patient to be informed about treatment 
alternatives, the research has confirmed that English law has little concern for 
patients’ interests in arriving at an autonomous treatment choice. While the law of 
trespass would protect the patient’s right to autonomy, the English judiciary has 
taken a minimalist interpretation of information requirements necessary for real 
consent, ruling out medical trespass as a course of action as long as the patient has 
been informed in broad terms about the treatment. Instead it is necessary to look to 
the law of negligence and a possible breach of the doctor’s duty to provide 
information to the patient. The courts have preferred to impose liability for lack of 
information in negligence rather than trespass. English judges, however, do not 
assess the adequacy of the information provided to the patient in accordance with a 
reasonable patient standard, which might go some way towards the recognition of 
the patient’s right to choose. With regard to the disclosure of alternatives, a doctor’s 
duty is further interpreted as only referring to treatments recognised by the medical 
profession and routinely available within the NHS. Additionally, the rigorous 
application of the causation principles, making it necessary for the claimant to show 
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physical injury in form of the risk materialising, means that patients are rarely 
successful in a claim for non-disclosure in negligence.  
Whether because of the deference of judges to the medical profession or because the 
courts are not concerned with prioritising patient rights but with balancing them with 
policy-based considerations, attempting to stem the escalation of costs of medical 
negligence cases, the interpretation of choice at the micro-level works for the policy-
makers at the macro-level. As Clarke and others point out, ‘the politics of choice 
works through the capacity of the word “choice” to flicker between … 
meaning[s]’.1239 While the courts resort to an inconsistent interpretation of choice as 
autonomy, policy-makers can claim to promote populist ‘choice’.  
‘Consumer’ choice  
The research has also demonstrated that choice can be linked with the idea of the 
consumer in the market exchanging money for the desired goods or services. The 
interpretation of choice as consumer choice is relevant in the context of healthcare 
mimicking market principles, in private healthcare and also in the context of 
treatment across borders in the European Union. Equally, at the meso-level, where 
the patient, with the support of her GP, disputes the lack of availability of a CAM 
modality as a ‘low-priority’ treatment on exceptionality grounds from the health 
authority, the choice involved is not liberal choice as a conception of autonomy but 
can be interpreted as the choice of the quasi-consumer in the market-mimicking 
public healthcare system which is constrained by limited resources. As was 
explained, the current PCTs, intended as the main purchasers of healthcare services, 
were created by New Labour by keeping the quasi-market principles of the 
purchaser/provider split, originally introduced by the Conservative government as 
part of the internal market. Likewise, the introduction of the Clinical Commissioning 
Groups by the current coalition government follows a quasi-market ideology. 
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As the research has suggested, where the patient’s individual funding request to her 
PCT on the basis of exceptional circumstances is refused, she can apply for judicial 
review of the decision. The role of the court is to oversee the legitimacy, procedural 
propriety and reasonableness of the decision, rather than assessing the merits of the 
patient’s claim. In reaching its decision the court reviews the exceptionality criteria 
applied by the PCT, which will turn on the consideration of the effectiveness of the 
requested CAM treatment. I have argued that if the PCT can demonstrate that it has 
considered the effectiveness of the CAM modality and also its cost-effectiveness, 
invalidation of its decision by the court is unlikely. The ‘consumer choice’ in this 
context is therefore largely dependent on the court’s role in judicial review 
proceedings.  
The research concludes that any refusal of this quasi-consumer choice at the meso-
level is generally removed from the macro-level. The devolution of decision-making 
from central government to local health authorities has the advantage of avoiding the 
public perception that lack of patient choice is national policy. Blame lies with local 
administrators, whose decisions are subject to judicial review for their lawfulness 
and transparency. National policies of developing personal healthcare budgets are 
further evidence that any lack of consumer choice at the local level is not due to the 
local administration of national policies but of their own making. Also consistent 
with this analysis is the response by the current coalition government to the 
recommendations regarding the use of homeopathy in the NHS by the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee.
1240
 Rather than accepting the 
recommendations of its own Chief Scientific Adviser to stop endorsing homeopathy 
on the NHS, decisions on the appropriateness and availability of homeopathy were 
left to be made at the micro- and meso-levels between doctor, PCT and patient. The 
overriding reason for the NHS provision of homeopathy was that homeopathy 
provides patient choice.  
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As the thesis has emphasised, consumer choice is the interpretation of the right of 
patients to receive healthcare in another EU Member State, and to be reimbursed by 
their healthcare system. This consumer right has been established in a series of 
judgments of the European Court of Justice which interpreted elective cross-border 
healthcare as an economic service within the meaning of the Treaty. The Court held 
in Watts that these rights of free movement to access cross-border healthcare and 
claim reimbursement of the cost of treatment from the ‘home’ Member State also 
apply to publicly funded healthcare systems such as the NHS.
1241
 The UK 
government’s argument that the NHS did not provide services for remuneration was 
rejected, despite the fact that the connection between medical services and the 
remuneration for these services is indirect. The right of consumers in the ECJ’s 
mobility case law has extended to a right to access not only orthodox medicine but 
also CAM, which is generally not routinely funded in EU Member States.  
Although the interpretation of choice as consumer choice in the EU market coincides 
with the government’s enthusiasm for patient choice domestically, and EU cross-
border mobility has clearly helped the consumer choice agenda,
1242
 the UK 
government’s support for the expansion of EU healthcare competency by the ECJ is 
not wholehearted. The creation and expansion of patients’ rights to NHS-funded 
treatment in other EU countries caused legal uncertainty and instability in the 
English NHS originating from outside the UK. The lobbying in Brussels by the UK 
government to contain the wider ramifications of the patient mobility case law, 
resulting in the EU Directive on cross-border healthcare, is clearly evidence of 
governmental concern. However, as the thesis argues, policy-makers’ promotion of 
patient choice within the English NHS needs to be viewed as part of the national 
political agenda of the government.  
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Choice as a policy mechanism 
The meanings attributed to patient choice in policy documents and at the micro- and 
meso-levels of the healthcare service range from liberal choice to consumer choice. 
As the research has argued, the policy-makers’ patient choice rhetoric may, 
however, also be open to different interpretations. Thus, patient choice has been 
interpreted and criticised as a proxy for competition, efficiency, marketisation and 
possible privatisation policies. The more recent policies of personalisation and 
responsibilisation have been similarly challenged since giving patients choice and 
making them responsible for their choices can be viewed as a technique to reduce 
costs while embedding a market-based model in the NHS.
1243
 However, as the 
research has suggested, the management of costs through personalisation and the 
concurrent responsibilisation of patients within the NHS need not necessarily be a 
policy concentrated exclusively on the extension of a market model. After all, 
market mechanisms have not been the most efficient means to achieve cost savings 
in the NHS. Rather, as the research has pointed out, the policy of patient treatment 
choice, via its link with responsibilisation, has enabled policy-makers to claim a 
commitment to the traditional values of the NHS, in particular that of solidarity, 
whereas a commitment to the value of equity, although asserted by New Labour, 
may be more tenuous.  
The research has argued that the policies of treatment choice, personalisation and 
responsibilisation, instead of being viewed as a coherent theme or narrative in 
developing a market model in healthcare, are employed by policy-makers as 
strategies with specific political objectives.
1244
 The patient choice policies are used 
as a mechanism by government to encourage destabilisation of the institutions of the 
NHS considered resistant to change with the motivation which drives the choice 
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agenda including, amongst others, concern for cost containment, quality 
improvement, greater responsiveness and administrative modernisation.
1245
  
The concept of destabilisation 
The theme of destabilisation links the interpretation of choice at the micro- and 
meso-levels with the macro-level interpretation as a policy mechanism. The notion 
of destabilisation is borrowed from Sabel and Simon’s concept of ‘destabilisation 
rights’1246 but, rather than referring to rights, destabilisation has been used as 
describing the possible, unintended ramification of threatened or actual litigation 
over treatment choice by patients at the micro- or meso-level. In contrast, at the 
macro-level, as has been argued, the destabilisation of the government’s patient 
choice policy reflects a strategy aimed at system reform.  
Destabilisation at the micro-level 
The research has suggested that private law litigation or threatened litigation by 
patients against doctors, either in tort and human rights law for failure to provide the 
desired treatment or in negligence for their lack of informed choice, while rarely 
realising the desired choice, has other effects. Following Sabel and Simon, I have 
argued that the common law operates not only as a system of dispute resolution with 
precedential effects but has wider potential ramifications.
1247
 Rather, as has been 
suggested, although patients rarely win informed consent cases or cases dealing with 
the demand for specific treatment by the patient, an action in common law is not a 
self-contained action between the immediate parties but has the effect of 
destabilising the status quo with an effect on healthcare practices and regulations. 
Taking the example of informed consent claims, destabilisation can be demonstrated 
by the frequent revisions of the medical practice guidance by the GMC reflecting a 
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higher standard of disclosure than that demanded by the law. Thus, as the research 
has concluded, even if informed consent cases have rarely resulted in an award of 
damages, litigation has provided a much-needed stimulus to greater debate about 
patients’ informational needs. The destabilising effects of litigation seen at the 
micro-level are even more apparent in the case of public law litigation at the meso-
level. 
Destabilisation at the meso-level 
The research demonstrates that the individual patient applying to a health authority 
to fund low-priority treatment on the basis of exceptionality is rarely successful. The 
definition of the exceptionality criteria emerging from judicial review case law is in 
very general and ambiguous terms,
1248
 causing uncertainty for health authorities. 
However, as judicial review proceedings involve considerable expenditure by PCTs 
in terms of finances and staff time devoted to the case, it has been suggested that 
health authorities may concede an individual funding request, particularly where the 
treatment costs are not high, simply to avoid the expense of court proceedings
1249
 
and a negative outcome for the PCT, which would set a precedent leading to more 
potential claims.  
As I have argued, where judicial review proceedings are brought against the health 
authority, litigation and adjudication have implications beyond the parties before the 
court, implications for health authorities generally and for potential future litigants. 
Judgments in public law cases, apart from being costly and time-consuming for a 
health authority and setting new precedents, have wider ramifications. The need for 
transparency by the health authority, the need to account for its rationing decision in 
public, and the media involvement in such cases opens the system to broader 
interests and voices. The research has suggested that the destabilising effect of 
public law litigation surpasses that of private law litigation. Following Sabel and 
Simon, public law litigation leads to public engagement, deliberation and 
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negotiation
1250
 and may lead to a restructuring of practices in the defendant and 
other institutions. This destabilising effect is likely to be further encouraged in view 
of the government’s personalised healthcare agenda and the rolling out of personal 
healthcare budgets.  
Similarly, as I have argued, legal uncertainties created by the patient mobility 
jurisprudence of the ECJ led to contained national implementation
1251
 with 
directions and guidance by the Department of Health to NHS commissioners 
regarding the authorisation and reimbursement arrangements for NHS patients 
seeking treatment under the cross-border rules. To end legal uncertainty and to 
reduce the possibility of legal challenge from patients, the Patient Mobility 
Directive, a partial codification of the ECJ jurisprudence was adopted in January 
2011 by the EU Member States to be transposed into national legislation by October 
2013. Although EU patient mobility fits with the current government’s domestic 
patient choice agenda, the need for restabilisation must be seen from the perspective 
of a government wishing to circumscribe patients’ rights imposed by the expansive 
interpretation of the freedom of movement provisions of the TFEU by the ECJ. As 
has been suggested, while UK policy-makers may wish to employ patient choice as a 
mechanism for destabilisation within their own national healthcare system, the 
destabilising effects of the ECJ case law raised concerns about expanding EU 
competencies as well as about its anticipated negative effects on solidarity and 
equity within the English NHS.
1252
  
Although the new Directive is expected to lead to clearer guidance for patients, 
administrators and healthcare professionals, the research has argued that 
uncertainties as to its likely impact remain, with possible legal challenges against 
local health authorities leading to further destabilisation at the meso-level. The main 
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obstacle for a patient wishing to access NHS-funded CAM in another EU Member 
State would be the existence of a clearly defined NHS benefit basket which excluded 
CAM altogether. However, as the research suggests, the establishment of precise 
national or local lists of included and excluded treatments to reduce the risk of legal 
challenge is doubtful. Such lists are not only complex to develop, even if based on 
cost-effectiveness criteria alone.
1253
 More importantly, local lists would fetter the 
administrative discretion of NHS commissioners and conflict with the underlying 
values of the NHS, while national lists are anathema to the government’s patient 
choice policy. An undefined healthcare benefit basket will, however, cause renewed, 
albeit more constrained, instability, and this may well be in line with current 
government initiatives.  
Destabilisation as political intention of patient choice policy 
In contrast with the destabilising effects of actual or potential legal challenge at the 
micro- and meso-levels, the research has suggested that destabilisation at the macro-
level is a consequence of the government’s patient (treatment) choice policy. Thus, 
as has been argued, patient treatment choice, personalised healthcare and personal 
health budgets can be interpreted as proxies for instability as a dynamic of system 
reform.
1254
 The policy of the current coalition government of extending primary care 
provision to include ‘any qualified provider’ similarly leads to volatility. 
Commissioning services within the NHS such as CAM which are currently outside 
the scope of NHS provision, and commissioning services from providers not 
previously employed by the NHS, is likely to encourage reorganisation in the 
primary care sector. The provision of such services is clearly driven by consumer 
demand, but at the same time policy-makers’ patient choice policy is useful as a 
strategy to encourage wider-ranging institutional change in the NHS.  
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Destabilisation and the reconfiguration of a space for CAM within the 
NHS 
As the research has suggested, destabilisation and volatility in the primary care 
sector, together with consumer demand, policies of personalised healthcare and the 
concurrent responsibilisation of the patient, might reconfigure the space for the main 
CAM modalities within the NHS. This is despite the challenges for patient choice 
and patient treatment choice at the micro- and meso-levels. The link between 
policies of patient (treatment) choice and personalisation of healthcare with 
responsibilisation, which also underlies CAM with its emphasis on self-management 
and self-care, fits with a reconfigured space for CAM. The depreciation of the 
claims to expertise by orthodox medical practitioners which has occurred in general 
practice,
1255
 and the changing relations between complementary and orthodox 
medicine, which are becoming noticeable, go to underline the emergence of a 
medical pluralism in the NHS. More extensive incorporation of CAM in health 
service provision has of course also been aided by the change in the special 
relationship between the state and the medical profession since 1990, and the 
regulation of the professions of osteopaths and chiropractors by Acts of Parliament. 
The current restructuring of expertise in general practice may be a populist move, 
particularly regarding patients suffering from intractable chronic conditions not 
amenable to cure by conventional medicine. The greater incorporation of CAM in 
public health service provision may also aid the drive for fiscal austerity because of 
the potentially lower cost of CAM, the reduced need for medical personnel
1256
 and 
the reduced dependency on the NHS by the ‘responsibilised’ consumer. 
Incorporation of CAM may also allow a reformulation of the meaning of the 
‘comprehensiveness’ of the NHS. However, it is unlikely to placate the opponents of 
CAM whose concern is the unproven effectiveness and potential safety of these 
treatment modalities ignored by the government’s choice agenda. 
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Although this research is concerned with the effect of government choice policy on 
the availability of CAM within the NHS, the research has wider implications.  These 
extend beyond the case study of CAM and beyond the availability of treatments 
designated as low-priority by PCTs.  The public increasingly demands choice in 
public services, not only choice in healthcare.  References to choice by policy-
makers are also not limited to the healthcare arena but cover other welfare services, 
and EU policy coordination supports this domestic choice agenda.  
 
Further research  
With the establishment of the new clinical commissioning groups in April 2013, 
there is a need to examine the actual impact of the expansion of the primary care 
sector to include new providers, and to investigate what extent this expansion will 
include CAM providers. It also remains to be seen whether patients will be able to 
access these new services directly or whether referral to other ‘qualified’ providers 
will be via the GP. The effect on patient treatment choice of the change from the 
current PCTs to CCGs is also not clear at present. Equally, the impact of the 
transposition of the Patient Mobility Directive into national law by October 2013 on 
the informational rights of patients regarding different treatment modalities 
nationally and in other EU countries will require further investigation. The effect of 
the Patient Mobility Directive on patient choice domestically remains to be seen, as 
patients may well be able to claim treatment domestically from the new CCGs rather 
than obtain cross-border treatment. 
  
251 
 
Appendix 1 
 Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ANH artificial nutrition and hydration 
BMA British Medical Association 
BMI body mass index 
BMJ British Medical Journal 
CAM complementary alternative medicine 
CCG Clinical Commissioning Group 
DG SANCO Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs  
DG Markt Directorate General Internal Market and Services 
DHA   District Health Authority 
DNR Do Not Resuscitate 
EBM evidence-based medicine 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EDTA ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid; a crystalline acid that acts as a strong 
chelating agent and forms a sodium salt used as an antidote for metal 
poisoning and as an anticoagulant. 
EU European Union 
FDA Food and Drug Administration 
GMC General Medical Council 
GP general practitioner 
HB haemoglobin 
HER2-positive 
breast cancer 
breast cancer that tests positive for a protein called human epidermal 
growth factor receptor 2, which promotes the growth of cancer cells 
HRA Human Rights Act 
IFR individual funding request 
IVF in-vitro fertilisation 
JAMA Journal of the American Medical Association 
NEJM New England Journal of Medicine 
NHS National Health Service 
NICE National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
PCT Primary Care Trust  
QALY quality-adjusted life year 
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RCT randomised controlled trial 
TAG technology appraisal guidance 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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